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For the Europe of tomorrow,
dedicated to the Europe of yesterday.
As supporter of intercultural open-mindedness
and
opponent of stereotyping and prejudice.
As European.




The tragedy of World War II led to the creation of the European Union, still in its in-
fancy in the 1950 s, but throughout the years continuously developing to an economi-
cally and politically integrated supranational entity. In its construction, the Single
Market is unique worldwide, offering its citizens free movement within a borderless
Union. The European consciousness of being ‘united in diversity’ is based on com-
mon European roots, however, the effects of globalization impact the ‘European dis-
trict’ as part of 21st century’s ‘global village.’
The consequences of the self-immolation of a Tunisian salesman in December
2010 were unpredictable. The incident, which was primarily seen as an isolated act of
protest against local authorities after humiliating treatment and the interdiction to
continue selling his vegetables on the market, can be declared as trigger for a move-
ment referred to as ‘Arab Spring,’ leading to a massive spill-over effect within the Arab
world. By questioning the legitimacy of the leading class, aspirations for freedom and
democracy were embraced in the created unity of pan-Arab sentiments. The echo of
protest roared across countries dominated by autocratic regimes, resulting in ‘an end
for the era of longstanding dictators like Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia) and
Muammar Al Gaddafi (Libya)’ (Campante/Chor, 2012). The escalation and destabi-
lization in Syria as result of the Arab Spring, the development of religious militant
groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, as well as the turmoil and ongo-
ing conflict in the Arab World, are issues now omnipresent within the Single Market.
Globalization has affected the rapidness of data exchange, and terrorist organizations
have perfected psychological warfare using the media and plenty of their advantages
to recruit online. The threat of religiously oriented terror, formerly perceived a ‘Mid-
dle Eastern’ issue, has now entered the Union’s borders. The anonymity and perceived
coincidence of this new conduct of war frightens a secular, pluralistic and open soci-
ety founded on the ideals of peace and stability.
The last years, and especially 2015, were characterized by a massive influx of mi-
grants crossing the Union’s external borders seeking for asylum. The unpredictability
and intensity of even secondary movements caused Europe’s citizens’ fear of getting
swamped, resulting in member states’ sealing off or reintroduced border controls.
Striving for humanitarian aid, the EU is accused of neglecting the interests of its own
citizens, which leads to gradually growing right-wing parties at the national level, in-
citing and provoking hatred between cultures, religions and ethnical backgrounds. Il-
legal migration, fear of unemployment, exploitation of social welfare systems, foreign
infiltration and increased terrorist attacks shape the changed attitude towards for-
eigners, refugees and migrants in Europe. The European Union is on the move, and
for predicting Europe’s future, it is essential to evaluate the EU’s handling of the cur-
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rent situation and its probability to demonstrate closed unity in relation to the
question of how to cope with the crisis. World and geopolitics are complicatedly in-
tertwined, as conflicting interests of individuals, organizations and nations dominate
and governmental decisions influence world citizens on an increasingly personal lev-
el. The current innovative digital era facilitates communication and exchange over
large distances, yet it has no impact on global in-depth understanding of foreign cul-
tures. Time shows that the created awareness of cross-cultural differences indicates
the trend of a revival of own traditional values, and increasingly often the citizens’ will
demonstrates a reversion from previously favored ‘global’ or ‘supranational’ into ‘na-
tional’ orientation.
The paper is examining legal aspects as well as security and intercultural issues in
order to provide an overall picture of the situation. It is necessary to profoundly un-
derstand the origin and development of the turmoil during the Arab Spring, its im-
pact and influence on Europe as value community, continent and supranational enti-
ty. The ongoing crisis goes beyond the scope of humanitarian aid and responsibility
for the life of the individual, as the impact of this crisis has far-reaching implications
for the future of the Union as ‘Europe of tomorrow.’ Aiming to describe Europe’s fu-
ture path, the paper will identify challenges for selected topics and offer recommen-
dations. Sensitive issues will be addressed, as these rough times demand honesty and
straight forwardness in order to provide sustainable solutions.
Disclaimer: today’s intermingled geopolitics requires the examination of multiple
aspects in order to draw conclusions. Especially in a pluralistic society, every perspec-
tive has to be objectively illuminated without prejudice to culture, religion or ethnical
origin. The role of the West should not be underestimated in the rise and fall of Mid-
dle Eastern regimes and also in the development of terrorist organizations pursuing
anti-Western propaganda. This paper is not about the apportionment of blame nor
about recriminations, but about a display of the causes and drivers of the Arab Spring
with lasting impact on the European Union, as well as an analysis of challenges the
EU is facing as result of the refugee crisis and the increasingly global threat of terror-
ism. The Arab perspective on backgrounds, supporters and financiers of militant
groups in the Middle East including affiliates is left out, however, the content of the
investigation is not one-sided, nor in favor of a certain perspective. In contrast, the
author aims to illuminate the issue from all angles in order to facilitate the reader’s
understanding of the current topic. The research paper is not a political thesis, nor
does it imply the expression of any opinion as political statement.




This research paper aims to provide an overall picture of the development of the
European Union under the influence of the Arab Spring, the refugee crisis and the
global threat of terrorism by providing a selected analysis on legal, security and inter-
cultural aspects. Challenges arise from external geopolitical affairs triggering e.g. se-
curity concerns as well as European citizens’ fear of foreign infiltration and cultural
struggle. The paper defines the multiple challenges across different areas, portrays
how the EU is coping with the crisis and provides recommendations on major topics.
The Union is a supranational entity consisting of 28 member states. Covering all
perspectives on legal codes, ongoing intercultural debates and challenges as well as in-
depth analyses of political movements would go beyond the scope of this paper. For
obvious reasons, the Federal Republic of Germany is therefore exemplarily used and
examined according to the methodological approach explained below. The thesis is
based on qualitative and quantitative data, however, exclusively secondary data has
been used for the research.
The research paper is primarily built on two equivalent pillars, aiming to facilitate
the reader’s understanding of complex national and geopolitical processes by provid-
ing background knowledge on the ‘European Union’ and the ‘Arab Spring’ in chapters
3 and 4. The paper introduces the topic to the reader by explaining the structure,
functioning and development of the EU, starting from its early beginnings and
progress until today, reaching a high economic and political integration as suprana-
tional entity. Roles and tasks of European institutions are defined and the Union’s
goals are portrayed in order to comprehend the purpose of a united Europe. As sec-
ond pillar, the paper illuminates the backgrounds and uprising of the Arab Spring, as
well as the roots of pan-Arab sentiments, in order to understand the drivers of the
movement. The spill-over effect of the Arab Spring is examined to create an in-depth
understanding of the ‘refugee crisis’ and the ongoing turmoil, which is still causing
people to flee. The examination demands further investigation of the role of interna-
tional, religiously oriented terrorism as global threat and the significance of Western
imperialism, root for ingrained anti-Western sentiments, yet often neglected in the
overall portray.
In Chapter 5, the paper aims at identifying diverse challenges the EU is facing to-
day, including the impact of globalization, a partially perceived heteronomy and the
debate on compatibility of oriental and occidental value systems resulting in a shift to
the political right across the European Union. In a time of globally acting terrorist or-
ganizations and citizens’ increasing doubts about the Union’s capability to guarantee
internal security, the EU is challenged to balance supranational and national as well as
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external and internal interests to sustainably guide and cope with the situation on the
innate ground of European values.
Chapter 6 focuses on legal aspects by connecting the process of European integra-
tion to the development of the Schengen area and by defining the tasks of Frontex as
European border management. Legal aspects concerning the refugee crisis are dis-
cussed by the exemplary portrayal of Germany’s Aliens and Asylum Law. The chapter
does not assert a claim to be exhaustive, as there are many more details and constella-
tions that might be considered when discussing Asylum Law, but the overview pro-
vides the necessary background to understand the complexity and the difficulties dur-
ing the ongoing crisis.
As result of the increased level of religiously motivated terrorism in the 21st cen-
tury, chapter 7 defines ‘terror’ and what the author refers to as ‘terror 2.0,’ focusing on
the unpredictability and anonymity of today’s terrorism as global threat. An analysis
of previous terrorist attacks and a demarcation from domestically acting groups striv-
ing for independence gives the reader an overall view of the current challenge the EU
is facing with reference to ideologically motivated jihadist violent terror organizations
operating across the Union including the lone wolf phenomenon.
Chapter 8 continues to point out challenges with focus on the intercultural per-
spective. Multiculturalism, intercultural compatibility and perceived threats arising
from the fear of foreign infiltration prevail in some parts of the Union. The challenge
is to understand one’s own values and traditions before aiming to balance a variety of
value systems and to find a sustainable solution for conflicting traditions and conduct,
while sticking to the own roots and identity as value community and entity referred to
as ‘Europe.’ Sensitive issues have to be addressed in order to provide an overall picture
of the diverse parties involved in these debates.
Chapter 9 portrays the multiple repercussions the Union is suffering from e.g.
emerging nationalism and electoral success of the right-wing, resulting in proposals
for urgently needed development in order to improve the Union’s ability to act and its
efficiency. The paper concludes by giving a European outlook and by summing up the
results in a final conclusion.
Note: the current crisis is referred to as ‘refugee crisis,’ however, the number of
economic migrants and social welfare seekers, willingly abusing the humanitarian cri-
sis in order to gain personal benefits from European social states, has to be kept in
mind. Therefore, the crisis is also referred to as ‘migrant crisis,’ as not all individuals
arriving in the Single Market are ‘refugees’ according to the definition of the Geneva





Apart from the myth about the Phoenician princess ‘Europa’ abducted by Zeus and
eponym of today’s continent, the idea of a separated Europe did not evolve before the
development of national identities. Before the Reformation, Europe was solely used as
geographical term. A new awareness of Europe developed through the confrontation
with the non-Christian world. Since the discovery of Asia in the 18th century and the
awareness of cultural differences, the term was used to describe a demarcation from
Asian cultures, languages and religions. There was growing urge for an external sepa-
ration, whereby the term itself developed ex negativo, not describing Europe’s affilia-
tion but clearly defining what was not associated with it (Herz/Jetzsperger, 2008).
Historical Background
Europe’s nations desired enduring peace after two perennially lasting World Wars
within just the first half of the 20th century. In 1950, Europe was still struggling to
overcome the devastation of World War II, which had ended in 1945. Dramatic politi-
cal shifts, namely the strategic west-expansion of the Soviet Union, gave rise to a new
level of mutual suspicion between the two blocks of the ‘communistic East’ and the
‘capitalist West,’ resulting in a period known as Cold War, which then dominated the
continent for the following decades. In order not to be subjected to the arbitrariness
of Soviet power, Western Europe understood the urgency of ‘European integration’
(see Glossary) (Homewood, 2014).
In the ‘Schuman Declaration,’ drafted by Jean Monnet (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015),
the French foreign prime minister Robert Schuman proposed on 9 May 1950 to place
the Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common High Authority of
an organization open to the participation of other European countries (Schuman,
1950). This ‘sectoral integration’ (see Glossary) (Homewood, 2014) should be the base
for lasting preservation of peace, as by pooling the industries ‘on cooperation with
shared institutions controlling war key resources’ (Glencross, 2014: 51), a conflict
should ‘not [be] merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’ (Schuman, 1950). Be-
lieving in unity, the Schuman Plan was the factual basis for the establishment of the
‘European Coal and Steel Community,’ set up in 1951 by the ‘Treaty of Paris’ and
signed by the six founding members France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy,
Luxembourg and Belgium. The ECSC Treaty defined the creation of an internal or





with decision-making power (Homewood, 2014). Reflecting Schuman’s vision, the in-
tegration should maintain peace, help to improve the living standard of workers in
the coal and steel industry and increase stability. Further goals were defined, such as
the development of the African continent and the promotion of peaceful achieve-
ments (Schuman, 1950).
Further Development of the Union
Starting with a sectoral integration by signing the Treaty of Paris or ‘ECSC Treaty’ in
1951, the EU developed to a ‘European Economic Community’ (1957) (Kenealy/
Peterson, 2015) with the Treaties of Rome, referring to the ‘EEC and Euratom Treaty,’
incorporating a common external customs tariff for goods entering the EU and free
movement of goods (Homewood, 2014). The Single European Act of 1986 was set up
to remove the last remaining physical and technical barriers to trade (Staab, 2011)
and restrictions on free competition until 1992 in the ‘1993 Objective’ to complete the
‘internal market’ (see Glossary) (Homewood, 2014).
The Treaty of Maastricht, which is also referred to as ‘Treaty on European Union’
(acronym: TEU), actually created the EU (Hummer, 2010), as it was ‘more than just
an amending Treaty,’ but the Union’s economic integration (Homewood, 2014: 5)
making the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ (see Glossary) more visible (Laursen, 2012) (see
Annex A: Treaty of Maastricht). The ‘European Community’ was renamed to ‘Euro-
pean Union,’ ‘reflecting the closer nature of member state’s relationship with one an-
other’ (Staab, 2011: 21) and the lack of democratic credibility was complemented by
numerous institutional innovations (Staab, 2011). The Treaty came into force in 1993
and changed the existing three-pillar structure (see Annex B: Three-Pillar Structure of
the Union). The Treaty gave European citizens uniform rights and citizenship values
(Staab, 2011). The TEU expanded the scope of European integration (Laursen, 2012)
and underlined the strong relationship between Europe and its citizens by conferring
free movement rights across the Union based on granted European citizenship to the
member state’s citizens in addition to national citizenship (Article 9 S. 2+3 TEU). EU-
citizens got freedom to move, work and study anywhere in the internal market, which
defines an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, per-
sons, services and capital is ensured (Article 26 (2) TFEU).
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 strengthened EU citizens’ rights even more, as
the Union confirmed its devotion to democracy, freedom, respect for human rights
and the rule of law (Schmidt, 2002). However, the Amsterdam Agenda was already
partially pre-defined by choices made in Maastricht. Therefore, it is rather a conse-
quence than a development and has to be seen as extension of Maastricht (Van-
hoonacker, 2012). Asylum and immigration policy were shifted from an intergovern-
mental to a supranational level under the Treaty of Amsterdam, whereby this policy
area was removed from the field of security policy (Naßmacher, 2013). In 2003, the
Treaty of Nice entered into force, primarily designed to cope with the institutional
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impact of a historical enlargement (Sbraiga, 2012) by the accession of new member
states (Homewood, 2014).
The European political integration was reached in 2007 with the Treaty of Lisbon,
renaming ‘Community’ to ‘Union’ and using the TEU and the ‘Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union’ (acronym: TFEU), including the Protocols and the
‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU’ (adopted in 2007) (see Glossary), having
the same legal value as the Treaties (Article 6 (1) TEU), as primary source of EU law,
which was acknowledged in 2009 and written down in the Preamble. In total, EU law
consists of primary law, secondary law including legislative acts (regulations (Article
288 para. 2 TFEU), directives (Article 288 para. 3 TFEU), decisions (Article 288 para.
4 TFEU) and recommendations (Article 288 para. 5 TFEU)) and non-legislative acts
(Article 290 TFEU) as well as tertiary law, in fact the case law of the Court of Justice
of the European Union. There is no EU constitution, but EU primary law is seen as
‘quasi constitution,’ since it is based on the rule of law. The member states voluntarily
and democratically approve all actions and confer competences to the EU as ‘Master
of the Treaties’ (Herdegen, 2015), determining the legal framework for EU institu-
tions, empowered then to pass secondary law (Homewood, 2014). The Union’s com-
petences are limited, based on the ‘principle of conferral’ (Article 5 (1+2) TEU) (see
Glossary). The use of transferred competences is governed by the principle of sub-
sidiarity and the ‘principle of proportionality’ (see Glossary).
Process of Enlargement
Pursuing the idea that national states join the community in the process of ‘enlarge-
ment’ (see Glossary), which was already suggested by Schuman in 1950, the Union
follows several principles for imposing requirements on candidate countries before
the accession treaty is signed (Homewood, 2014).
In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council defined the accession criteria, known
as ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ (see Glossary), which any country wishing to become a
member state of the Union must meet for admission: political and economic criteria
as well as the implementation of the acquis (European Commission, 2016 a). There-
inafter, a potential candidate country must guarantee democracy, the rule of law, hu-
man rights, respect for and protection of minorities and a functioning market econo-
my (Eur-Lex, 2016). The Copenhagen Criteria are used to double-check the country’s
potential to become a member state of the EU. As conditional the accession country
also has to accept and integrate the ‘acquis communautaire’ (see Glossary) in national
law before the accession treaty is signed (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015). The term refers to
the total set of obligations and rights that emerged and have been passed in the Euro-
pean legislation process since 1951, including for example Treaties, EU legislation and
case law developed by the Court of Justice in national legislation (Staab, 2011).
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Institutions of the European Union
The European Council is located in Brussels (European Union, 2014), defining the
political direction and priorities (Article 15 (1) S. 1 TEU) as major policy-making or-
gan (Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011). Its members are the 28 head of member states, the
president of the European Council and the president of the European Commission
(Article 15 (2) S. 1 TEU). The president of the European Council is representing the
Union externally (Article 15 (6) (d) S. 2 TEU). The Council of Ministers represents
the Union at European level (Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011), but does not exercise legis-
lative functions (Article 15 (1) S. 2 TEU). The leaders define further steps for EU de-
velopment in consensus when meeting on the summit twice every six months (Euro-
pean Union, 2014).
The European Parliament is seated in Strasbourg, although it works from Brussels
and Luxembourg, too. The 751 Members of Parliament are directly elected by the citi-
zens of all 28 member states (Article 14 (2) S. 1+2 TEU), whereby the seats are allo-
cated according to their share of EU population (European Union, 2014). The Parlia-
ment is the only EU-institution directly elected, and as multinational parliament with
significant powers it is unique in the world (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015). The institution
exercises legislative and annual EU-budgetary functions jointly with the Council and
influences EU-spending (Article 14 S. 1 TEU). The Parliament’s approval is needed to
appoint a new Commission, and the president of the Commission is elected by the
Parliament (Article 14 (1) S. 3 TEU). Tasks are, inter alia, to examine citizens’ peti-
tions and to monitor the Council’s work as ‘voice of the people’ through direct repre-
sentation of EU citizens (Article 10 (2) TEU) (European Union, 2014).
The Council was developed as primary European decision-making body (Ke-
nealy/Peterson, 2015), working from Brussels and Luxembourg (European Union,
2014), and shares legislative power and annual EU-budget planning with the Euro-
pean Parliament (Article 16 (1) S. 1 TEU). The institution represents the member
states on a ministerial level consisting of officials, each representing an EU member
state (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015). The Council is responsible for policy coordination of
member states, defining and developing the common foreign and security policy fur-
ther, as well as for concluding international agreements with non-EU countries and
organizations (European Union, 2014).
The European Commission is a politically independent institution devoted exclu-
sively towards the interests of the EU (Article 17 (1) S. 1 TEU). The 28 Commission-
ers, one from each member state, with independence beyond doubt (Article 17 (3)
S. 2 TEU), work in Brussels (European Union, 2014) and are supposed to do their
work independently (Article 17 (3) S. 3 TEU). The Commission, as ‘Engine of the
Union,’ has the exclusive right to propose legislation to the Parliament and the Coun-
cil to decide on and to enforce EU law as ‘Guardian of the Treaties’ jointly with the
Court of Justice of the European Union (Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011). Supervision and
implementation of policies are also part of the Commission’s task (European Union,
2014). The institution represents the Union’s general interests, which is referred to as
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‘Watchdog Function’ (Glencross, 2014: 99), while also managing and negotiating in-
ternational trade and cooperation agreements (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015).
The Court of Justice of the European Union is located in Luxembourg (European
Union, 2014) and consists of 28 judges, one from each member state (Article 19 (2)
S. 1 TEU). Assisted by eleven Advocates General (Article 19 (2) S. 2 TEU + Article
252 S. 1 TFEU with effect from 7 October 2015), the Court is responsible for ensuring
the correct interpretation and application of EU legislation across the member states
(Article 19 (1) S. 2 TEU). The Union’s judicial branch’s judges enjoy full independence
in order to carry out their work properly (Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011). The legal institu-
tion includes the Court of Justice, which deals with preliminary rulings, the General
Court ruling on inter alia actions for annulment and the Civil Service Tribunal, a spe-
cialized court dealing with disputes arising between civil servants and the EU
(Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011). Besides setting diverse tasks, the areas of jurisdiction
forming the core of the European Court’s activities are reviewing the legality of acts,
establishing infringements ((1) Article 258, 259 + 260 TFEU + Article 4 (3), 17 (1)
S. 2+3 TEU (against a member state); (2) Article 263 + 265 TFEU (against an EU in-
stitution: annulment and failure to act)) and giving preliminary rulings (Article 19 (3)
(b) TEU + 267 TFEU).
The European Central Bank is based in Frankfurt, managing the monetary policy
and the Euro within the Euro area (European Union, 2014). It is modeled on the in-
dependent German Bundesbank and responsible for formulating the Union’s mone-
tary policy and setting interest rates (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015). Members are the cen-
tral banks within the Euro area, neglecting e.g. Sweden and Denmark, as not all mem-
ber states adopted the Euro as cash currency. The ECB’s task is to maintain monetary
stability by ensuring stable and low consumer price inflation. The institution decides
independently, without taking instructions from governments or other bodies (Euro-
pean Union, 2014).
The European Court of Auditors, located in Luxembourg, is responsible for
checking the correct use and application of EU funds and for improving the financial
management of the EU. The 28 members, one from each member state, review the
regularity of EU income and expenditure in order to keep the Union efficient and
effective (European Union, 2014).




The Political Shift in the Arab World
Revolutions are vivid movements against the current status quo, not mechanical pro-
cesses characterized by evident development, but a flow of highly unpredictable
events. Causes are manifold, like unexpected transformation, refused change, surpris-
ing incidents, discontentment and stagnation (Kühnhardt, 2012). The beginning of a
peaceful, as well as armed, but always national uprising against authoritarian rule in
several Arab countries started in 2011 and is still ongoing in form of civil wars. These
developments are prominent features of the 21st century, which is characterized by a
high level of globalized elements.
The Arab Spring is considered a new phenomenon due to the revolution within
the field of communication (Abdelbaki, 2013). Technology had an irrefutable role in
shaping the political landscape of the Middle East by contributing to shift the infor-
mation monopoly to a public sphere (DeVriese, 2013). Information and communica-
tion technologies left their mark, as broadcasting possibilities like blogs or chat via the
World Wide Web facilitated to circumvent traditional censorship of state monopolies.
Yet potential manipulation of data, doubts about the authenticity of information and
regular filtration burden the relationship of hostile governments, opponents and the
rest of the world, assailed by a flood of information aiming to draw conclusions (Ben-
mamoun/Morris, 2012).
The Arab Spring – A Spill-Over Effect
The Arab Spring started in January 2011 in Tunisia, where Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali
had ruled since 1987 (Gause, 2011). A series of incidents against the regime were trig-
gered after Muhammad Bouazini had set himself on fire after being interdicted selling
his vegetables in a demeaning way on a Tunisian market in December 2010 (Al-
sharairi/Abubaker, 2016). Turmoil followed, and the Islamist party Nahda succeeded
in first elections in October 2011 but had to resign in 2013. The political crisis was
solved in January 2014, as a final constitution was approved by the parliament. In Oc-
tober 2014, Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of the election winning secular party Nida
Tounes, became president (The Economist, 2016).
Demonstrations and protests followed in early February 2011, leading to a wave
of turmoil spreading over to Libya, where the uprising against Muammar Al Gaddafi,
who had ruled since 1969 (Gause, 2011), started in Benghazi. In August 2011, Tripoli





elections were held, but Islamists started to attack Benghazi and in October 2014 Der-
na was taken over by Jihadists. In February 2015, around the same time that Egypt
started to attack the established terrorist group in Libya, IS took over the Libyan port
Sirte (The Economist, 2016).
First protests in Cairo against President Hosni Mubarak, who had been ruling the
country since 1981 (Gause, 2011), were held in January 2011 (The Economist, 2016).
Political reforms, freedom and elections were demanded in a MENA country with
one of the largest economies. After the resignation of Mubarak in February 2011 and
the takeover of a military council (The Economist, 2016), first elections took place in
November (Alsharairi/Abubaker, 2016). Muhammad Morsi, a candidate from the
Muslim Brotherhood, was elected, but Morsi was overthrown by a military coup in
June 2013 (The Economist, 2016). The Muslim Brotherhood was banned in Septem-
ber 2013. Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, former army chief, won the following presidential elec-
tions in May 2014 (The Economist, 2016).
Further spill-over effects hit Yemen and affected the reign of president Ali Abdul-
lah Saleh, formerly president of North Yemen, later united with South Yemen and in
power since 1978 (Gause, 2011). Saleh promised not to seek re-election and left the
country in November 2011. Al Quaida captured most of Yemen in March 2011, and
after the Houthi Rebels increasingly gained power in late 2014 and IS bombers be-
came more active, a Saudi-led coalition started a still ongoing intervention in March
2015 (The Economist, 2016).
In early March 2011, protests against the status quo started to rise in the military
dominated political landscape of Syria, where the Al Assad family had ruled since
1970 (Gause, 2011). The Baath Party already gained absolute power under Hafez Al
Assad, shifting power to the country’s minority of Alawites, ‘an anomaly in the Arab
world’ (Ajami, 2012). In February 2012, Jabhat fath Al Sham was set up in Syria, and
a rebel-offensive aiming to take over Aleppo started, causing a first exodus of people
seeking refuge elsewhere. The foundation of ISIS rendered the conflict even more in-
tense, and an US-led coalition was initiated to intervene on spot in 2014. At that time,
formal borders had already been removed by the self-named state. Russia and Britain
have carried out air strikes since late 2015, therefore also participating in the ongoing
offensive (The Economist, 2016).
After around five years of Arab Spring, the following figure provides an overview
of the current status quo in the countries presented before as part of the Arab Spring.
Neighboring countries like Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan are also included,
but the movement did not affect these countries in a similar way. The Republic of Al-
geria remained an exception, as untouched by the Arab Spring of 2011, although
neighboring Libya. The country was still recovering from the experience made under
a similar movement in 1988 when, as result of the first free elections in 1990, Islamists
gained power long before this particular threat was even known to the West. The
‘therapeutic coup d’état, of coup as cure from Islamism’ became known for Algeria.
Due to historical experience and fear of regaining Islamist dictatorship as well as 132
years of French presence, the country prevented the desired change by equating
‘democracy’ with ‘chaos’ (Daoud, 2015). In early 2011, Morocco experienced a slight
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uprising of protesters demanding greater social justice, democracy and the restriction
of royal powers under a constitutional monarchy (Bozonnet, 2015). As a consequence
of the Arab Spring, Libya, Yemen and Syria are still settings for ongoing conflicts be-
tween rebels and local regimes, but Syria turned out to be the most internationalized
conflict.









  Democracy   Autocracy / Restricted Democracy 
  Full Autocracy   Failed State / Civil War 
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Source: The Economist, 2016
The previous stability of the dictatorship led countries grounded on two pillars in the
past: military security services and state control, both supporting the ruling regimes
by putting down uprisings and civil wars. It was not foreseeable how military forces
would react during the Arab Spring: siding with the protestors (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia)
or backing the regime (e.g. Libya and Yemen) (Gause, 2011) (see Annex C: The Arab
Spring – A detailed Overview of 2010 – 2016). The Arab Spring is characterized by
high divergences from country to country, as there are divided societies ruled by
regimes representing regional, ethnic or religious minorities like the ruling Alawite
family in Sunni-dominated Syria (Gause, 2011). Examining the affected countries, it
gets obvious that Arabs are not passively accepting authoritarian rule.
Generally, there are wide disparities between Arab countries, as ‘a homogeneous
Arab world is a myth’ (Kühnhardt, 2012). The same applies to the assumption that
Arab societies are stagnant and rather immobile. The reactions to the turmoil that
had originally started in Tunisia are manifold, especially when it comes to criminal
energy and legitimacy (Kühnhardt, 2012). The degree of mobilization has indeed a
special meaning, as it demonstrates the awoken pan-Arab identification. This effect
multiplied across the MENA region and expressed the insurgency aiming for democ-
racy, although the echoed enthusiasm for revolution is limited and not universal with-
Fig. 4.1
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in the Arab world (Lynch, 2011). In contrast to the quest for democratic participa-
tion, voice and inclusion, a trend can be recognized. Countries with hereditary
monarchies like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait have re-
mained unaffected and stable so far. Power-based, traditional legitimacy continues to
play a stabilizing role (Kühnhardt, 2012), but further explanations are not part of this
paper.
Reasons for the Uprising Arab Spring
Revolutions are never deterministic processes, so there is no guarantee if and which
country might be affected next. Strategies to achieve economic growth and to raise
performance through foreign direct investment have been developed long time ago to
pursue employment, trade openness and further access to technology. FDI has risen
with an increasing contribution to the GDP since 2000 and investment reform pack-
ages as well as free trade agreements have improved economic liberalization (Ben-
mamoun/Lehnert, 2016).
The last decades were marked by expansion of schooling, yet the lack of opportu-
nities for the increasingly educated youth best highlights the development of the Arab
Spring. Instability was created, as the desire to participate in the decision-making
process in order to shape the country’s future was raised within the sophisticated so-
cial classes. A correlation between increased education and the likeliness of political
change became apparent, yet corruption, nepotism, questionable press freedom, poor
labor market prospects and GDP per capita were other determinants that triggered
the wish to engage in political decision-making (Campante/Chor, 2012). The created
turmoil, as consequence of the Arab Spring, reflects economic hardship and social dy-
namics (Anderson, 2011: 6). Arab countries are still divided into resource-rich and
resource-poor countries, suffering from autocratic regimes and high unemployment
rates, particularly in North Africa, where social development is still ongoing and
where the Arab Spring can be seen as a wake-up call (Benmamoun/Lehnert, 2016)
(see Annex D: Theory of ‘Imagined Community’ as Trigger for Pan-Arabism).
The Rise of IS and the Significance of Western Imperialism
Several militant Sunni Islamist groups evolved across the region as result of the US-
led invasion of Iraq that had started in March 2003 (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville,
2015). In 2004, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi was setting up a local branch of Osama bin
Laden’s Al Quaida in Iraq (Said, 2014). Unlike bin Laden, the Jordanian Al Zarqawi
followed the idea that Shiite Muslims, due to their belief, were renegades and should
be eliminated. Several demands from bin Laden and his secretary Ayman Al Zawahiri
to change Al Zarqawi’s course failed (Melhem, 2015). In the following years Al Quai-
da founded an umbrella organization called ‘Council of Mujahideen’ grouping diverse
Sunni resistance troops against the occupying forces (Said, 2014).
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In 2006, the Al Quaida subsidiary in Iraq rebranded itself after Al Zarqawi’s death
in an US air strike as ‘Islamic State’ or ‘Al Dawla’ (English: state) under his successor,
Umar Al Baghdadi (Melhem, 2015). The group aimed at territorial expansion and
conquering terrain in order to create a base, founded on Al Zarqawi’s idea and shared
by the successor of Umar Al Baghdadi after his death in 2010. With increasing vio-
lence from the West, IS gained strength, but it was only in 2011 when the organiza-
tion expanded its size and renamed itself again ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham’
(acronym: ISIS) (Melhem, 2015) or ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ (acronym:
ISIL) (Government UK, 2016).
Awwad Ibrahim Ali Al Badri Al Samarrai Al Qurashi alias Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi
(Said, 2014), the new leader of the organization, announced the re-establishment of
the Caliphate under his nom de guerre (Said, 2014) ‘Al Baghdadi’ as Caliph (Melhem,
2015) in the summer of 2014 (Hashim, 2014), after Islamic extremists took over con-
trol of Mosul and Tikrit, now occupying an area equal to the size of the UK (Melhem,
2015). ‘Coming out of nowhere or rising from the ashes of Al Quaida’ (Melhem,
2015), the previously in desert regions dominant violent group became one of the
main threats to global security (Rekawek, 2015).
By 2015, the organization had around 30,000 armed members whereas half of
them were, despite the name, neither Iraqi nor Syrian. The annual income is
around 300 million USD, holding more than 2 billion USD in assets (Rekawek, 2015)
and generating around 1 million USD through poll taxes and extortion daily (Mel-
ham, 2015). The Caliphate is likely to be the richest terrorist group ever. Foreign mili-
tants devote themselves to a purpose, searching for ‘collective identity’ (Rosiny, 2015),
camaraderie or ‘salvation’ (Rosiny, 2015) by the profound belief in defending the Is-
lamic State as state of God on earth (Melham, 2015).
Ideological Roots and IS Backgrounds
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, as IS is also referred to, is an extremist Sunni
Islamist terror organization pursuing jihad-ideology by following an extreme inter-
pretation of Wahhabi Islamism, characterized by anti-Western slogans and the pro-
motion of violence. The aim of the terror group is the creation of an independent
state governed by sharia, imposing rules on people by applying violence and extortion
(Government UK, 2016). The flexible patterns of these low hierarchical organizations
referred to as ‘katiba’ (English: independent task force) are characterized by vassal
structures, all connected to a single commander. Around 7,000 katibas are estimated
to operate in Syria, but only IS became so internationally recognized by attaining
questionable fame (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 23).
The Caliphate is currently redefining the borders of the world map fixed back
then in 1916 by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Despite lacking international recognition,
the attempt to define itself as ‘state’ highlights peculiarities which have to be outlined:
apart from theological ideology, own administration, population and territory, the
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group focuses on economic and political targets which separates the organization
from other militant groups (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015).
‘Islam’ as religion is not identical to the phenomenon of ‘Islamism.’ Islamism roots
in the humiliating experience of the MENA region under the era of Western imperial-
ism. The Arab world is still looking back to the glory of its empires, covering a huge
part of the world back then. Starting in the 17th century, there had been regionally
differing reactions to the state of siege: adoption, refusal and violent rebellion (Neu-
mann, 2015). Jihadists deny Western-made borders, clustering the region into nation-
al states as human-made separation between Muslims, leading to perceived destabi-
lization. The unification of Iraq and Syria is therefore an essential part of IS propagan-
da (Said, 2014). The Islamic State is aiming at a state formation, fostering an expan-
sion strategy for world supremacy. Western democracy, claiming freedom but, ac-
cording to IS, resulting in local quasi-powerlessness of governments, is accused. The
feeling of never-ending oppression by geographical borders imposed by the major
European forces in the early 20th century has awoken the desire under radical Sun-
nites since the 1950 s for a renaissance of a Caliphate (Napoleoni, 2015).
The crucial role of the West in the development of ISIS cannot be neglected. The
intervention in 2003 resulted in a decade of ethnical and religious conflicts. Depres-
sion and disillusion threw a shadow on the region. Boiling energy under the surface
also derived from the feeling of being deceived by local regimes (Napoleoni, 2015).
The attention should be turned towards the bogeyman, the institutions, governments
and powerful private individuals providing logistical and financial support towards
whichever kind of violent group (Rekawek, 2015). As geopolitical matters, enmeshed
political and economic interests of leading nations and accusations of improvable
charges are not necessary for the understanding of this paper, the issue is not argued
further. Also the abuse of a religion for self-defined goals by uprooted meaning ne-
glects the fact that all three monotheistic religions cannot fully be considered peaceful
and that elements of violence and brutality are embedded in all sacred texts. It is
about interpreting and understanding the roots of IS in Islamic tradition, yet these
traditions are placed in a different historical era and deviating culture. The struggle is
to define how and which of these traditions define religion and behavior in the future
(Melham, 2015), but further religious investigation is also excluded from this paper.
The term ‘Tauhid w Al Jihad’ refers to monotheism and jihad (see Annex E: Dif-
ferentiation between ‘Jihad’ and ‘Holy War’) under the assumption that there is no ex-
istence without God’s reign. The re-establishment of a Caliphate refers to the five hun-
dred years of suppression (see Annex F: History of Perceived Sunni Arab Humiliation
and Suppression). The first Caliphate, created after the death of Prophet Muhammad,
is seen as a perfect society led by God. The incarnation of the Caliphate today can
therefore be understood as the return of the golden age of Islam in a time of regional
destabilization and chaos (Napoleoni, 2015). The installment of a Caliph is a political
action including religious legitimacy (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 55). The title
‘Caliph’ supports motivation and is adherent to a role model and triggers inspiration
linked to history (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 50). The contrast to the pre-Is-
lamic ‘jahiliyya’ (English: ignorance, the term refers to the pre-Islamic era that is
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marked by the ignorance of the guidance of God, defined as ‘zindik,’ English: Shia and
non-Muslims as heretics) is a Caliphate. A Caliph is defined as representative of the
Prophet on earth and has religious (Arabic: din) and political authority (Arabic: sul-
tan). The task of a Caliph is to fight ‘fitna’ (English: Islamic term denoting hard times
with increased apostasy and religious schism, which refers e.g. to the U.S. and the Shia).
The IS adherents and the population in IS-occupied territories are bound to the deci-
sions of a Caliph by oath. Without delving deeply into religion, ‘obedience’ is essential,
as according to the Qur’an, ‘disobedience triggers anarchy as synonym for the worst
horror scenario for an Islamist regime’ (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 55), but an
in-depth explanation of this issue is irrelevant for this paper. The correlation between
the establishment of the Caliphate and the threat of ISIS, to comprehend which kind
of violent group actually threatens the Union by causing attacks and what driver is
behind this ideology is essential for understanding the scope of this issue.
The Caliphate is built on several pillars. Ibn Taimiya (1263–1328), a medieval au-
thor of early ‘fatwas’ (English: legal texts) differentiated between good and bad Mus-
lims. In his writings, he refered to Shia as even more dangerous enemy than Chris-
tians and Jews. Ibn Taimiya declared excommunication and outlawed them. Today
the Caliphate uses Taimiya to justify actions against Shia and Syrian Shia-related
Alawites (see Annex G: Islam and its Denominations). IS tries to provoke a govern-
mental overreaction in order to create chaos and to present the organization as re-
sponse to the crisis. This idea was already published by Abu Bajr Naji (*1962) in 2004.
The Egyptian Jihadist is referred to as well when it comes to strategic preparation and
accounts to the path the IS stroke over the last years (Neumann, 2015).
The anachronistic organization currently covers the space from the Mediter-
ranean coast of Syria to the heart of Iraq. The Taliban does not necessarily differ dras-
tically when it comes to bans and imposing restrictions, yet the religious cleansing in
this mission-led aggressiveness is new, not the medieval violence, which is also char-
acteristic for Al Quaida and other armed groups. Despite its opinion and belief re-
garding the legal interpretation and way of life according to the time of the Prophet,
the Caliphate is not per se backwards-looking. Globalization and information tech-
nology are the basis for its penetrating power, differentiating itself from other armed
forces. It is an ‘online-state,’ knowing how to benefit from the advantages and effects
of globalization. But apart from the heroic advertisement and bold distribution of
apocalyptic messages, the leaders remain more or less mysterious and faceless to the
outside (Napoleoni, 2015).
Despite the ‘world’s united efforts to abort IS,’ it turned to be a new model of gov-
ernment, as result of the wave of revolutions across the region. IS, as ‘brutal reproduc-
tion of previous autocratic regimes,’ has survived so far by emphasizing anti-central-
ization. The attraction of the Islamic State might derive from its establishment as
‘state’ with facilitated black-white philosophy, in which ‘local officials seek to regulate
and tax commerce,’ all in contrast to previously known regimes owning the oil-indus-
try and pushing hyper-centralization forward (The Economist, 2016). Despite the on-
line mass campaigns attracting foreign jihadist fighters from around the globe volun-
teering for the Islamic State, it is an illusion to think that the increasing strength of IS
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is more harmful than Al Quaida or Jabhat al Nusra (Waterbury, 2015) (see Annex H:
Number of Terrorist Incidents caused by Major Terrorist Organizations in 2015).
Criticism of Western Approaches
The current events on spot go far beyond simple ‘change,’ but raise a deep-rooted con-
flict about the compatibility of religion and an adequate form of government, as well
as whether a certain state form, namely the interpretation of ‘Western democracy,’ can
successfully be applied everywhere, despite obvious differences in historical develop-
ment and the witness of significant events, shaping the nation and marking its indi-
vidual future. Traditional expectations, formed by the immediate culture, influence
behavior, norms, values and beliefs. The desire for change and the ability to mobilize
should not be misinterpreted with readiness or general susceptibility of a government
form that worked well in an interculturally and historically different developed hemi-
sphere (Gause, 2011).
Arab voices claim that ‘the West only interferes when it serves its interest, not
when it is simply about democracy’ as the Israeli attacks of 2012 against Gaza are still
freshly in mind. Back then, the incident did not trigger a Western alliance to protect
the Palestinian civilians. This led to the assumption that the West had different ap-
proaches, depending on its interests: in Yemen, the threat of Al Quaida gaining power
after a revolution determined the view of a ‘terrorism aspect’ causing an intervention.
In Bahrain, it was more the ‘Iranian aspect’ that mattered. The US has its naval base
near Manama, and the fear of Bahrain-based Shia groups having close relations to
Teheran and their influence on swaying Iran endangered the States. The ‘wait-and-see
approach’ in Syria at the beginning of the turmoil was seen negatively, as well as the
military invention later on, when it became obvious that Jabhat Al Nusra might take
over control after a collapse of the Al Assad regime: a scenario threatening not only
Israel’s security, but also America’s and Europe’s representation of interests in the re-
gion. Discontent was created by the unsteady strategies of the West: interfering or re-
maining on the sidelines despite continuous human right violations in the respective
countries (Metawe, 2013).
Political Outlook
Daring an outlook into the future should not be underestimated, although the ongo-
ing turmoil created woe and conflict in one of the world’s most heated regions, as
imagined, real or exaggerated fear prowls around the Arab World. The West is chal-
lenged by balancing its national interest in the region, while defending human rights
in ongoing spot-interventions. Local religious minorities fear constitutional change
like the implementation of Islamic law under e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
The active use of sharia practice in IS-occupied territories caused a large number of
heterodox persons to seek refuge elsewhere, including the ones referred to as ‘econo-
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mic migrants’ and the ones striving for welfare benefits, thus involving Europe as a
continent, entity and value community in an Arab conflict. The burden of the West is
to take its responsibility from those times when the former colonial powers dominat-
ed several parts of the world, and to settle re-emerging disputes and conflicts with
historical linkage. The Arab Spring turned out to face fanaticism, challenged by de-
fending religious tolerance regarding the resurrection of a Caliphate. Not just the sta-
tus of minorities is in debate but also the question of women’s rights is omnipresent
(El-Issawi, 2011), as some of the Islamic or secular drivers are ‘far away from being
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World War II triggered the common wish of former war opponents for lasting peace
and stability. The idea of a so-called ‘political Catholicism’ developed in the 19th cen-
tury, was harmonized across national borders and facilitated integration later. The na-
tions, characterized by divergences, were seeking similarities by invoking their innate
common ground, leading to a renaissance of Christianity. The universalistic approach
of Christianity helped overcome the post-war discredited pigeon-hole national-state-
border-thinking and resulted in the creation of the EU, which was, however, still in its
infancy in 1950 (Herz/Jetzsperger, 2008). Today the Union is economically and politi-
cally highly integrated (Haller, 2008), but there is still work to do: adopting measures,
issuing frameworks and defining articles that leave too much leeway for interpreta-
tion – deliberately or not.
The Impact of Globalization and the Refugee Crisis
Philosophically spoken ‘change is the only constant’ (Heraclitus of Ephesus, 535 BC)
and in today’s globalized world this is particularly true. The digital age is character-
ized by facilitated data exchange as information is spread around the globe within
seconds. Yet abuse and questions on authenticity and credibility doubts mark the in-
formation era of the 21st century. There has always been war in the history of
mankind, but today it is about its global impact, the far-reaching implications of deci-
sions, governance claims and the influence of societies divided by disagreement. Tur-
moil has broader spill-over effects than possibly conceivable in the 20th century. There
is no escape from the growing flood of information spreading around 24/7 including
the regular updates on previously shared information. This decade prevents a retreat
from current happenings for the individual. More than ever mankind is at the mercy
of the effects of globalization: united in living in a global village. The European Union
faces new challenges, as the complexity of world politics is complicatedly enmeshed,
new threats arise, and globalization is a positively and negatively major responsible in
the way information is perceived by European and world citizens.
The spill-over of the Arab Spring had a far-reaching impact, and the West did not
remain unaffected by the recent developments in the Middle East. The situation for
heterodox people in the region became critical, not just since the Mujahideen de-
clared Shiites as most dangerous enemy for Muslims by comparing the Shia belief to
an ‘axe destroying the pillars of Islam,’ according to Abu Muhammad Al Adani, IS
spokesman (Said, 2014: 103). The fear of terror, violence and persecution resulted in




(Kingsley, 2016). The escalation and destabilization in the region of Syria and Iraq
and the insecurity about a life between moments of silence and clashing airstrikes led
to the biggest wave of migration since World War II, displacing 12 million people at
December 2015 levels (DePillis/Saluja, 2015). The terrorist organization Islamic State
has international and regional supporters, yet the majority of civilians rejects the ide-
ology, acts and behavior of the self-declared state and lives in fear and angst itself.
People turned their backs on home, land and country, hoping for a better future else-
where. The first refugees from the region were registered late in 2011. Due to world-
wide conflicts like the Ukrainian crisis, the Ebola epidemic and the intervention in
Libya, the UN referred to donor fatigue when explaining the decreased European
willingness to donate, stressing the accountability of Middle Eastern neighbors (see
Annex I: GCC’s Denied Access – Understanding the Importance of Cultural Sub-
Clustering in the Effort to Integrate Sustainably). Despite the monetary contribution,
the World Food Program had to shorten means further, which triggered a huge wave
of refugees trying to organize traffickers and paying large sums hoping for a future in
Europe (Gutschker, 2015).
The refugee crisis, as result of turmoil and destabilization of countries across the
region, challenges the European Union in foreign and inner politics on a supranation-
al and on a member states’ level regarding legal, security and intercultural issues. To-
day the Union’s task is to sustainably manage a high influx of people seeking refuge in
the EU: to provide refuge, shelter, integrate and offer a future and to distinguish be-
tween persons in need and terrorists abusing an open-door policy. Several challenges
arouse and the EU’s path will be determined by its reaction to the crisis. Different an-
gles have to be examined in order to fully understand the dimension of the task the
EU and its member states are currently facing, especially as globalization prevents an
individual sealing off on current issues, but demands governments to position by stat-
ing an opinion and acting thereupon, however disagreement prevails.
Perceived Heteronomy from Brussels and Isolation Attempts
Europe as supranational entity is acting on the basis of the principle of conferral,
whereby the member states transfer competences to the EU to act on behalf of their
interests. The competences are transferred democratically and voluntarily. According
to the ‘doctrine of supremacy’ (see Glossary), which is not expressed in the Treaty, EU
law takes precedence over national law. The new legal order has been created in Vand
Gend en Loos (Case 26/62) and is constituted on the basis of the member states’ lim-
iting their sovereignty, but the Union is still acting in limited fields, as only the trans-
fer of competences creates the legal basis to act upon (Homewood, 2014).
Facing the high number of refugees in 2015, the EU decided to distribute at least
160,000 refugees according to a quota. The idea to distribute refugees across the
Union, as Germany, Sweden and Austria were targeted as final destinations in most
cases, aimed at relieving border countries like Greece and Italy (Löwenstein, 2016).
Yet, since the beginning of the refugee crisis in Europe Hungary is continuously fight-
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ing to contain the illegal and Muslim-migrant wave and found an increased number
of supporters after the incident in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015/16 in Germany.
The country held a referendum in October 2016 proclaiming ‘no’ and ‘don’t risk any-
thing’ against the further influx of migrants and in particular against the quota distri-
bution of refugees across the EU (Löwenstein, 2016). Despite the fact that the referen-
dum failed, as only 40% had handed in a valid vote (Kingsley, 2016 a), Victor Orbán,
Hungarian president, still aims at a refugee distribution according to majority vote
(Löwenstein, 2016). Slovakia, another opponent of the idea to distribute refugees
across Europe, aims for flexible solidarity, a concept of monetary support without tak-
ing in refugees (Unknown, 2016 a). The anti-Brussels attitude of some member states
became apparent as the disagreement caused an inability to manage and effectively
proceed further in the ongoing crisis. Hungary’s anti-immigration policy and current
political attitude as extreme EU-critic are classified as attempt for a Christian-nation-
alistic isolation. Orbán refers to the need to protect Hungary’s values as EU values
and urges to defend Europe’s Christian identity (Flanagin, 2015).
The refugee matter is not solely an issue of humanitarian aid and welfare but
could become the turning point of the Union’s stability. Jean-Claude Juncker argued
that solidarity between member states had to be demonstrated voluntarily and could
not be forced (Löwenstein, 2016). The legal framework of the Union also refers to the
importance to promote solidarity among member states as well as economic, social
and territorial cohesion (Article 3 (3) S. 5 TEU), but several states feel exposed to the
decision-making from far-away Brussels (see Annex J: Exclusive and Shared Respon-
sibilities between the EU and its Member States), a term that defines the abstractness
and impenetrability of the perceived exogenous strength. The question raised during
these days is whether all or just some member states will have to accommodate
refugees and also which number will be accepted as limit, referring to the discussed
quota regulation. Financial support excluding the intake of refugees, distribution ac-
cording to majority vote and quasi unlimited intake are scenarios partially present
and partially discussed in the Union (Trenz/Klein, 2013), heating up the debate about
foreign migrants.
The current situation demonstrates a lack of solidarity, and it has even caused a
reversion to nationalism. The perceived deficit of democratic elements in the Union
resulted in discontent among the citizens and generated a mobilization against the
perceived heteronomy of Brussels triggering increased regionalism. This new phe-
nomenon refers to local identity and calls for anti-European movements opposing the
so-called anonymous institutions situated abroad. Creating lasting identity on a Euro-
pean level failed so far, as the desire for democratic local autonomy is particularly
stressed by Europeans these days (Trenz/Klein, 2013).
Throughout the debate, the European population gets the impression that nation-
al and Union interests are conflicting. Combined with a lack of knowledge about the
functioning and structure of the European Union, citizens these days tend to vote
more ‘regional,’ by reverting to nationalism, which results in a radical renunciation of
the EU. The growing right-wing across the Union, the Brexit referendum and the elec-
toral success of the Republican Donald Trump (Hemmer, 2015) are examples of na-
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tions turning back from globalization towards nationalization as result of increased
nationalism. The anonymity, opacity and impenetrability of geopolitical connections
don’t seem to hit the zeitgeist anymore. Today’s world of a global village literally in-
creased the security threat, as the term refers to the connection, linkages and con-
fused political landscape with pre-defined bogeyman, anticipating the idea of a ‘vil-
lage,’ making people revert to their own values and traditions as a secure harbor of
continuity and duration. Many feel left behind, suspended, and others directed by
anonymous institutions not acting transparently, but empowered to make decisions
for 28 member states simultaneously across national differences and cultures. The
Union’s challenge is to make the roots, initial idea, ideals and goals of the suprana-
tional entity accessible to the citizens, and to provide background knowledge about its
work, functioning and structure. Education will prevent false assumptions and defeat
radical movements as a consequence of the above explained.
Political Shift in the European Union
As result of fear of the unknown, the continuously rising right-wing across Europe is
not surprising. Several critical incidents with persons under the status ‘recognized
refugee’ (e.g. rape and drowning of Student Maria L., Freiburg 2016 (Frank, 2016))
and terrorist attacks, undertaken by Sunni Islamist organizations referring to the holy
book of a world religion to justify their acts, frighten the European population. Each
critical incident supports the inflow of right-wing parties, which all proclaim nation-
alism, meaning against a united Europe and enjoy electoral success, as many people
do not feel represented by the moderate center and left political parties anymore. Eu-
rope is split like never before, resulting in the current trend of reversion to national-
ism and political right shift.
The community has to balance the interests of Union’s citizens and the demand of
those who have lost all and arrive in Europe hoping for a better future. It is compre-
hensibly hard to differentiate between the ones in need, demanding refuge, the free-
riders, the forum shoppers (definition: asylum seekers particularly searching for
countries granting generous reception conditions and recognition quota (Hailbron-
ner/Thym, 2016)) and undercover terrorists, secretly entering Europe alongside so
many others. The Union is struggling between the growing calls of EU citizens about
being neglected in the face of the refugee crisis. Politically, this became apparent in
several elections that already took place on member state level. Standing for their
rights as EU citizens, frightened about the future of their country and awaiting an
unpredictable, but potential change, the Union is split between EU supporters and EU
opponents. Economic and cultural doubts arise from the fear regarding foreign infil-
tration, shortened retirement funds and e.g. the adaption of a foreign culture, leading
to public restrictions and limitations of common freedom. Unknowingness of the ori-
ental culture and religion is paired with extremists stressing behavioral attitude, using
the Western tolerant society to pursue the enforcement of intolerant goals like the
Sharia Police Patrol in Germany (The Guardian, 2016). Parallels to the Hisbah, the
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police patrol in charge of morals and values, rooting in the times of the Abbasids and
well established in IS occupied cities and regions (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015:
84), should not be overseen.
The imaginary, real or exaggerated fear of a cultural clash between the Occident
and the Orient within the borders of the Union are tools from dark forces aiming to
weaken and split the EU. An ongoing debate apart from the general questions about
(illegal) migration and refugees is the question about Muslim migrants. Countries
like Hungary made it clear that they disliked the idea to let Muslim migrants settle in
their country, and critical voices proclaim ‘Europe to the Europeans.’ Parallels should
be drawn on time, leaving no scope for religiously as well as ethnically motivated ha-
tred. In the effort to manage the ongoing crisis, while struggling to keep a unified Eu-
rope, the EU is facing a growing right-wing, which makes it hard to differentiate be-
tween trigger, driver and impact of the crisis.
Security Concerns due to Terrorist Attacks Across Europe
Facing the thousands of migrants as well as the illegal migrants crossing the border of
the Union daily, EU citizens question, whether they still enjoy guaranteed safety, as
one of Europe’s priorities is to protect critical infrastructure and to keep a high quality
of life (European Union, 2010: 9, 13) within the internal market. Many of the refugees
started to seek refuge elsewhere due to the sharia concept of ‘jizyah,’ a poll tax on
Christians and heterodox persons living permanently in Muslim territory but wishing
to practice a religion, other than Islam, openly. The tax of around 60 USD has to be
paid monthly and per person, and it created a large number of refugees from Raqqa,
Erbil and Mosul under the 24 hours of a guaranteed advantage of escape from the
threat of death under sharia (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 79). However, a high
number of persons under granted protection became apparent in abusing the tolerant
and open society in Europe or in executing terrorist attacks. Union-opponents take
incidents like Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2016 as an example to claim an urgently
demanded change in policies towards foreigners, migrants and refugees by distin-
guishing between abuse of granted security, asylum and humanitarian aid. Nowadays,
Europe is exposed to a different kind of security threat. Unlike the previously known
terrorist attacks of the separatist-national Basque ‘Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’ and the at-
tacks happening in Turkey, initiated by the ‘Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê,’ Europe now
became the setting for a new threat of terrorism, which is detached from nationalist
movements. The ‘warriors of the Caliphate’ want to destroy Western lifestyle under
the broad definition of Western values. Terrorist attacks, uncoupled from the organi-
zation, but executed by radicalized individuals somewhere across the EU, disregard-
ing nationality, are a fear that is difficult to handle, as unpredictability and anonymity
prevail. Investigations into several incidents and terrorist attacks in Europe discov-
ered the perpetrators’ traceable refugee background, like the bomb attacker from
Ansbach (Syrian refugee) in July 2016 (Meiritz, 2016).
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Security issues are challenges that demand the Union to gain a profound under-
standing of goals and missions from religiously motivated terrorist violent organiza-
tions as global actors. It is essential to focus on understanding the source of the threat,
rather than simply improving border management, while neglecting the clarification
of motives and backgrounds of Jihadists as warriors of the Caliphate. An analysis of
terrorist attacks with jihadist background and a gradation of radicalization are essen-
tial to understand the omnipresent threat of terror in the 21st century.
In the Cross Hairs of Critics – Which Approach to Choose?
Apart from humanitarian aid and donations for human beings, countries refer to cul-
tural compatibility as one of the main EU challenges. The historical conflict between
the Orient and the Occident might experience a revival in the 21st century. Aside
from crusades in Jerusalem, the metaphorical battleground is now within a Union
that defines itself in terms of humanitarian values, which are based on the aim to pre-
vent war. The dominance of religiously rooted conflicts nowadays has to be examined
in order to understand Europe’s change under the ongoing development as a result of
the refugee crisis, displacing local conflicts rooting outside the Union. Politically, a
right shift can be proven, and interculturally increased xenophobia and cultural isola-
tion trigger nationalism in a century in which the world is referred to as ‘global vil-
lage.’ This will probably cause lasting change in existing structures.
Legally, politically and interculturally: the Union is challenged on all levels. Fear,
existing terror, the balancing act between humanitarian aid and proclaiming human
rights, while hazarding the consequences of being slightly abused as a value system
rather than as a Union, keep the EU busy. The high number of people crossing the
Union’s borders daily, including the illegal migrants and disagreement among the
member states on how to deal with the issue led to the delayed ability to act as an
entity. Criticized by third-nations on the discussion about limiting the influx of peo-
ple, while being critically questioned by European citizens about increased security
threats, fear of foreign infiltration and religion keep the Union on the go.
It is not legitimate to claim that all these challenges were easy to manage. Several
conflicts of interests and different ideas about the development and organization of
the Union and its future path are difficult to reconcile on a supranational level. The
uncertainty, resulting from a wait-and-see approach, as well as the inability to act as
an entity due to different aims in the refugee matter, caused some member states to
initiate individual approaches by solely pursuing national interests. The EU’s concept
of dealing with the current situation has to be carefully overthought, especially when
it comes to securing the external borders of the Single Market, the inner security and
the prevention of terrorism. The Union is provoked to act fast by the chaos that has
been created, however, understanding the roots of the crisis in order to find a sustain-
able path to manage and develop, while sticking to European values, might be the
biggest challenge for the Union.
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Legal Issues Concerning the Migrant Crisis
European Integration Process
The post-war alliance started with the attempt to become a military and political
Union by signing the ECSC Treaty in order to confront the Soviet threat. This sectoral
integration stage was followed by the creation of a customs union, as economic inte-
gration was pursued further, resulting in the legal framework of the EEC Treaty,
which is based on four ‘fundamental freedoms’ (see Glossary). Aiming to create a sin-
gle pan-European market, trading obstacles were gradually removed, like national
legislation favoring or protecting certain industries. Europe’s endeavor for integration
resulted in the completion of the Single Market, which is still developing further to an
economic union after the post-Cold War era. The Treaty of Lisbon from 2009 final-
ized the integration process by turning the EU into a political union (Glencross,
2014). Today the Union is a supranational entity that is politically, financially and
economically integrated (Juncker/Tusk, 2015: 4, 5). The European integration process
is demonstrated in the figure below, showing the development over time including the
respective treaties, years and places of signature as significant steps towards the















































Source: Suder (2011: 18)
The European integration process brought plenty of advantages for European citizens.
The abolition of internal and the unification of external tariffs, the removal of intra-
European borders and the implementation of a single currency are just a few exam-
ples that underline the success of European integration as stage of the race to become
global. The possibilities to study and work abroad (e.g. Bologna Process and Erasmus)





standard, widened educational horizons and a gain in cross-cultural experience. The
reasons to abandon borders within the so-called ‘Schengen area’ were mainly econo-
mic ones. Nevertheless, the pressure to speak with one voice will become even more
intense in the years to come (Howorth, 2007). Globalization as key driver in this de-
velopment urged the Union to evolve further. A borderless Union has many advan-
tages as explained before, but security concerns arise by nature. The importance of
keeping the Union’s external borders safe, as internal borders have been removed, be-
comes essential in order to guarantee inner security, so migrants crossing the borders
have to be properly controlled. In the following, the structure and functioning of the
Schengen area will be explained as well as the importance and tasks of Frontex as
European border management. Facing the current refugee crisis, an overview of Asy-
lum Law and Aliens Law is given afterwards, aiming to deepen the understanding of
the ongoing conflicts when it comes to refugees and conflicting supranational as well
as national legislation and the trend to revert to nationalism resulting in a rejection of
supranational law and lack of member states’ solidarity.
The Schengen Area
The ‘Schengen Agreement,’ signed in 1985 by France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Ger-
many and the Netherlands, was pursued further by the ‘Schengen Implementation
Convention’ of 1990 (Hummer, 2010) and came into effect in 1995 as ‘Schengen Con-
vention,’ creating the Schengen area by effectively removing all border controls among
the signatories. The Amsterdam Treaty integrated the Schengen acquis in the Euro-
pean Union (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015).
Including Schengen associated countries, but non-EU member states, like
Switzerland, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway, the area comprises 26 countries ex-
cluding EU member states Ireland and the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Romania,
Croatia and Cyprus (European Commission, 2016 b). The Schengen area has 44,000
km of external sea borders and 9,000 km of land borders (Frontex, 2016 a). 500 mil-
lion EU citizens enjoy their fundamental right to work, live and travel within the bor-
derless Union without special formalities and border checks. The ‘freedom of move-
ment of persons,’ as part of the four fundamental freedoms, is guaranteed by the EU
for Union citizens irrespective of nationality. Also business-men, many non-EU na-
tionals and tourists benefit from the facilitated internal movement under Schengen
visas (European Commission, 2016 b).
As part of the compensatory measures for the removal of borders, the signatories
agreed on enhanced border checks at the Union’s external borders, the establishment
of a uniform visa-regulation and the respective field of competences for asylum appli-
cations. It was decided to set up regulations concerning the travelling of third-coun-
try nationals within the Union and to increase police-coordination across the mem-
ber states as well as to implement a union-wide investigation system, called ‘Schengen
Information System,’ (SIS) (Hummer, 2010), which is defined in Article 92 et seq.
Schengen Convention.
6.2
6 Legal Issues Concerning the Migrant Crisis
28
The Schengen Area as of 1 July 2013
Source: European Commission, 2016 b
The creation of a borderless Europe is one of the biggest achievements of the Union
and it is irreversible (European Commission, n.d.: 3). However, there is a security
deficit resulting from the removal to exercise controls and identity checks of persons
at the countries’ borders. In order to decrease this particular risk, intensified police
cooperation, cross-border surveillance and the SIS are emphasized across the Schen-
gen territory. The computerized system collects data from all Schengen countries and
supports by providing a huge database on individuals’ information, but data protec-
tion is taken very seriously (e.g. the Schengen Convention contains rules on informa-
tion relating to the identification of a person in the SIS (Article 93 SC)). In the ab-
sence of internal border controls, the Schengen states have to ensure security within
the area, but referring to a ‘fortress Europe’ is unjustified. Efficiently controlling exter-
nal borders is part of the Schengen states’ responsibility to offset the effectively in-
creased security risk and to maintain a high security level (European Commission,
n.d.). Countries willing to be part of the Schengen area are responsible for maintain-
ing a high level of security by controlling the external borders on behalf of other
Schengen states properly and to issue Schengen visas in order to balance the deficit
resulting from the internal border removal. The law enforcement and the application
of Schengen acquis have to be ensured: systematic border checks are unlawful, but
Fig. 6.1
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spot checks regarding purpose and duration of stay, as well as the identification
through competent national authorities, are justifiable. In case of serious threat to
public policy or internal security, a Schengen country may temporarily reintroduce
border controls at its internal borders. The European Parliament, the Commission
and the public have to be informed (European Commission, 2016 b). The Commis-
sion may issue an opinion, but the temporarily reintroduction of border controls is a
prerogative of the Schengen states, meaning no veto is possible (European Commis-
sion, 2016 c).
The Schengen Convention
The Schengen Convention of 19 June 1990 applies the Schengen Agreement of 14
June 1985 between the governments of the Benelux States, France and Germany on
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. In the following, details of
the Schengen Convention are described further focusing on the abolition of checks at
internal borders and movement of persons: crossing internal and external frontiers
(Chapter 1+2 Schengen Convention), conditions governing the movement of aliens
(Chapter 4 SC), and the responsibility for the processing of applications for asylum
(Chapter 7 SC).
According to Article 1 of the Schengen Convention (hereafter referred to as
‘Schengen Agreement’) from 1990, ‘internal borders’ are defined as common land
borders of contracting parties including airports and sea-ports, within the territories
of the contracting parties not calling at any ports outside those territories.’ ‘External
borders’ mean the contracting parties’ land and sea borders as well as airports and sea
ports provided that these are not internal borders (Article 1 Schengen Agreement).
Internal border controls have been abolished, but there is a set of rules for external
border controls via air, land, and sea supervision to secure the Union internally
(European Commission, 2016 b). These pre-defined crossing points have been autho-
rized by the competent authorities and are referred to as ‘border crossing points,’ per-
mitting to cross the Schengen area’s external borders (Article 1 SA).
Internal borders can be crossed at any time and any point without checks on per-
sons (Article 2 (1) SA), meaning EU citizens enjoy the full right to free movement
across the Schengen area and the Union. The Union’s external frontiers are to be
crossed at any border crossing point during fixed opening hours (Article 3 (1) S. 1
SA). Unauthorized border crossing at places other than the defined crossing points or
at times other than the fixed opening hours lead to penalties (Article 3 (2) SA). The
cross-border checks for ‘aliens’ (see Glossary) at external Schengen borders are under-
taken by the competent authorities (Article 6 (1) S. 1 SA) and include the verification
of travel documents and other conditions governing entry, residence, work and exit,
but also checks to detect and prevent threats to national security and public policy to
the contracting parties (Article 6 (2) (a) SA). Upon the alien’s exit, checks are also car-
ried out according to Aliens Law and with respect to all persons other than those na-
tionals of a member state of the European Community (Article 6 (2) (d) SA). The
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surveillance and checks on external borders are undertaken by contracting parties
(Article 6 (4) SA) and exercised on equivalent control levels (Article 6 (5) SA). In or-
der to maintain effective surveillance and checks, close and constant cooperation is
guaranteed (Article 7 SA). In addition to promoting uniform training, relevant infor-
mation and data have to be exchanged, and instructions given to the authorities
should be harmonized as far as possible (Article 7 SA).
Aliens are granted entry with the permission to stay and move within the Schen-
gen territory up to three months under certain conditions, namely possessing a re-
quired valid visa, valid documents and those permitting border crossing (Article 5 (1)
(a) SA). Additionally the alien must not be considered a threat to public policy or na-
tional security (Article 5 (1) (e) SA). Entry is refused in case the alien does not fulfill
the list of criteria written down in Article 5 (1) SA (Article 5 (2) S. 1 SA). Exceptions
are made if a member state considers the entry on humanitarian grounds, in national
interest or because of international obligations (Article 5 (2) SA). Upon legally enter-
ing the Schengen area, the alien is obliged to declare himself to the competent author-
ities of the territory first entered (Article 22 (1) S. 1 SA in conjunction with Article 7
Regulation No. 604/2013).
Conditions governing the movement of aliens are laid down in Article 19 et seq.
SA. In case individuals entered the external borders of a contracting member state
legally and hold a uniform visa, free movement within the territory of the Schengen
area throughout the period of validity of their visas is guaranteed (Article 19 (1) SA).
Article 5 (1) (a, c-e) SA is a prerequisite and has to be fulfilled. The duration of free
movement is limited to three months maximum from the date of first entry (Article
19 (2) SA). Aliens holding a residence permit or a provisional residence permit issued
by one of the Schengen states are allowed to move freely across Schengen countries
for a period of three months (Article 21 (1+2) SA). In case the conditions for a short
visit are not fulfilled or not fulfilled anymore, the alien is supposed to leave the terri-
tory without delay (Article 23 (1) SA). Expulsion and arrest are caused in case of non-
compliance, but asylum rights under national provisions of the Geneva Convention of
28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the New York Protocol
of 31 January 1967, or of paragraph 2 of this Article or Article 33 (1) of the Schengen
Convention are not precluded (Article 23 (4+5) SA).
The Schengen Agreement focuses on responsibilities for the processing of appli-
cations for asylum in Chapter 7 SC. The contracting parties of Schengen affirmed by
the signature to the Schengen Agreement their obligation under the Geneva Conven-
tion of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the New York
Protocol of 31 January 1967. Geographical restrictions were not made (Article 28
SA). Any application made for asylum has to be examined, but the country processing
the application has the right to deny access (Article 29 (2) SA). Article 30 SA defines
the processing of asylum applications in detail. The process is supposed to be finished
as fast as possible (Article 31 SA).
In case an applicant for asylum is illegally within a Schengen country, other than
the one processing the application for asylum, the applicant has to be taken back to
that country (Article 33 (1) SA). The respective country is also bound to take the alien
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back if the application for asylum has been rejected and the alien has entered another
country without authorization (Article 34 (1) SA). The country granting refugee sta-
tus and providing the right of residence is responsible for processing any further ap-
plication for asylum made by family members of that individual (Article 35 (1) SA),
which is defined in Article 35 (2) SA.
The Schengen Agreement points out the importance of data exchange and net-
working. If requested, information on an applicant for asylum shall be sent to another
state in order to support the process of application for asylum (Article 38 (1) SA). In
general, the communication on information exchange that might include e.g. identity,
travel documents, residence permits and visas as well as location where the applica-
tion for asylum was submitted (Article 38 (2) SA), has to be recorded (Article 38 (8)
SA). However, the communication of data is supposed to be only preserved as long as
necessary for the purpose exchanged (Article 38 (9) SA) and will be deleted after-
wards.
The Schengen Borders Code
The Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006, ‘Schengen Borders Code’ of 15 March 2006, pro-
vides for the absence of border control of persons crossing the internal borders be-
tween the member states of the EU (Article 1 Schengen Borders Code). The estab-
lished community code governs the movement of persons across borders. The Schen-
gen Borders Code applies to any person crossing the internal or external borders of
member states, without prejudice to the rights of persons enjoying the right of free
movement or the rights of refugees and persons requesting e.g. international protec-
tion (Article 3 (a+b) SBC). The Code replaced Article 39 of the previously laid down
provision concerning the border crossing of persons within the Single Market. As it
remains the member states’ responsibility to regulate border crossing, the European
Council implemented the agency Frontex for operational support. The Borders Code
is a ‘legal framework to harmonize border control and border guard with regards to
the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality’ (Hummer, 2010:
172).
Article 23 et seq. SBC concern the temporary reintroduction of border control at
internal borders (European Commission, 2016 e). A member state is entitled to ex-
ceptionally reintroduce border control at its internal borders in the event of serious
threat to public policy or internal security for a limited period of no more than 30
days (Article 23 (1) S. 1 SBC). A prolongation is possible under Art. 23 (2) SBC refer-
ring to the same grounds that were expressed before in Article 23 (1) SBC. However,
the total period of reintroduced border controls shall not exceed six months (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016 c).
It is distinguished between ‘foreseeable events’ (Article 24 SBC) and ‘cases requir-
ing urgent action’ (Article 25 SBC). Reintroduced border controls concerning foresee-
able events require the notification of the Commission and other member states (Ar-
ticle 24 (1) SBC). This notification has to be made without delay and according to de-
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tails laid down in Article 24 (1) SBC. Information about reason, scope, date and dura-
tion as well as names of authorized crossing-points have to be transmitted (Article 24
(1) (a-d) SBC). It is possible to prolong border controls at internal borders in case of
serious threat to public policy and internal security for a renewable period of up to 30
days in accordance with Article 26 SBC, referring to the procedure for prolonging
border control at internal borders (Article 23 (2) SBC).
Cases requiring immediate action demand the member state to act fast. Whenev-
er public policy or internal security are concerned, the member state may exception-
ally reintroduce border controls at internal borders immediately (Article 25 (1) SBC)
for a duration of 10 days without any prior notification according to Article 28 SBC
(European Commission, 2016 d). The member state has to provide a report regarding
the effectiveness of the reintroduced border control to the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission and has to confirm the date on which the border con-
trol is lifted (Article 29 SBC). The reintroduction of border controls has to be made in
transparent manner, and the public has to be informed thereof, unless security rea-
sons prevent from doing so (Article 30 SBC). Confidentiality on information supplied
in connection with the reintroduction and prolongation of border controls has to be
respected on the member state’s request (Article 31 SBC).
Recommendation of the Council of 12 May 2016
The Council of the European Union issued a ‘recommendation for temporary internal
border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the
Schengen area at risk’ in May 2016. First identified in 2013, reports showed that the
existing deficiencies of member states in carrying out external border controls were
jeopardizing the guarantee of Schengen acquis (European Commission, 2016 c). Fac-
ing an unprecedented refugee crisis and an increase in mixed migration since 2015,
the Union had difficulties ensuring efficient external border control in accordance
with the Schengen acquis. Structural deficits became evident in hotspots like Greece,
leading to secondary movements of irregular migratory pressure, causing serious
threat to public policy and internal security in several member states (Recommenda-
tion of the Council, 2016).
Based on a proposal by the Commission, the Council may recommend the rein-
troduction of internal border controls at specific spots in exceptional circumstances,
where the overall functioning of the Schengen area is put at risk as a result of serious
deficiencies related to external border control, leading to threat to public policy or in-
ternal security. The measure aims at protecting the common interests of the Schengen
area but should be used as last resort (European Commission, 2016 c). Striving for an
adequate response to the identified threat to internal security, five Schengen coun-
tries, namely Austria, Germany, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, decided to carry out
internal border controls due to the situational context of the refugee crisis and based
on the Recommendation of the Council of May 2016. The approach to reintroduce
internal border controls is considered necessary and proportionate for keeping up the
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normal functioning of the Schengen area under the given circumstances (Recommen-
dation of the Council, 2016) (see Annex K: Temporarily Reintroduced Border Con-
trols at October and December 2016 levels). Pursuant to Article 25 et seq. of the SBC,
these member states reintroduced border controls facing the massive rush of migrants
‘putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk’ (European Commission,
2016 d).
As distinguished before, there is a difference between ‘cases requiring urgent ac-
tion’ (Article 25 SBC) and ‘foreseeable events’ (Article 24 SBC). In the context of fore-
seeable events, Poland reintroduced border controls between 4 July and 2 September
2016 due to the NATO Summit, the ‘World Youth Day’ and a visit of the Pope. The
French emergency state following the terrorist attacks in Paris was introduced on 13
November 2015. Foreseeable events like the ‘Euro 2016’ and the ‘Tour de France’ led
to a prolongation of the emergency state, as well as the terrorist attack in Nice, which
triggered the decision to keep controls at the French border until 26 January 2017
(European Commission, 2016 e).
The temporarily reintroduced border controls, which were already in place since
the Recommendation of 12 May 2016, have been prolonged by additional three
months, based on a recommendation of the European Commission and adopted by
the European Council in October 2016, as the Commission aims to ensure ‘proper re-
ception conditions such as housing, education and health services.’ The internal bor-
ders of Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Norway will therefore be main-
tained, as the exceptional circumstances leading to the adoption of the Recommenda-
tion, are still present (European Commission, 2016 f). The improvements in the bor-
der management of the Hellenic Republic and the EU-Turkey Statement, as well as
the ongoing Frontex and NATO operations, have led to a decrease in migratory pres-
sure (Recommendation of the Council, 2016), yet the situation in Greece remains dif-
ficult (European Commission, 2016 f). A high number of irregular migrants still chal-
lenge the member states additionally to the asylum seekers from the past years includ-
ing their applications, which still have to be processed (European Commission,
2016 f). Secondary movement of (unregistered) irregular migrants remains a persis-
tent risk to public policy and internal security, forcing member states to temporarily
reintroduce internal border control, as the functioning of the Schengen area is put at
risk (Recommendation of the Council, 2016). As mentioned above, the general bor-
der management, border surveillance and situational awareness have to be improved
(Recommendation of the Council, 2016).
Circumstances constituting serious threat to public policy and internal security,
jeopardizing the functioning of the Union’s internal area, empower the Council to re-
commend border controls within the Union. As explained before, a prolongation of
temporarily reintroduced border controls on the basis of Article 29 SBC is possible,
but even under persisting exceptional circumstances the prolongation may not exceed
two years in total. The Commission pointed out that the recommended prolongation
was based on ‘serious deficiencies identified in the external border management by
Greece at the time,’ clearly excluding potential migrant flows from e.g. Italy or the
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overall migratory situation in the Union as causes of the implemented measure
(European Commission, 2016 f).
During these days, the contractually defined ‘borderless’ Union is questioned by
the rest of the world. Credibility and seriousness are doubted and despite the fact that
the model of a borderless Union is unique worldwide, some states condemn the Euro-
pean behavior and critically question its values targeting humanitarian responsibili-
ties. Aiming to maintain high security standards for European citizens, while manag-
ing to fulfill and provide for those in need is difficult, as the Union’s task is challenged
by those abusing the possibility to enter Europe, while focusing on weakening the
member states’ unity through terrorist attacks, and as result, created threat. In the fol-
lowing, Frontex as European border management is introduced, including the various
routes and trails used by refugees, asylum seekers and migrants to cross the external
EU borders.
Frontex – European Border Management
Frontex is a European agency created in 2004 as own legal personality (Hummer,
2010) coordinating border controls and ensuring the safety of the Schengen areas’ ex-
ternal borders for the EU and Schengen-associated countries (Kenealy/Peterson,
2015). The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (acronym: Frontex) has its le-
gal basis on the Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and
amending Regulation (EU) No. 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007 of the European Parliament and
of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 and Council Decision
2005/267/EC (OJ L 251, 16 September 2016, p. 1), replacing the ‘European Agency
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Mem-
ber States of the European Union’ (Frontex, 2016 b). Internal border checks have been
effectively removed in 1995 (European Commission, n.d.), so the European border
management agency Frontex was a systematic consequence of the Schengen Agree-
ment (Richter, 2015).
Schengen countries with external borders, including land, sea and international
airports, have a lot of responsibility and must ensure effective surveillance and proper
checks. The agency is responsible to harmonize border management standards, thus
reducing border crime and facilitating a legitimate passage across external borders.
The agency provides training for member states and supports by coordinating in areas
under pressure by providing equipment (Frontex, 2016 c). Frontex was created to pro-
vide training to national border guards and support member states in migrant return
operations. Organized control operations and the development of risk analyses are
part of the agency’s work as well (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015).
The Guardia Civil in Madrid has a prime responsibility (Grupo Edefa, 2016) and
works from the maritime surveillance center for coasts and borders as part of Frontex.
The Guardia Civil is referred to as ‘bosom of the body of the EU for the control of
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external borders’ (Guardia Civil, 2016). The police leads call in Frontex operations In-
dalo and Hera, Triton and Poseidon (Grupo Edefa, 2016). Hera was one of the first
Frontex operations, as the number of primarily West African illegal migrants trying
to cross the Mediterranean Sea increased since early 2000, as the distance between the
African continent and Europe, in particular the Canary Islands, is indeed very short
(Richter, 2015).
The idea of Eurosur was implemented in December 2013 with a total cost of 244
million Euros under the umbrella of Frontex. Eurosur was set up to improve the co-
operation between member states and to intensify border surveillance. Each member
state is supposed to collect data on migratory movements and to release this informa-
tion on a National Coordination Center to provide a common data platform for all
member states (Richter, 2015).
Frontex Operations
Indalo and Joint Operation EPN Indalo
‘Indalo’ was set up in 2011 ‘to combat and monitor illegal migration flows along the
Mediterranean coast from North Africa and Sub-Saharan nations.’ Participating states
are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Slovakia (Frontex, 2016 d).
In 2015, the ‘Joint Operation EPN Indalo’ was established ‘to implement coordi-
nated operational activities at the external sea borders of the Western Mediterranean
region in order to control irregular migration flows towards the territory of the EU
and to tackle cross-border crime.’ Participating countries are Belgium, Finland,
France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Switzerland (Frontex,
2016 e).
Poseidon Sea, Mare Nostrum and Triton
Apart from ‘Poseidon Sea,’ ‘Mare Nostrum’ and ‘Triton’ are also operations under the
umbrella of the European border management to sustainably safeguard the Single
Market’s external borders (Unknown, 2015 a).
‘Triton’ is the successor of Frontex operation ‘Mare Nostrum.’ The Italian govern-
ment created the operation as a reaction to the tragedies that happened in the
Mediterranean Sea in 2013. The budget was around 9 million Euros per month. Due
to increasing refugee numbers over time, the state urged the Union to bear the costs
(Unknown, 2015 a). ‘Triton’ was implemented in November 2014, focusing on
surveillance and border control. The maritime patrol is active off the Italian coast to
safeguard borders and prevent human trafficking with a monthly budget of just
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Criticism on Frontex Operations
The complex monitoring system and bilateral agreements of Frontex with e.g. Algeria
and Morocco led to comparatively low migrant numbers over time. But without third-
state cooperation in form of agreements, Frontex could not manage the migratory
flow as successfully as it does, but drug smuggling and trafficking of human beings
still occurs (Richter, 2015).
The operation Triton, also referred to as ‘Frontex Plus,’ was implemented by Euro-
pe’s border management, replacing Mare Nostrum. Pro Asyl claims the restrictive fo-
cus on border control and defense. Problematic issues are due to several reasons. First,
the budget is reduced to almost one third compared to Mare Nostrum, preventing an
effective replacement under same conditions. Second, Frontex does not obtain indi-
vidual technical resources but receives them on participating member states provid-
ing. Third, the operation focuses on patrols along the Italian coast, but the patrols of
Mare Nostrum were including the Libyan waters near the island of Lampedusa. The
last argument of Pro Asyl critics is the difference in perspective: as Mare Nostrum fo-
cused on sea rescue service operations, Triton was primarily set up for external bor-
der control and surveillance (Pro Asyl, 2014). Members of Human Rights Watch criti-
cally access Frontex and its operations. It is said that Frontex does not improve the
humanitarian crisis, but indirectly supports the trafficking industry. Human rights or-
ganizations refer to incidents at the Greek border, demonstrating the misbehavior of
Frontex’s police as ‘accomplices of Greek authorities’ supporting ‘push back methods’
(see Glossary) which are not compatible with EU law (Richter, 2015: 95).
European Refugee Crisis – Migratory Routes
The current refugee crisis is characterized by an unprecedented influx of people pre-
dominantly from North Africa and the Middle East. The majority of illegally residing
migrants in the EU entered the Single Market via international airports, holding valid
travel documents and visa, and then simply overstayed the visa validity duration
(Frontex, 2016 f). The following table and figure provide an overview of the major
routes that have been used to enter the Single Market. The number of illegal crossings
in the first half of 2016 and the registered nationalities per route are stated in the ta-
ble, the geographical map describes the seven main routes of migratory flows based
on Frontex statistics to facilitate an understanding of the current crisis and to provide
a visual and quantitative overview of migratory movements.
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Listed Illegal Crossings by Route (January – July 2016)
No. Route (2016) Illegal Crossings Registered Nationalities
1 Eastern Borders 1,920 Vietnamese, Afghan, Ukrainian
2 Western Balkan 121,908 Not specified
3 Eastern Mediterranean 164,796 Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi
4 Apulia and Calabria
96,465 Nigerian, Eritrean, Gambian
5 Central Mediterranean
6 Western Mediterranean 3,402 Guinean, Ivorian, Cameroonian
7 Western African 330 Guinean, Ivorian, Cameroonian
Source: Frontex, Migratory Routes Map, 2016 f
Migratory Routes Map 2016
Source: Frontex, Migratory Routes Map, 2016 f, adopted by Dankert, 2016
The Eastern Borders Route covers 6,000 km of land borders between Belarus, Moldo-
va, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Eastern member states. Although the num-
ber of illegal crossings accounts for just 0.1% of the total, the states still struggle to
secure their borders. The Arctic Route has developed in 2015 via Russia and Finland,
and the borders still remain difficult to control (Frontex, 2016 g).
A 16-fold rise was registered in 2014 on the Western Balkan Route with a record
number of 764,038 illegal border crossings. In order to reach Western Europe, the
Tab. 6.2
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Union was entered in Greece, then continued in Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. The
unprecedented number of migrants led Hungary to build a fence, aiming to stop the
continuous influx of people (Frontex, 2016 h). On the Eastern Mediterranean Route,
885,386 illegal border crossings were registered in 2015, which is 17 times the num-
ber of 2014, a record year itself. In 2008, this route was used for 40% of all migrants
arriving in the EU (Frontex, 2016 i). The popular Central Mediterranean Route re-
mains under intense pressure with a well-established smuggler network in Libya, a
collecting point for African migrants. Due to bilateral agreements between Italy and
Libya, the flow of migrants was very low in 2009. The Arab Spring of 2011 renewed
the rush and led to a record year 2014 with 170,760 illegal crossings (Frontex, 2016 j).
Although the Apulia and Calabria Route is not a major point of EU entry, the
difficulty are travelers claiming to have lived in Greece for months or years before de-
ciding to move within the Union. The decline in crossing numbers on this route is
solely due to the migrant flow relocation via the overland Western Balkan Route
(Frontex, 2016 k). The Western Mediterranean Route is characterized by fluctuating
migrant numbers, also the likelihood of residence in Europe is increased through a
departure from Libya, reached over land routes. 7,164 illegal migrants passed Europe’s
external border in Spain in 2015 (Frontex, 2016 l).
Bilateral Agreements between Spain, Senegal and Mauritania improved the situa-
tion on the West African Route through strengthened border controls. Characteristic
of this route is the bad organization of smuggler networks that will eventually lead
individuals to arrange the passage themselves (Frontex, 2016 m).
The possibilities of the EU to reduce and restrict migration are limited. Some re-
searchers even state that it is impossible to limit migration or to effectively control
migration. However, creating less favorable conditions for migrants, eliminating
smuggler networks, or diplomatic endeavors to end the civil war in Syria, to actually
reform the asylum system and to cooperate with nations of origin in order to remove
causes of migration and allow readmission (Stern, 2015) might reduce the migration
wave and separate those in need from forum shoppers and economic migrants. But
the Union is devoted to the Geneva Convention: keeping migrants outside the
‘fortress Europe,’ as critics refer to the Union’s approach to limit the migratory influx,
is no option for the EU. Adequate protection is legally guaranteed. There are several
legal frameworks on Migration and Mobility like the GAMM Framework or the
Khartoum Process (see Annex L: Selected Legal Frameworks on Migration and Mo-
bility). Despite the desire to pursue common goals, the lack of binding effects of
agreements between the Union and third-countries effectively cause an inability to
change the status quo. The signatories’ implementation is mainly driven by individual
national goals, which might contradict with the ones pursued by the EU. The volun-
tary approach facilitates engagement and results in an increased likelihood of cooper-
ation, yet improved change and active support are lacking.
Like the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process is a promising initiative designed
to create a dialogue on migration, but transparent communication is incessant. Both
parties, the EU and African states, pursue different goals, which makes it hard to
achieve a common goal, especially if the declaration does not create legal rights under
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international law. In order to retain its credibility, the EU must ensure to engage with
third-nations, provided that human rights are maintained according to international
standards. Aiming to abandon illegal migration, the initiative has to focus on estab-
lishing concrete projects to allow legal migration. However, critics in scientific re-
search argue that legal migration was not addressed strongly enough (Stern, 2015).
Aliens Law in the European Union
Due to the supremacy of Union law and the hierarchy that has been created in the
milestone judgement Costa vs. Enel (C6/64), EU law always prevails. International
agreements and European Community Law make up the two sides of EU law. Nation-
al law ranks below EU law, but the immense overlapping and mixture of international
and community-related as well as national rulings results in a difficult assessment in
order to decide on the legal status of foreigners. It is distinguished between EU-citi-
zen-foreigner and third-national-foreigner. A further differentiation can be made by
clustering the group according to generation and integration-status, but this is not
discussed further (Sieveking, 2007).
The legal status of a foreigner depends primarily on International Law, which
consists of e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Multilateral Inter-
national Agreements (Geneva Refugee Convention (1951), the Convention against
the Discrimination of Races (1961) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1989)) and Bilateral International Agreements (Social Security Agreement) and the
Convention and Agreement of International Employment Office (Sieveking, 2007).
Despite the created hierarchy and the Europeanization of Law (see Annex M: Euro-
peanization vs. European Integration – A short Scientific Demarcation), the member
states remain sovereign about detailed aspects and forms of foreigner treatment. As
covering all 28 member state perspectives on Aliens and Asylum Law would go be-
yond the scope of this paper, an illustration of the Federal Republic of Germany is
exemplarily represented afterwards.
German Aliens Law and Asylum Law
The Aliens Law of the Federal Republic of Germany is based on EU law (EU treaties,
regulations and directives, Schengen rules, settled case law and latest jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice and the associations law) as well as on international law.
Due to the principle of supremacy that has been created in the landmark decision
Costa vs. Enel (C6/64), EU law prevails over domestic German jurisdiction. German
Aliens Law consists, inter alia, of the German Constitution, the Residence Act, the
Freedom of Movement, the Asylum Procedure Law and the Benefits for Asylum Seek-
ers Act, Integration Course and Employment Regulations and the Employment Pro-
cedure Ordinance and Regulations governing German Residence. People with immi-
gration background have different rights that derive from their respective legal status,
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whereby the purpose of stay is crucial in defining access to social benefits, education,
labor market as well as societal and political participation (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
Aliens Law governs e.g. the granting of visa, residence title, deportation and title
of tolerance for foreigners. The Residence Act is valid norm for application on Aliens
Law in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Refugee Law is the law governing the
Aliens Law of foreign refugees regarding entry and stay. Asylum Law is part of
Refugee Law and anchored in Article 16 a Grundgesetz (English: German Constitu-
tion): ‘politically persecuted enjoy the right on asylum.’ Thereinafter, Asylum is a basic
right in the German constitution. How to treat the persecuted asylum seekers is de-
fined in the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951. Since 2002, people persecuted be-
cause of sexual orientation or gender are also granted the right of asylum in Germany.
The European Charter of Human Rights prohibits the expulsion of individuals in case
of ongoing severe human right violations in the individual’s country of origin, also if
the individual has not received the right on asylum (Bittner, 2016). The Refugee Law
distinguishes between ‘refugees’ by categorizing according to reason (e.g. natural
catastrophe, poverty, illness and political persecution) and by comparing to the over-
all situation in the country of origin (Hildebrandt, 2016).
The political right on asylum is described in Article 14 of the Universal Declara-
tion on Human Rights as restricted human right. A human is entitled to seek refuge
in another country (Article 14 (1) UDHR), but the Article does not oblige a state to
actually grant asylum to the politically persecuted individual. Therefore, Article 14
refers to the right on asylum as to the degree to which the individual states are willing
to grant asylum. Asylum is not granted for the ones not in line with the principles of
the United Nations (Article 14 (2) UDHR), so war criminals are excluded. The Gene-
va Refugee Convention added a restriction to send back refugees into their country of
origin if political persecution is proven (Meisen, 2016).
In the following, the focus is on Asylum Law and derived rights for those defined
as ‘refugees’ according to the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951, (see Annex N:
Definition ‘Refugee’ according to the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951) ‘ratified by
149 state parties and outlining the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal obliga-
tions of states to protect them with focus on non-refoulement’ (UNHCR, 2016). Is-
sues concerning late repatriates, displaced persons, as well as EU citizens using their
freedom of movement within the Union to work, live and study abroad will be ne-
glected, but general related aspects will be mentioned in order to portray the full
scope of law.
The asylum procedure in Germany is performed according to the Asylum Law
(1982), which has been renewed in 1993, 2013 and 2014 due to the Europeanization
and the targeted European standardization. Before, Germany examined an applica-
tion for asylum if the request was applied here. Due to the Europeanization of Asylum
Law that introduced the ‘Principle of a safe country of origin,’ as well as the impact of
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), Germany’s competence in examining locally applied
requests ceased (Heinhold, 2015).
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) conferred the competency of ‘Visa, Asylum and
Immigration’ to the Union. The EU migrant policy aimed at unified asylum politics
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and fair treatment of third-state nationals. The Union targeted controlled immigra-
tion in order to fight illegal migrant flows. Therefore, it has to be verified, for example,
whether Germany is the country responsible for handling the application, also in case
the application was raised in the respective county.
Since borders have been effectively removed due to the Schengen Agreement, a
first regulation to prevent ‘Asylum-tourism’ was implemented in 1997 (Dublin I, No.
360/1997), then progressed to Dublin II in 2003 (Rüssel, 2015). The Dublin Agree-
ment (Date of effect: 1 September 1990) is an agreement to determine the EU mem-
ber state that is responsible for examining an asylum application. The examination
process undertaken by the Federal Agency of Migration and Refugees is called
‘Dublin Procedure.’ The Dublin III Regulation (No. 604/2013), or the ‘Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, establishing the criteria
and mechanisms for determining the member state which is responsible for examin-
ing an application for international protection provided by third-country nationals or
stateless persons in a member state,’ has replaced the Dublin II Regulation (No.
343/2003). The Regulation has been directly applicable since 2014, with the result that
the state, that the asylum seeker first entered, must perform the entire asylum proce-
dure (Heinhold, 2015). If illegal entry in a second member state is proved, a transfer
of the individual to the country of first contact is possible. EURODAC (Regulation
No. 603/2013), a European automated system for comparing fingerprints of asylum
seekers, was set up in 2013, to prevent the initializing of multiple asylum procedures
across several member states simultaneously and to compare data (Rüssel, 2015).
The Federal Agency of Migration and Refugees (acronym: BAMF) is in charge to
examine whether, and in case if, which reason of persecution exists. The recognized
asylum procedure that is undertaken on an individual basis has binding effect for oth-
er authorities like the social welfare office paying benefits. The BAMF will decide on
the right of asylum and whether the applicant in question qualifies according to § 3
AsylG and if subsidiary protection, meaning the existence of an expulsion prohibition,
is present or not (Heinhold, 2015).
The German legal system is based on the rule of law and the sacrosanct human
dignity (Article 1 (1+2), 19 (2) + 20 GG). Everyone is equal before the law (Article 3
(1) GG) and no one is discriminated or disadvantaged due to race, language, home or
origin (Article 3 (3) GG). A differentiation is made between nationals and nationals of
other states under the criteria ‘citizenship,’ leading to a separation between ‘Germans’
and ‘Non-Germans.’ Non-Germans cannot claim the right to freedom of movement
(Article 11 (1) GG) or the right of free assembly (Article 9 (1) GG). Depending on the
legal status, child benefits, as part of German social law, or unemployment benefits
are not granted for some (Tießler-Marenda, 2013). It is distinguished between every-
one’s basic rights, which can be appealed by foreigners and Germans, and rights that
are primarily reserved for German nationals, e.g. ‘all Germans have the right to regis-
ter clubs and associations’ (Art. 8 (1) GG).
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The German Immigration Act
It is still controversial whether the Federal Republic of Germany is an immigration
country (see Annex O: Brief Digression: Germany – An Immigration Country?),
however, it is necessary to define basic rights that match the requirements of the con-
stitution for a society with successors of foreigners in the second or third generation
permanently living in the country (Sieveking, 2007).
The German Immigration Act has been released in 2005, called the ‘Law of control
and directivity of immigration, regulation of entry and residence and the integration
of Union citizens and foreigners.’ The Law is an omnibus act, meaning there is no
German Immigration Law, but the Act aims at controlled immigration to prevent ter-
rorism and improve the security policy with special focus on integration capacity in
terms of the German economical and labor-related interests. Due to primacy of EU
law, Foreigner and Asylum Law has been changed in accordance with the EU Direc-
tive of 2007 concerning asylum and stay and national law has been adopted to the EU
Visa Code (2011) fighting forced marriage (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
The legal components of the Immigration Act are defined below: the Residence
Act governs the entry and residence of foreigners in Germany as well as the expulsion
and deportation. Several acts and regulations complement the Residence Act, which
is crucial for the work permit. The current Citizenship Law roots in the Reichs and
Citizenship Law of 1913 based on ‘ius sanguinis’ (English: right to citizenship based on
parentage). In 1999, the principle was broadened by adopting ‘ius soli’ (English: right
to citizenship based on place of birth). Children of foreigners born in Germany would
be granted the citizenship of their parents and the citizenship of Germany (§§ 4 (3),
40 (b) StAG). At the age of 18, it has to be decided between the two citizenships (§ 29
StAG). If no decision is taken until the age of 23, German citizenship would be auto-
matically lost by virtue of law. In 2007, a citizenship test was introduced, but so far the
participation is not compulsory.
The Asylum Law defines that Germany grants asylum to politically persecuted
persons (Article 16 a (1) GG). On this legal basis, the constitution offers an enforce-
able right of protection for individuals, excluding persons from EU member states, as
EU states are defined as secure countries of origin (§ 26 a (1+2) + Article 16 a (2)
GG). Such an application will be refused as unfounded (§ 29 a (1+2) AsylVfG). Grant-
ing the right of asylum to those who are forced to or who voluntarily decide to mi-
grate for reasons of war, natural catastrophes or archaic habits, is still unregulated and
highly discussed. The term ‘political persecution’ is derived from the term ‘refugee’
under international law that has developed within the 20th century. People threatened
on life, limb and asset by the political order in their own country because of their eth-
nical background, religion, nationality, their belonging to a minority or due to politi-
cal conviction will be granted refuge in Germany in line with the Directive
2011/95/EU. The Act on Affairs of Displaced Persons and Refugees focuses on yet an-
other immigration group, but this act will not be discussed further.
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Legal Basis of German Immigration and Residence Law
German Immigration and Residence Law is based on national and European direc-
tives, as well as on the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights of 1950. According to Article 1 (A) No. 2 S. 1 GRC, the
term ‘refugee’ covers all those seeking refuge due to persecution of race, religion, na-
tionality, belonging to a specific social group or political conviction. This definition is
still used today but highly discussed, as the current inflow of people searching refuge
is mainly triggered by civil wars (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
The Geneva Convention has to be transferred into national law in order to take
effect for the individual. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948
grants the ‘right for each individual to seek asylum in another country,’ but, as men-
tioned before, there is no general duty for states to grant asylum. Asylum Law is still
an individual law, as the accepting state is the authority to decide on asylum exclu-
sively as part of its sovereignty. The right on asylum is therefore not part of general
human rights. However, the right of entry is derived from the Geneva Convention, as
it prohibits an individual to be expelled or returned (‘Prohibition of Refoulement,’ Ar-
ticle 33 GRC). The Geneva Convention is part of German law due to ratification and
therefore applicable (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
The European Human Rights Convention does also not directly grant the right of
asylum. But in contrast to the Geneva Convention, the EHRC grants the right for the
individual to sue at the European Court of Human Rights using an individual appli-
cation. Germany has enforced the Convention by an act of assent, therefore it ranks
equally with federal law (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
Aliens Law is part of Police and Security Law, but Refugee and Asylum Law rep-
resents a (theoretical) exception, as they are based on Article 16 a GG (excluding the
ones mentioned in § 16 a (2) S. 1 in conjunction with § 26 a AsylG) and on interna-
tional law. Due to many links between Residence Law and Asylum Law, Refugee Law
is one of the most complex issues in the field of Aliens Law. Aliens Law (aliens’ rights
are derived from each state’s responsibility to protect individuals under international
law (Kokott/Doehring, 2003)) applies to all non-Germans according to Article 116
(1) GG (Tießler-Marenda, 2013). German Asylum Law is shaped by Article 16 a GG,
the Asylum Procedure Law (from 1993, amended in 1997) and the Regulation on De-
termination for the Responsibility of Asylum released in 1997. The Law on Measures
under Humanitarian Aid Campaigns for Refugees (from 1980, amended in 1997) and
the Law on Stateless Foreigners from 1951 are applied. Different laws also have to be
considered at federal state level, e.g. guidelines for the accommodation of asylum
seekers. Asylum seekers are under the protection of the Geneva Convention from
1951 including the additional protocols from 1967, as well as the Charter of Human
Rights and the Directive 2011/95/EU. The Dublin Agreement (2003) and the Benefits
for Asylum Seekers Act also influence German Asylum Law (Sieveking, 2007).
A German is defined as ‘German with German citizenship’ or ‘German without
German citizenship,’ so-called Status-Germans (Article 116 (1) GG), referring to eth-
nical German-nationals like expellees or (late) emigrants from the former Soviet
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Zone, ‘DDR’ or Poland (Sieveking, 2007). Foreigners are stateless persons and the
ones possessing foreign citizenship, therefore they do not belong to the Status-Ger-
mans (Tießler-Marenda, 2013). Foreigners can be citizens of other EU states or citi-
zens of third countries. Asylum seekers, persons entitled to asylum, bona fide
refugees, convention refugees or de-facto refugees are also categorized as foreigners
(Sieveking, 2007), but this will not be discussed further in this paper. Legal provisions
determine whether a person is legally or illegally in Germany. Entry and stay are gen-
erally forbidden for third-state nationals, unless it is explicitly permitted. Each mem-
ber state will decide about entry requirements as part of its sovereignty. Due to inter-
national obligations (e.g. Regulation No. 604/32013) and the German constitution,
‘refugees,’ as part of Asylum Law, portray an exception here. EU citizens obtain a spe-
cial legal status due to the free movement right as part of the four freedoms within the
Union that have been created for Union citizens (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
Entry and Residence Title
Generally, border crossing is only permitted at specified entry points (§ 13 (1) S. 1
AufenthG). Noncompliance will be avenged as an administrative offense and lead to a
penalty (Tießler-Marenda, 2013). Entry in Germany is only legal under valid resi-
dence permit (§ 4 (1), § 14 (2) AufenthG). The residence permit is a limited residence
title and depending on the purpose of stay (§ 4 (1) No. 2, § 7 AufenthG): work, study,
or research-related as well as asylum, refugee according to the GRC definition, tem-
porary protection, prohibition of deportation or victim of human trafficking are se-
lected examples for granted residence titles that are categorized by purpose and deter-
mine the right to stay according to §§ 16 et. seq. (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
Asylum seekers are granted a legal permit to stay (§ 55 (1) S. 1 AsylG, § 63 a (1)
AsylG) for the duration of the asylum procedure. Entry-prerequisites like clearly
defining the identity and citizenship of the foreigner (§ 5 (1) No. 1 a AufenthG) deter-
mine the issuing of a residence title. Recognized asylum seekers, GRC refugees and
persons who have been granted subsidiary protection (§ 25 (3) AufenthG) benefit
from a loosened and shortened procedure, as the conditions in order to get the resi-
dence title (passport, providing a sustainable livelihood and defining a clear identity)
can be neglected (§ 5 (1)+(2) AufenthG). The entry prerequisites will be loosened for
individuals granted a residence permit on the base of humanitarian reasons (§ 5 (3)
AufenthG). Aiming to fight international terrorism and to prevent hazard, a residence
permit can be refused in case of anti-constitutional activities, politically motivated vi-
olence, if considered a danger to the Federal Republic of Germany or by suspicion to
be member of a terrorist organization (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
A residence title can generally be granted for the purpose of training, like lan-
guage courses and education (§ 16+17 AufenthG), for the purpose of paid employ-
ment (§ 18, 19+20 AufenthG), for the purpose of self-employment (§ 21 AufenthG)
and on the basis of international, political or humanitarian reasons (§ 22−26 Aufen-
thG). In the following, the focus is on granted residence permit to those of the group
last-mentioned (Section 5 AufenthG) (Tießler-Marenda, 2013), but the list is not
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complete, as e.g. hardship (§ 23 a AufenthG) and residence titles for well-integrated
pupils and young adults are not portrayed here further.
Granted Residence Title due to International Reasons
(§ 22+23 AufenthG)
An alien can be granted a residence permit on the basis of urgent humanitarian rea-
sons according to § 22 S. 1 AufenthG. The higher state authorities can generally li-
cense a residence title for nationals from a pre-defined state or for certain groups of
asylum seekers (§ 23 (1) AufenthG).
Granted Residence Title for Temporary Protection
(§ 24 AufenthG)
On the basis of the Directive 2001/55/EG about ‘minimum standards for giving tem-
porary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and measures
promoting a balanced distribution of the burden associated with the recording of
these people and the consequences of this recording on the member states,’ displaced
persons can be granted temporary protection for one year (§ 24 (1) AufenthG in con-
junction with Article 4, 6 and 25 of Directive 2001/55/EC), with the possibility to be
renewed twice for half a year (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
Granted Residence Title on the Basis of Humanity (§ 25 AufenthG)
Granted Residence Title for Recognized Persons entitled to Asylum
(§ 25 (1) AufenthG)
Recognized asylum seekers, refugees and persons who have been granted subsidiary
protection will be given a residence permit on the basis of humanitarian reasons (§ 25
AufenthG). The residence permit involves the admission for employment purpose
(§ 25 (1) S. 4 AufenthG), which is limited to three years (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
Recognized asylum seekers are under the protection of expulsion: unlike in § 5 (1)
No. 2 AufenthG, the mere existence of a deportation reason does not justify denying a
residence permit, but in case of serious threat to public order and security, which
leads to deportation, no residence title will be granted.
Granted Residence Title for Convention-Refugees
(§ 25 (2) AufenthG)
Convention refugees are defined as refuge seekers because of gender or religious per-
secution. The religious subsistence level (Latin: forum internum) is protected and the
freedom of public worship, as well as the public denial of religious acts. This type of
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no alternatives other than searching refuge elsewhere (Tießler-Marenda, 2013). A
convention refugee is legally equated with the status of an Asylum seeker (§ 25 (2)
S. 2, § 26 (3) AufenthG). In contrast to recognized asylum seekers, no special protec-
tion of expulsion is granted, but a convention refugee may benefit from tolerance
(§ 60 a AufenthG) and is treated equally when it comes to claiming family reunion
and access to the labor market. If a convention refugee constitutes danger to the com-
munity and the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany, no residence
permit will be granted (§ 60 (8) AufenthG).
Residence Title in Case of Prohibition of Expulsion
(§ 25 (3) AufenthG)
Foreigners are granted protection of expulsion and are given a residence permit (§ 25
(3) AufenthG) in case of the existence of legal prohibition of deportation (§ 60 (2+3),
(5), (7) AufenthG). Protection is valid for those who are expecting torture, death
penalty or concrete danger to life, limb and freedom in case of deportation. The resi-
dence permit is granted for a minimum of one year. A residence permit is not granted
if the respective person is a danger for the community and the security of the Federal
Republic of Germany and in case the individual has committed severe crimes against
humanity and peace or has committed war crimes (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
Residence Title due to Humanitarian and Personal Reasons
(§ 25 (4) AufenthG)
A temporary residence permit (§ 25 (4) S. 1 AufenthG) is granted to foreigners in case
of urgent humanitarian or personal reasons, which have to be examined on an indi-
vidual case basis. § 25 (4) S. 2 AufenthG denies a permanent residence permit, but al-
lows a prolongation in case of exceptional hardness for the foreigner when leaving the
country. The transferred title has to be of transient nature, like operation or studies.
The residence permit is granted for a maximum of six months and can be prolonged,
as long as the foreigner has not yet been within the German territory for a total peri-
od of 18 months (Tießler-Marenda, 2013).
Residence Title due to Obstacles to Deportation
(§ 25 (5) AufenthG)
If the deportation is technically or legally impossible and the hindrance is expected to
be continued for an incalculable period, the foreigner will be granted a permit to stay.
After a maximum of 18 months, the deportation has to be achieved, if not, a residence
title will be given in order to prevent tolerance cases. If the foreigner aims to get the
residence title by masking his identity, no residence permit will be granted.
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General Regimentation and Procedure for Residence Titles
After three years, the requirements for asylum or refugee seekers have to be reviewed
in order to double-check, whether the conditions are still given to maintain the re-
spective legal status (§ 73 (2 a) AsylG). The residence permit will be removed in case
the prerequisites are not given anymore. If the requirements are still given, the for-
eigner can be granted a residence title on the basis of the previously mentioned sce-
narios or receive the ‘title of tolerance.’ The residence title on the legal base of human-
itarian, international or political reasons is granted for a maximum of three years
(§ 26 (1) AufenthG) but can be prolonged.
Family Asylum, Reunion and Reunification of Spouses
There is no general right of family reunion on the legal basis of Article 6 GG, and
differentiations are made between Germans, foreigners and persons entitled to asy-
lum. Many different constellations have to be taken into account, and the likelihood
to ensure the livelihood is important. However, an examination of applications made
by family members of already recognized asylum entitled persons under international
protection is not necessary (Article 26 AsylG), as e.g. spouses are equally recognized
as asylum entitled persons, if the marriage was already concluded in the home coun-
try (§ 26 (1) No. 2 AsylG). The same holds true for minors of recognized asylum enti-
tled persons (§ 26 (2) AsylG). Persons causing danger to the community, order and
security of the Federal Republic of Germany or persons known for war crimes and
crimes against humanity will not be granted family asylum or subsidiary protection
(§ 26 (5) S. 3 in conjunction with § 4 (2) AsylG).
Asylum seekers and GRC refugees according to § 25 (1 or 2) AufenthG with resi-
dence permit according to § 26 AufenthG do not have to fulfill the prerequisites for a
family reunion of § 5 AufenthG, like e.g. a secured livelihood (§ 5 (1) No. 1 AufenthG
and clarified identity (§ 5 (1) No. 1 a AufenthG). Applicants under subsidiary protec-
tion according to § 24 (1) AsylVfG will be granted family reunion apart from § 5 (1) +
§ 27 (3) AsylVfG (§ 29 (4) AsylVfG) on the legal basis of § 36 AsylVfG. Foreigners
having a residence permit on the legal base of § 22, 23 (1) or § 25 (3) AufenthG can
only be granted family reunion because of humanitarian or international reasons
(§ 29 (3) S. 1 AufenthG). Family reunion for foreigners having a residence permit on
the basis of humanitarian, personal, legal or real reasons according to § 25 (4+4b+5),
§ 25 a (2), § 25 b (4), § 104 a (1) S. 1 + § 104 b AufenthG are excluded from the right of
family reunion (§ 29 (3) S. 2 AufenthG). Parents of minors under valid residence per-
mit according to § 23 (4), § 25 (1 or 2) AsylVfG have the right of family reunion, un-
less a parent entitled to custody is already in Germany (§ 36 (1) AufenthG).
Spouses of foreigners are granted family reunion in partial fulfillment of § 30 (1)
AufenthG. Despite the defined legal requirements, language skills are not necessary
for spouses of foreigners having a granted residence title according to § 23 (4), § 25 (1
or 2), § 26 (3) AufenthG. § 30 (1) AufenthG includes a list of exceptions and potential
deviations for various constellations.
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Termination of Residence and Expulsion
A withdrawal, recall, expulsion or longer absence from Germany results in the end of
the residence permit, thereafter the foreigner has to leave the country (§ 51 No. 1−8
AufenthG). A withdrawal is given when the subsidiary protection of asylum entitled
persons or recognized refugees is eliminated (§ 52 (1) No. 4+5 AufenthG).
‘Expulsion’ is defined as the compulsory enforcement of the obligation to leave
the country. The regulatory law measure is declared when a foreigner poses a risk to
public order and safety (§ 53 (1) AufenthG). The law measure aims to prevent further
harm. However, several groups of foreigners are hard to expulse, unless a severe dan-
ger for public order and safety is given: as GRC refugees and asylum entitled persons
are subject to special protection against non-refoulement (§ 60 AufenthG), the title of
expulsion will then be transferred to a title of tolerance (§ 60 a AufenthG) in form of
an expulsion-stop for a maximum of three months (§ 60 a (1) S. 1 AufenthG) or as
tolerance on basis of humanitarian or personal reasons.
Several causes lead to expulsion, e.g. if a foreigner is leader of an organization
supporting anti-constitutional practices (§ 54 (1) No. 3 AufenthG) or by endangering
the free and democratic order of the Federal Republic of Germany (§ 54 (1) No. 2
AufenthG) or by calling out for hatred against religious or ethnical parts of the society
(§ 54 No. 5 AufenthG). Expulsed foreigners underlie a re-entry ban (§ 11 (1) Aufen-
thG), but the legal measure has only temporary effect (§ 11 (2) S. 1 AufenthG). There
is no temporary but a permanent effect of expulsion if the foreigner was expulsed due
to war crimes or crimes against humanity (§ 11 (5) S. 1 AufenthG).
General Asylum Procedure in the Federal Republic of Germany
According to § 13 (1) AsylVfG an application for asylum is received, when a foreigner
expresses the will to seek refuge in the federal territory of Germany. The foreigner has
to appear in person (§ 22 (1) AsylG) to apply for asylum in a BAMF branch (§ 14
AsylVfG). Personal data will be recorded, fingerprints and a picture will be taken and
all will be saved in the data room of EURODAC (Heinhold, 2015) (obvious gaps in
this system are not discussed here). The fingerprint will ensure that the foreigner has
not already applied for asylum in another EU country according to the EURODAC
Regulation No. 603/2013. A person illegally entering the country or using a falsified
passport can be sued (Heinhold, 2015). If a foreigner has escaped persecution in his
country and has illegally entered Germany, but explains his case, he will not be sued
according to Article 31 (1) GRC. The foreigner is prohibited to re-enter the country’s
borders if expelled, but the expulsion has only temporary effect (§ 11 (1+2) Aufen-
thG). An illegal re-entry will be sued with imprisonment of up to one year (§ 95 (2)
No. 1 AufenthG).
After a successful application for asylum was made, the foreigner will be invited
for a hearing, if the situational context and regulatory knowledge does not automati-
cally grant the right of asylum, currently e.g. for Christians and Yazidis from Syria.
6.5.3.2.2
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The BAMF uses several practices to be able to differentiate ‘real’ refugees from the
ones trying to enter the country by claiming to have a certain nationality and origin
for their personal benefit. The language-analysts raise questions to political and geo-
graphical features and discuss several topics in their mother tongue during a hearing
session. Dialects and knowledge about specific parts of e.g. the city of Damascus, if
indicated as home town, will help distinguish a person telling the truth from an un-
trustworthy person (Heinhold, 2015).
A person will be granted legal permit to stay for the time the application for asy-
lum is examined (§ 55 (1) 1 AsylVfG, § 63 (1) AsylVfG). The residence permit is can-
celled when e.g. the foreigner is expulsed (§ 67 (1) No. 1+1 a AsylVfG) or if the for-
eigner has not officially applied for asylum within two weeks of staying in Germany
(§ 67 (2) No. 2 AsylVfG). For the first six weeks, but for not longer than three months,
the foreigner has to stay in the institution for first admittance (§ 47 AsylVfG) in the
district of the respective administration (§ 56 (1) AsylVfG). After three months of stay
within Germany, the territorial limitation ceases, however, travelling is still prohibited
without prior authorization (§ 58 AsylVfG).
The monetary benefits Germany grants for asylum seekers are defined in § 3
AsylbLG. The height of these rates varies, depending on asylum seekers staying in an
institution for first admittance (§ 3 (1) AsylbLG) or living externally (§ 3 (2) Asyl-
bLG). Foreigners coming to Germany in order to solely receive benefits shall be
avoided. Therefore, benefits are only granted to the ones defined in § 1 AsylbLG, like
asylum entitled individuals (§ 1 No. 1 AsylbLG), the ones under the title of tolerance
according to § 60 a AufenthG (§ 1 No. 4 AsylbLG) and the ones who are obligated to
leave the country (enforceable title), but ‘threat of deportation’ cannot be performed
anymore (§ 1 No. 5 AsylbLG). However, shortening benefits is extremely difficult and
a highly delicate topic, as it contradicts with human dignity and the idea of a social
state (Heinhold, 2015).
Asylum seekers are not allowed to take up work as long as they reside in an insti-
tution for first admittance (§ 61 (1) AsylVfG). After three months of stay within the
federal territory of Germany, a work placement can be allowed in accordance with the
Federal Labor Office. The prerequisite of the work placement is that no German na-
tional or EU worker is available for the specific work (§ 39 (2) AufenthG) at the re-
spective time.
Lacking Harmonization and Failure of Dublin III
The Schengen Convention of 1990 resulted in the abolition of border controls within
the Schengen area, so the cooperation on asylum began as a measure to compensate
for the member states’ loss of control options. At the same time, the member states
agreed on the Dublin Convention concerning asylum, which entered into force in
1997. ‘Forum shopping’ and the phenomenon of ‘refugees in orbit’ (definition: appli-
cants are relegated from one member state to the other, without any state declaring to
be responsible for examining the respective application due to the domestic safe third-
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country ruling (Hailbronner/Thym, 2016)) should be prevented by the adoption of
these measures. There was no substantive harmonization of asylum procedures in the
Union, and the Treaty of Maastricht declared the issue of asylum an area of common
interest that had to be realized through intergovernmental decision-making, but opt-
out possibilities prevented a harmonized approach to asylum. The Treaty of Amster-
dam created a supranational competence within the TFEU, but it was not before the
Treaty of Lisbon until the supranationalization of asylum was achieved. Minimum
standards in line with respective EU competences have been created in 1999 as the
idea of a Common European Asylum System was issued as legally binding objective.
Later on the minimum standards were replaced by a common set of rules, aiming to
reduce disparities and to increase harmonization between member states (Hailbron-
ner/Thym, 2016).
The Union’s internal security has been a growth area over years: it was possible to
identify a common migration and asylum policy, but harmonizing and covering all
aspects of the policy remained impossible. Legal barriers complicated and prevented
an effective cooperation between member states on internal security issues. Since
2000, EU law has covered asylum, irregular migration, family and labor migration
and the right of migrants to be long-term residents in the Union.
The lack of commitment and cooperation between member states hampered the
work of Frontex, which reported ‘illegal stay and asylum record levels in the second
half of the crisis year 2015 and a significantly higher level of irregular migration in Q2
2016’ (Frontex Q2, 2016: 9). A lack of willingness to share responsibility in form of
taking in refugees and the ignorance of newly developed structures to reinforce oper-
ational capacity only raised the question whether the new routes became increasingly
dangerous for refugees but not how to decrease the influx of persons effectively. The
member states’ reluctance to pool internal security resources in order to increase the
EU’s capacity to deal with the crisis was accompanied by national governments’ ten-
dency to limit the scope of the Union’s supranational legislation (Kenealy/Peterson,
2015).
An Europeanization, that is to say the transfer of competences of Asylum Law on
Union level, has taken place in order to standardize and harmonize the legal treat-
ment of foreigners and asylum seekers within the EU. The Hague Program of 10 May
2005 (Official Journal C 236 of 24 September 2005) was another step in order to har-
monize the variety of asylum applications across the Union. The Dublin III Regu-
lation, launched in 2013, was seen as further improvement, as it prevented the previ-
ously often used attempts of foreigners and refugees to seek asylum in more than one
European member state in order to benefit from social payments and welfare systems
(Heinhold, 2015). Despite the aim to harmonize Asylum Law across the Union, there
is still no full standardization, and more work is needed to define a burden sharing,
balanced and ‘European’ approach to migration.
Different decision-making processes and an inadequate implementation of proce-
dures hinder a uniform treatment of foreigners. First, the protection quote typical of a
specific country differs between the member states: it may be 10% in one and 70% in
another country. Moreover, the living conditions for accepted refugees vary dramati-
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cally: Germany provides integration courses and training for improved access to work
placements and society, but other countries do not put much effort in these measures
(see Annex P: Statistics on Asylum). The Union targets a harmonized asylum treat-
ment, as expressed in Article 78 TFEU: ‘guaranteeing equal treatment of refugees in
all member states, resulting in a union-wide common asylum status.’ However, the
member states demonstrate actual non-compliance and non-performance as satisfac-
torily implementation is lacking, provoking legally and illegally onward migration
and confirmatory applications elsewhere (Heinhold, 2015).
The Dublin III Regulation is criticized because refuge seekers do not tend to sur-
render their fate but refuse to apply for asylum in certain countries and illegally try to
get to another one with better future opportunities, creating an imbalance. As long as
there is no harmonization of standards, as originally declared in the EU Stockholm
Program of 2010, refugees will not cease to prevent being crammed in barracks with-
out receiving benefits to cover their subsistence level, thus triggering secondary
movements and illegal border-crossings. The EU-Stockholm Program aimed at a har-
monization of recognition criteria and residence conditions across the member states,
and in case of acceptance the refugee should be granted the same rights as Union citi-
zens have, referring to the freedom of movement, which is highly criticized by skep-
tics. So far, the freedom of movement is limited to the respective country. The Stock-
holm Agenda also aimed at a harmonization in terms of social law, meaning a unified
welfare program to prevent the selective choosing of a state with the highest benefit
(Heinhold, 2015). Member states would benefit from sharing the burden equally and
by successfully demonstrating assistance in humanitarian matters.
Critics argue that the Dublin III Agreement and the common practice since 1997
to deport refugees to border countries as first contact countries, does not work any-
more due to the lack of intra-European solidarity in asylum matters. This debate trig-
gered the idea of ‘Dublin vs. Quota,’ referring to the equal distribution of refugees
across the member states in order to release the Union’s border countries (Ziedler,
2012). As the Dublin III Agreement requires asylum applications to be dealt with by
the first country of entry (European Commission, 2015), defining the admission and
deportation of refugees in the respective border countries where the first ground con-
tact took place, Greece and Italy reached the limits to fulfill their obligation under the
agreement to function successfully and to provide humanitarian aid on the ground
(Ziedler, 2012). In 2012, a European capacity quota was already discussed due to the
lack of intra-European solidarity in asylum matters. Germany applies an equivalent
distribution key within the state called ‘Königsberger Schlüssel,’ to allocate refugees
across the 16 federal states (see Annex Q: The Registration of Refugees portrayed ex-
emplarily at the Federal Republic of Germany). The UK and Denmark do not partici-
pate in the European Asylum politics, and Greece, Italy and Hungary are freed of the
quota. East European countries still defend the quota regulations (Schwarz, 2015),
therefore Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have not received any refuge seek-
ers so far (Unknown, 2016 b).
On 22 September 2015, the European Commission released a fact sheet on the
European Agenda on Migration adopted on 12 May 2015, aiming to coordinate and
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develop a European response to the refugees and migration front. Concrete measures
were proposed, like defining a common European list of safe countries of origin, an
emergency relocation for people in clear need of international protection from Greece,
Hungary and Italy and a crisis relocation mechanism to be inserted into the Dublin
Regulation. Refugee support measures and an emergency trust fund for Africa, im-
proved communication and addressing the external dimension of the refugee crisis
were proposed as concrete steps in order to solve the crisis. According to the treaty,
the UK and Ireland as well as Denmark have an ‘opt-out’ (see Glossary) possibility,
but Ireland and Denmark opted in and announced to participate in the relocation
efforts. The European Commission proposed a distribution key for all member states
on the legal basis of Article 78 (3) TFEU, stating that ‘in the event of one or more
member states being confronted by an emergency situation, characterized by a sud-
den inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Com-
mission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the member state(s) con-
cerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.’ In case a member state
cannot take part in the emergency relocation, the state has to make a financial contri-
bution of 0.002% of its GDP to support and finance efforts undertaken to cope with
the crisis. Syrians and Iraqis are the nationals who are most likely to benefit from the
relocation scheme, having an average EU-wide asylum recognition rate higher than
75%. The size of the population, the total GDP, the average number of asylum appli-
cants per one million inhabitants and the unemployment rate are considered when
calculating the distribution key for relocation across the member states. It shall be en-
sured that all applicants enjoy their right of protection as soon as possible and to pre-
vent an unduly prolonged stay in the EU (European Commission, 2015). Current de-
bates show the urgent need to finally define safe countries of origin to speed up de-
portation, but political disagreement hampers an effective implementation of the tar-
geted measures.
The Union is not able to control events happening in potential refugees’ countries
of origin by nature, but these incidents trigger cross-border movements. The situation
of the Union’s external borders became subject to debates as more and more people
tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea or the Eastern Mediterranean routes from
Turkey to Greece. Secondary movements were triggered, as many of the rights grant-
ed to individuals under the European Directive 2011/95/EU (see Annex R: The Direc-
tive 2011/95/EU) and the status of refugee under international protection could not
be accessed in EU border countries. The reality of Europe’s borders varied from its
manifestation (Richter, 2015) (see Annex S: Differentiation between Directive and
Regulation). Human rights organizations reported daily from push back methods in
Greece, Spain or Italy. The excessive demand in these countries, the flood of people
arriving within a short time span, the inability to react accordingly on the spot and
the resulting push back methods caused illegal secondary movements as well. Richter
(2015: 208) claims that ‘granting asylum is worthless if no perspective is provided.’
Like in all sciences the answer to this question highly depends on the individual point
of view and the ‘perspective.’ The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘perspective’ as ‘particu-
lar attitude towards something as viewpoint.’ Therefore, both points of view have to be
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analyzed in order to conclude on this issue. European citizens enjoy e.g. the right of
free speech, the right of assembly and the right to openly discuss political issues and
express antipathy to the leading government as natural rights, yet these rights should
not be seen as international standard but as exclusive rights granted to just a small
part of the world. From the perspective of a foreigner under refugee status, the
question turns out to be more philosophical, referring to living in a peaceful environ-
ment as equivalent to perspective, compared to the previous reality of state prosecu-
tion, serious harm and omnipresent war, causing danger to life and limb. Again, it has
to be differentiated and terms have to be clearly defined.
As the individuals entering Europe’s borders during the refugee crisis are not nec-
essarily refugees according to the Geneva Refugee Convention but possibly also eco-
nomic migrants and forum shoppers, a clear demarcation has to be drawn, as it is im-
possible to receive migrants as ‘asylum seekers’ from all countries with a lower GDP
per capita than the European average. Moroccans or Algerians do not have high
chances to get a European residence permit, so nationals of these countries disappear
from the screen upon arrival, without being registered at all or registered in multiple
places and countries once they have entered the Union. An improvement through
system harmonization is urgently needed to treat all refugees equally and to prevent
terrorists from masking their identity, as well as multiple registrations under different
identities, nationalities and religions to improve asylum chances in the respective
country.
The Union has to support countries of origin, the ones in need of development
aid and the ones in civil war causing people to flee, but it has to be differentiated be-
tween actual support and imposing a ready-made structure of Western-style democ-
racy on historically undemocratic countries. Countries like Germany need to imple-
ment an immigration act to cope with the influx of people (refugees and economic
migrants) sustainably, now and in the future (Richter, 2015).
So far, the EU did not respond consistently, and skeptics refer to the Union as
‘fortress Europe.’ It is argued that the EU tries to prevent migrants from reaching the
Union by taking too restrictive measures (Hailbronner/Thym, 2016). Skeptics also ar-
gue that alliances between states were temporary, and it is claimed that Europe’s best
days were most probably behind it. Despite the divided national opinions concerning
e.g. the treatment of refugees, the Union still sticks together, and Euro-critics find it
hard to explain this phenomenon. Tony Blair, then British prime minister, had already
urged in 2000 that the Union should become a superpower but not a super state (Ke-
nealy/Peterson, 2015). As long as disrespecting the Union’s decisions, like the quota
distribution, is repelled by some member states, placing national interests before the
common European good, it will be challenging for the Union to enforce lasting solu-
tions. Controversies, blockades and permanent border closings are no reasonable so-
lutions for people waiting outside these borders and the ones living behind the closed
borders, suddenly deceived from their freedom of movement.
Humanitarian responsibility, driven by the passion for vividly living the Union’s
ideals in order to preserve European values, is the key to durable behavioral patterns,
saving human lives and satisfying the Union’s standard in aid possibilities. Critics ar-
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gue that member states can redeem themselves easily, which does not result in the tar-
geted improvement of intra-European solidary. It is the refugee crisis that might trig-
ger a lasting change in the Union, but it is on the member states cohesion to not fall
apart in individual states but to stand together and develop a sustainable solution in-
cluding the lessons learned, marking the turning point in the crisis towards a sustain-
able future in a united Europe.
Legal Recommendations
The economic development, the ongoing progress of increased mobility, technical im-
provements and cross-border communication possibilities as part of globalization re-
sulted in the awareness that regulations limited to national borders are ineffective, as
the Union requires unification and standardization. This idea is not new, and the
Union has already worked to improve the situation, but during the current crisis the
lack of harmonization and solidarity became dramatically evident regarding the
asymmetry of asylum applications or the failure of e.g. the Greek asylum system,
which was found not to be in compliance with human rights standards and EU legis-
lation (Hailbronner/Thym, 2016).
In 2012, during the French election campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy criticized the
Schengen area due to a lack of solidarity and missing political leadership, turning the
idea of a borderless Union into an uncontrollable area of facilitated illegal migration
and organized criminality. Despite recent regulations and developments, the Schen-
gen area is said to have lost its effective functioning. A borderless Union without ef-
fective border controls is an idea driven ad absurdum (Winter, 2012). The TFEU de-
fines that ‘the Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the
functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Treaties’ (Article 26 (1) TFEU). The concept refers to secured external borders with
improved border management and supported local authorities in the respective bor-
der countries to prevent illegal migration and comparable migration waves that Euro-
pe faced in late 2015 (Gillert, 2016).
New measures have to be adopted, especially in the field of data collection sys-
tems. Due to historical reasons, data protection is taken very seriously in Europe, yet
the climaxed situation and tense political state facing the growing right-wing de-
mands urgent change and flexible improvements. EURODAC turned out to not effec-
tively meet the expected technical support. Although finger prints were saved in the
system, follow-up examinations showed that ‘persons who threat’ have been regis-
tered under diverse identities and nationalities somewhere across the Union. The wel-
fare abuse by others also questions data synchronization and demands for urgently
needed improvements. As European citizens are registered and have an identity card
or passport with their biometrical data, the same should be demanded from ‘foreign-
ers,’ despite their reason to enter the Union, thus including refugees under the defini-
tion of the Refugee Convention and the Directive 2011/95/EU. The common practice




ones enjoying a shortened and loosened procedure, like GRC refugees, persons under
subsidiary protection and recognized asylum seekers, should be suspended, facing the
increased level of terrorism and the intentional abuse of social welfare systems under
forged identity and multiple registration, again a hint at the non-functioning of re-
spective databases and systems. Moreover, measures should be adopted in time to
support the fast expulsion of individuals, as there are several groups of foreigners that
are hard to expulse, even though they constitute danger and harm. For an effective
security concept, the exclusive protection from non-refoulement for certain groups of
foreigners should also be loosened. The title for tolerance should only be granted in
exceptional cases to prevent further abuse of Europe as a value system.
Frontex operations outside the European borders are currently discussed, but the
disagreement as to how to treat the refugees and how to deal with the situation splits
the governments and challenges common decision-making (Bewarder/Gillert, 2016).
It is questionable whether the Schengen area will remain in its known structure. So
far, it can be said that the collaboration of Schengen countries has not worked sus-
tainably in the crisis. An excessive demand, the lack of financial support, the denial of
the crisis’ true scope for too long, and a Union functioning rather on an individual
basis than as supranational entity resulted in a debilitated effect causing security gaps
and trouble. By discussing the crisis and the effects of closed borders for refugees, the
debate leaves out Europeans and rather portrays a one-sided matter. The unique con-
cept behind the Schengen area is worth to be preserved, and referring to the four free-
doms Union citizens can benefit from, it is essential not to undermine the granted
rights for Europeans in order to serve the common. The impetus for discussion
should be about how to balance the interests and needs of Europeans while simulta-
neously meeting the demands of refugees regarding their rights under humanity and
human dignity.
The refugee crisis showed that ‘Dublin’ has failed, but the Dublin Regulation has
potentially also failed due to the refugee crisis. Since its implementation, the mass of
migrants crossing Europe’s border within a short time span has reached a peak now
during the refugee crisis. The central European states are mostly the designated final
destinations of refugees across various nationalities. Reaching these states without en-
tering the Union’s borders illegally was prevented through respective articles under
Dublin, as the Regulation made the first country, in which a refugee arrives, responsi-
ble for proceeding the asylum claim, naturally the border countries Greece, Italy, Mal-
ta or Spain. Dublin failed, and the excessive attempts by refugees not to get registered
in a country other than the central European states shows that Dublin has to be re-
newed. However, the imbalance created through destinations chosen under different
prerequisites causes a burden for states like Germany and Sweden. A distribution per
quota and a definite EU-wide limitation of intake per annum is useful and needed in
order to realize integration, to provide accommodation and meet essential needs.
It is important to enhance EU-collaboration and the external border management,
to harmonize registration systems across the Union and to show solidarity among the
member states. In today’s times of increased fear and prejudice, condensed in right
parties’ electoral success, triggering insecurity and one-sided accusations by scape-
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goating, the Union is invited to implement mechanisms that can successfully hinder
the development of xenophobia by using the competences transferred to efficiently
work and function as a supranational entity, built in accordance on the shoulders of
the member states. The Union is asked to demonstrate its functioning and working,
and it is during these days that the European Union can show the world its unique
model of consensus finding, working hand in hand to solve a crisis that affects all
member states equally. Standing together in good times is easy, aiming to hold togeth-
er in challenging times demonstrates the will and the ability of 28 nations, govern-
ments and people to jointly work for a sustainable future rooting in the Union-credo
‘united in diversity.’
The EU considers itself an area of protection. Granting asylum is an international
obligation, but the degree of granted asylum varies according to the states’ willingness.
The member states, sharing fundamental values, should feel similarly obliged to grant
asylum and provide equal and fair procedures. It is stressed that the borderless Union
has to apply a joint approach to guarantee high standards of refugee protection. Uni-
form standards and a similar outcome have to be ensured in order to prevent unilat-
erally advantageous treatment. ‘The right of asylum’ should rather be understood as
mercy, not as an enforceable right, but the author’s impulse is rather philosophical.
Since 1999, the EU has been working on a common European Asylum System to
improve the legislative framework. Some harmonizing minimum standards for asy-
lum have already been adopted, like the Refugee Fund and the Family Reunification
Directive that applies to refugees as well. The EU is striving for more harmonization
in terms of the standards of protection and to increase the level of cooperation and
solidarity among the member states. To ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally
across the Union in a fair and transparent procedure, the EU released common high
standards on strong cooperation: the revised Asylum Procedure Directive for fairer
and quicker asylum decisions, the revised Reception Conditions Directive ensuring
the respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers across the Union, and the re-
vised Dublin Regulation detecting problems in national asylum systems. Neverthe-
less, the harmonization efforts seem far from being eventually implemented in the
member states’ practice or in the individual states’ feeling of responsibility. These
times demand for solidarity purely arising from intra-European understanding as
unity and go far beyond the legal responsibilities and the simple performance of obli-
gations. The Union can prove its actual coherence now, but it is most likely that the
EU will split internally at the end of this crisis and be clustered in countries with
strong striving for unity and the ones preferring a rather loosened approach. The cri-





The Global Threat of Terrorism
Terror – Classification and Distinction
Linguistically, it has to be distinguished between ‘amok’ and ‘terror,’ as amok is psy-
chologically and terror politically motivated. Amok is abbreviated from the Malayan
word ‘amuk’ (English: angry, furious) and characterized by a lack of solid, organized
planning. The act itself is rather spontaneous and random. The culprit is motivated by
personal revenge, therefore an amok attacker is mostly acting alone (Seidler, 2016).
The draconian reign (French: regime de la terreur) of the Jacobins in France of
1793 is likely to be the origin of the term ‘terror,’ which is characterized by an ideolo-
gy, political goals and violence (Seidler, 2016). Despite today’s negative connotation,
terror was originally seen as instrument to re-establish order (Aubrey, 2004). A ter-
rorist is motivated to change the state’s system and/or the society by spreading fear.
Politicians can fight terrorism by releasing decrees to support existing safety measures
and to take precautions like restricting access to special areas and improving control
mechanisms on body and luggage checks. There is no universally accepted definition
of terror, and the differentiation between ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom fighter’ is controver-
sial, as it is highly dependent on the perspective (Seidler, 2016).
Terrorist Organizations as Global Threat
There are different organizations causing attacks like e.g. Al Quaida, Al Shabaab, the
Islamic State or the Taliban. All of them are classified as terrorist groups but vary re-
garding their degree to act globally. A new form of dangerous interruptions within
settled states, as the EU can be referred to, became apparent over the last years: reli-
giously oriented terrorism as dangerous omnipresent companion. In 2015, France,
Greece, Italy, Denmark, Spain and the UK faced 211 failed, foiled and completed ter-
rorist attacks. 151 people died and over 360 were injured. In total, 1,077 individuals
were arrested and accused for terrorism-related offences, 424 in France alone. 94% of
the arrested individuals were prosecuted for jihadist terrorism and found guilty (Eu-
ropol, 2016 a). The following table provides a chronological overview of terrorist at-
tacks in European countries over the last three years. There have been many addi-
tional terrorist attacks all over the world in the years between 2014 and 2016, yet the
table focuses solely on religiously oriented attacks within the EU that were executed





Terrorist Attacks across Europe between 2014 and 2016
Year Date Country City Location
2014 24 May Belgium Brussels Jewish museum
2015 7 January France Paris ‘Charlie Hebdo’
9 January France Porte de Vincennes Hostage-taking
27 April Bosnia-Herzegovina Zvornik Police station
20 July Turkey Suruç Festival
10 October Turkey Ankara Peace demonstration
13 November France Paris Series of attacks
18 November Bosnia- Herzegovina Sarajevo Street, bus, authorities
2016 12 January Turkey Istanbul Sultan-Ahmed place
19 March Turkey Istanbul Boulevard
22 March Belgium Brussels Airport, metro station
13 June France Magnanville Police officers
28 June Turkey Istanbul Airport attack
14 July France Nice Boulevard
18 July Germany Würzburg ‘Axe attack’ in train
24 July Germany Ansbach Festival
26 July France Saint-Etienne-du-
Rouvray
Church attack
6 August Belgium Charleroi Police officers
20 August Turkey Gaziantep (Kurdish) wedding
20 December Germany Berlin Christmas market
Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2016
The PKK has neither roots in the Arab Spring nor is it a religiously oriented terrorist
organization. Based on drivers and goals of the PKK, which are not explained further
in this paper, the Kurdish organization is not considered a global threat, but a region-
al voice for Kurdish political autonomy, however, ‘classified as terrorist organization’
(Government UK, 2016). Therefore, attacks executed by the PKK in Turkey have not
been included in the table. The terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks as
militant organization and faction of the PKK in February, March and June 2016 are
also not included in the table above, due to the explained reasons.
An US-led coalition against ISIS was set up in 2014 and includes 62 countries in
total. Air support and other military equipment are provided by 20 out of 62 coalition
partners. Excluding non-European partners of the alliance, inter alia, the UK, the
Netherlands, Germany, France and Belgium are militarily involved in the fight against
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Amongst others, Norway, Sweden and Aus-
tria focus on humanitarian aid, and Finland expresses support as ally (Freeman,
2014).
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In 2014, Alan Henning, a British hostage, was executed on camera ‘in response to
British air strikes against the positions of [IS] in Iraq’ (Mamoun, 2014). On video,
Henning was supposed to refer his execution to the British parliament’s decision to
attack the Islamic State. By directly referring to David Cameron and the British par-
liament, the British-originated Jihadi headsman dismissed his burden from the action.
Before, several videos of live-executions of e.g. ‘UK aid worker David Haines and two
American Journalists, Steven Sotloff and James Foley, were released by the self-named
state’ (Mamoun, 2014). The likelihood of terrorist attacks happening in Europe in-
creased over the last couple of years. Moreover, a geographical concentration and an
enhanced probability of terrorist attacks executed in countries that are involved in
military intervention as partners of the anti-IS coalition can be identified (Freeman,
2014). The ‘Annex T: Terrorist Attacks’ provides an overview of worldwide terrorist
attacks and best demonstrates the previously mentioned geographical concentration
in major European states as anti-IS coalition partners, namely France and Germany.
Generally, bombing and explosions can be identified as the most frequently used type
of terrorist attack, followed by armed assaults and hostage-taking (compare Annex T).
The number of injuries after an attack refers to the author’s cautious assumption that
the terroristic focus nowadays is not on creating the most damage possible, despite
the fact that every terror victim is a victim too many, but on frequency and the reality
that an act of violence has actually happened. The lone wolfe phenomenon, which is
explained further in Chapter 7.3, supports the assumption, as nowadays jihadist ter-
rorism is dominated by a lack of deadlines and specified targets, which make it essen-
tially difficult for police forces to trace and prevent such acts of violence.
Terror 2.0 – Unpredictable and Anonymous
Over the last years, the European Union has been exposed to a continuously growing
level of overall security threats, including the danger and influence arising from polit-
ically unstable countries bordering the Single Market (e.g. Libya). Jihadist terrorism
and foreign terrorist travelers are of main concern for the Union and its member
states. Despite the fact that the majority of recent terror attacks were executed in the
name of the Islamic State, Al Quaida and other violent (religious) militant groups still
have to be considered active and dangerous (Europol, 2016 b).
On the first day of Ramadan, 29 June 2014, the Islamic State was symbolically re-
established as Caliphate (Musharbash, 2014) but did not engage in terrorist attacks in
Europe before August 2014 (Reuter, 2015). Within the first 18 months, ‘al-Dawla al-
Islamiya fi al-Iraq w al-Sham’ (acronym: Daesh, English: Islamic State of Iraq and Syr-
ia) undertook 50 attacks in 18 countries causing 1,100 victims and leaving over 1,700
people injured. Analyzes showed that IS prefers soft targets, as it is more effective to
inflict mass causalities on an urban population, aiming at well-publicized terror, than
to attack military bases (Europol, 2016 b). The re-establishment of the Caliphate is
also important, as referring to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his establishment of a small
Wahhabi state in the 18th century, the loyal Qur’an interpretation in line with the con-
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cept of ‘tauhid’ (English: unity with God) is a prerequisite and demands the active
fight against ‘shirk,’ meaning all societal and religiously oriented practice, which does
not root in the times of the Prophet (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 112). It is
essential to understand the drivers and goals of militant organizations to classify and
categorize the existing danger and uncover unknown threats to the society, especially
as the Western world is unfamiliar with the ideological background.
The World Wide Web as cause and trigger of globalization has influenced the
communication process and data exchange of terrorist organizations as well. The
change in the process of radicalization is characterized by facilitated access to infor-
mation and speed of data exchange. Before, supporters and sympathizers passed
training in a respective foreign country in so-called ‘terror camps.’ ‘Being educated in
different disciplines, the returnee was on call or directly instructed with a target’
(Luther/Vu, 2016). Today, technology facilitates the radicalization process. The World
Wide Web is huge, obscure and opaque, opening up doors for dangerous propaganda
of shady organizations recruiting online. Despite the digital fingerprint, the anonymi-
ty of the internet provides a platform for the glorious presentation of an ideology, as
holding specific recruiters accountable remains difficult. The key for the Online-
Caliphate is physical independence, as there is no need to be at the same place due to
online campaigns and advertisements. As result of the diversity regarding planning
and executing possibilities, the in-depth understanding of attacks has to be modified
by distinguishing between different typologies of attackers. Apart from specific train-
ing in terror camps, threats of previously unknown terror affiliates have emerged.
First, ‘lone wolves,’ a phenomenon of unobtrusive individuals unknown to the police,
self-radicalized via the internet without having personal contact to a particular terror
organization. The lone wolf acts on behalf of the ideology, but not at the behest of a
certain group and without previously arranged target. Despite this type of lone wolf,
living partially secluded from society, research showed that there are confidants in
around 60% of the cases. Second, there are lone wolves directly communicating with
terrorist groups via chat rooms. Ideas regarding targets, implementation and realiza-
tion are exchanged, but no direct instructions are given. The act itself would be incal-
culable and potentially spontaneous. A third type of lone wolf is communicating with
so-called virtual planners supporting the lone wolf in choosing a target and in assist-
ing in the technical planning without giving a specific order or deadline (Luther/Vu,
2016).
The actual threat, regarding what the author refers to as ‘terror 2.0,’ is caused by
terror groups operating from far away, different types of lone wolves, and acts plotted
by returnees, as so-called foreign terrorist travelers and women dedicating their life to
the ideology of IS, willingly leaving their country to get married to an IS fighter, are
referred to. The majority of foreign terrorist travelers is indeed female. Their role is
not to neglect, as they have already volunteered as e.g. suicide bombers. Although the
likelihood of women returning to their European home countries is marginal, a future
security threat to the Union lies in the fact that the minors, born and grown up in the
IS territory, get trained as next generation of IS fighters. Returnees have to be precise-
ly monitored, not simply because of them initiating fundraising and improving re-
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cruitment within the EU, but due to further radicalization activities, as they still hold
strong bonds with the terrorist and militant organizations abroad (Europol, 2016 b).
Despite the absence of apocalyptic mysticism in Islam, the messianic return of a
‘mahdi’, a so-called infallible individual guided and selected as Imam by God, enjoys
distribution across the World Wide Web and on online platforms advertising the IS.
The concept is military-driven, and according to the prophecy it will take place in the
region of Syria. The connection between the fascination for the hereafter and the re-
sulted indifference regarding life in this world, is an ideological programming, which
caused a new form of violent willingness the world has to cope with in the 21st centu-
ry (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 80, 81).
Although there are no concrete numbers of terrorists available to prove how
many have abused the refugee wave to enter the external borders of the EU unnoticed,
recent follow-up examination of attacks proved that it already happened (e.g. Berlin
attacks, December 2016). The consequences of the uncontrolled migration cover the
media and social debates and fuel right-wing extremism. Both perspectives are target-
ed: asylum seekers as well as the fear of European citizens to be played off security-
wise, as border guards cannot sustainably distinguish between terrorists, civilians and
refugees. In order to secure what people refer to as ‘Union’s task,’ civilian street patrols
have developed in form of vigilante justice and emerge particularly in Scandinavian
countries (Europol, 2016 b).
Founded in 1998, Europol is seated in The Hague as law enforcement agency. By
identifying the major threats to the internal security of the Union, Europol helps de-
tect criminal and terrorist networks in order to fight international crime including or-
ganized fraud, counterfeiting, smuggling and cybercrime, as well as trafficking human
beings and terrorism (Europol, 2016 c). For the security forces and police it remains
challenging to discover sympathizers of IS ideology, keeping track of suspected indi-
viduals and to check on those, who might actually be able to perform violent acts.
However, the number of arrests increased from 2014 to 2015, showing the intensity
and effort to fight this new form of terrorism as global threat (Europol, 2016 b).
Recommendations
Removing borders in order to create a Single Market results in obligations and rights
for the joining member states. The registration of migrants entering the Union takes
place in e.g. Greece, geographically located at the Union’s eastern border. Disregard-
ing the mass of influx of people, Athens refused help while failing to manage the reg-
istration for the wave of migrants arriving on the spot (Traynor, 2015). Aiming to
maintain the same or even an improved security level for the individual states, the
Union is responsible for an efficient external border management. Intensified cooper-
ation, common solidarity and facilitated data exchange are prerequisites of a sustain-
able European Union facing security issues. The existing lack of harmonization in the
field of networking and databases became apparent in the follow-up investigation into




despite them being known as terror suspects. After the attacks, politicians asked for a
revision of the Schengen Borders Code, aiming at systematic controls of EU citizens
and foreigners, focusing, inter alia, on the verification of biometrical data. The securi-
ty gap that Europe faces today is driven by globalization including intermingled polit-
ics, as all countries are affected by geopolitical change and impact, but the refugee cri-
sis also caused an increase of incidents over time due to the open border policy that
was driven by humanitarian reasons. Recent events demonstrate great omissions that
have been willingly accepted back then by allowing persons with unidentified identi-
ties to cross the Union’s borders. Despite humanitarian aid and the respect for hu-
manity, no country in the world can afford to create, willingly or naïvely, a security
gap to this extent.
It is highly recommended to harmonize the refugee databases across the Union,
as the current situation of fragile external borders, the potential risk of terrorist at-
tacks and terrorist organizations aiming to harm the Western world are still present.
The EU has to change and urgently to adapt its common practice: biometrical data
and fingerprints have to be taken when the Union’s external borders are crossed. Per-
sons without valid papers have to be separated until their identity is proven. To pre-
vent illegal means and multiple registrations, new measures have to be installed: Arti-
cle 38 (9) of the Schengen Agreement states that the communication of data is sup-
posed to be only preserved as long as necessary for the purpose exchanged and will be
deleted afterwards. However, the recorded communication on information exchanged
according to Article 38 (8) SA, which includes e.g. identity, travel documents and res-
idence permits (Article 38 (2) (a-g) SA), should actually be preserved and saved in a
database, justified on the basis of the current situation and overall security threat
across the Union.
Moreover, it is essential to define a list of safe countries of origin, like e.g. Moroc-
co, Algeria and Tunisia. Many critics of this practice argue with regard to human
rights violations or limited press freedom, but the European standards in terms of hu-
man rights, freedoms and law enforcement mechanisms are higher than the common
standards in many countries worldwide, so the comparison is unequal anyway. ‘Argu-
ing to safeguard those, who live below the European standard, means simultaneously
accepting all persons whose countries of origin do not meet these somehow unique
standards’ (Durankiev, 2015). Due to, inter alia, the lack of women’s rights, the repres-
sion of culture and religion, tyranny, corruption, violent suppression of protests by re-
ligious and militant extremists, Nigeria, Yemen, Myanmar, North Korea, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Syria
are classified as the countries with the worst human rights violations at 2015 levels
(Durankiev, 2015). Many individuals used the open door policy to access Europe due
to economic reasons, referring to the EU social welfare systems. To avoid abuse of Eu-
rope as community, safe countries of origin have to be defined and entry refusals have
to be pronounced at the Union’s borders if individuals cannot be clearly categorized
as ‘refugees,’ but as economically driven migrants. There is a legal demarcation be-
tween the term ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant,’ but the means to enforce the consequences
lack in reality. The currently increased and obvious security threat was triggered by an
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uncontrolled entry and the abuse of some, taking the chance to hide behind a forged
identity, name and nationality, again, without prejudice and stereotypes on refugees
or ethnicities.
The Arab Spring offered many with dubious past the possibility to start a new life
abroad under false name, erasing the connection to potential previous convictions.
The Union is challenged regarding the means of deportation in case the states of ori-
gin refuse to take back their national citizens, or in case the national is expecting
death penalty in his home country but has entered the Union using a forged passport
to hide the past. Problems occur, despite violent attacks, regarding falsified identities,
challenging the entire process of deportation. Dublin failed, but the common practice
of a detention and deportation duration of four days has to be modified as well: de-
portation has to be facilitated, especially when an affiliation with terrorism is proven
or highly suspected. Countries of origin should not be allowed to refuse the taking
back of a demonstrably national citizen, which simply prolongs the investigation and
stresses diplomacy. International consequences and penalties should be implemented.
It has to be classified between refugees and all kinds of drivers motivating individuals
to move to Europe. But in case of verifiable criminal records, a disappearance from
the screen should be prevented. The comparison of granted rights within Europe and
abroad should be kept in mind to distinguish between humanity and naivety. A
stricter policy has to be established in order not to be abused as value community.
The voluntary (European-originated) Daesh fighters (Germany: ~450 of 7,000
sympathizers joined IS so far (Hanne/Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 46)) later returnees
or fanatics on spot are instrumentalized and constitute a severe intra-EU security
threat. The executed acts of violence by IS sympathizers or affiliates might be a dis-
traction or a simple side effect of the IS-driven expansion policies. In both ways, the
Caliphate welcomes to be named as reference to increase its area of influence. The
European standard of data protection is very high, but due to the current situation an
improvement and an adaption are needed. At the moment, there are 522 persons re-
ferred to as ‘those who cause threat’ and known by name to the competent authorities
in Germany. 264 of them are living in Germany and 82 are currently arrested
(Statista, 2016 a). Competent police authorities should improve European coordina-
tion of data exchange and access to data (e.g. e-mail) should be facilitated. Skeptics
refer to ‘Big Brother is watching you’ (Orwell, 2006: 8), but for the overall security it is
essential to catch terror affiliates as early as possible and to detect networks and sym-
pathizers. In the end, facilitated access to data and spot checks frightens only those
who have to hide something. Standing up for common security and supporting the
authorities in their task to fight terrorism, law enforcement mechanisms have to be
improved to facilitate screening and early detection.
Other prevention mechanisms have to be implemented on the ground within the
Union to effectively decrease the number of European Jihadists volunteering for IS.
The established European Muslim community should raise this issue and prevent rad-
icalization of individuals by means of educational work. There is indeed a lot of ratio-
nality in the so-called fanatic behavior of the IS, excluding mental absence and psy-
chopathic behavior as possible excuses for the acts. The determination and firm con-
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viction is driven by the concept of martyr, an ideology in which the hereafter succeeds
this world. As this ideology is closely linked to and partially rooted in a world religion,
the Muslim community has the responsibility to dissociate publicly and to implement
training on the spot to prevent radicalization movements and in-depth convictions.
This new form of terror roots in religion and religious ideology drives the terrorist
acts. Neglecting the religious aspect in the 21st century’s threat of global terror turns a
blind eye on the roots of this conflict and on the army of religious fundamentalists.
There is no generally accepted definition of ‘those who threaten,’ but it is essential
to define this term in order to establish prevention mechanisms. The current law has
to be adopted slightly, as the security threat has caused a new status quo. Ankle moni-
tors should be used intensely to spot and survey the location and routes of persons
who pose a threat. As it is comprehensively hard to differentiate between the nuances
of terror affiliates, financial means or staff shortage should not hinder efficient moni-
toring when a person potentially willing to execute an attack has finally been positive-
ly identified.
Olivier Hanne and Thomas Flichy de la Neuville (2015: 137) refer to the ‘develop-
ment of IS as accident of Islam and the Middle East, benefiting from a unique histori-
cal chance to evolve as small, yet prepared minority, using the weakened political sta-
tus quo in Syria and Iraq’ as result of the Arab Spring and of previous Western-led
military interventions. The Islamic State is not just a group of criminals but has to be
understood in connection with the Arab Spring and the resulting flow of migrants.
The EU is challenged, as it guarantees security for European citizens, but struggles to
implement sustainable policies, especially as the possibility to detect individuals,
Union citizens and foreigners causing threat and danger, is hard to depict.
Increased cooperation and in-depth understanding of unity as ‘we,’ focusing on
national topics as Union issues rather than individually targeting national subjects, is
important. Challenging times demand solidarity and underline the necessity to stand
together. In contrast, individual sealing-off and unilateralism are incompatible with a
borderless Union that regards itself united as entity based on humanist values.
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Interculturality, Multiculturalism, Cultural Relativism and
Compatibility Issues
The following part focuses on intercultural issues and highlights critical topics caus-
ing difficulties in the cohabitation of different cultures with diverse ethnical and reli-
gious backgrounds and different ways of thinking as a result of the refugee crisis and
the high number of non-EU foreigners now residing in the Union. A lack of knowl-
edge causes a gap between the respective cultures. It is essential to clearly define the
meaning of words expressed and to scrutinize the etymological roots of terminology
used. In the absence of a profound understanding, a frequent appearance of foreign
terms triggers the feeling of familiarity, but knowledge of cross-cultural communica-
tion is not created by regular repetition without precisely defining the foregoing (see
Annex U: The conflict of Islam and Democracy).
Europe’s Values under Foreign Influence
Today’s global village causes increased interaction due to neighboring with people
from foreign cultures and diverse ethnical backgrounds. The geographical decrease in
distance implies an enhanced analysis of the respective culture including values,
norms and beliefs. Culture has an impact on all aspects of life by influencing and de-
termining the individual’s way of thinking and acting. Hofstede (2005) refers to cul-
ture as ‘programming of the mind,’ as the individual is unaware of the process to actu-
ally be programmed to a certain culture. However, culture defines the scale for moral-
ity and sets the guideline for appropriate or socially not accepted behavior by e.g.
tabooing certain topics. Culture and cultural heritage define the individual as succes-
sor of the inherited values, norms and rules (Dankert/Dekkiche, 2017). It is impor-
tant to understand each individual’s ‘cultural backpack’ (see Glossary) when referring
to interculturality and compatibility of multiple religions across the range of cultures.
Blinkered mindsets are out of place. Discussions on intercultural issues make it im-
portant to reflect the own value system and individual culture objectively by critically
analyzing one’s own behavior, morals and values while bearing in mind the historical
development and considering linguistic and social aspects. Without open-minded-
ness and the ability to objectively evaluate ‘culture’ as determinant of thinking and be-
havior, it will not be possible to draw conclusions and to find sustainable solutions on
questions about harmonious cohabitation.
In some debates, there is a subtle negative connotation when someone refers to
‘Western values’ or ‘Western lifestyle.’ However, these terms do not implicate some-




structures and patterns of a counterpart when understanding the individual cultural
heritage and thus being able to reflect upon it. Terms are interpreted differently, words
might be used in a different context, and the result is the feeling of insurmountable
conflict of interests. The absence of a profound understanding of the counterparts’
value system, which underlies e.g. religion and history, makes ‘democracy,’ as pillar of
Western societies, a perceived evil trap for those entering Europe’s borders and sepa-
rates them from the European society by terminology issues. It is not per se a conflict
of ideologies, but rather, despite criticism of this theory, a ‘conflict of civilizations’
(Huntington, 1993), as ‘civilization’ (see Glossary) is shaped by culture.
Defining European Values according to the TEU
The European Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights
of persons belonging to minorities (Article 2 S. 1 TEU). These values are common to
the member states in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, jus-
tice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (Article 2 S. 2 TEU).
The objective of the Union is laid down in the treaties: promoting peace, its values
and the well-being of its people (Article 3 (1) TEU), whereby the Union offers its citi-
zens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the
freedom of movement is ensured […] with respect to external border controls, asy-
lum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime (Article 3 (2) TEU).
The Union shall combat social exclusion and discrimination and shall promote social
justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between genera-
tions and protection of the rights of the child (Article 3 (3) S. 4 TEU). The EU shall
respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural
heritage is safeguarded and enhanced (Article 3 (3) S. 6 TEU). In its relation with the
wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and con-
tribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sus-
tainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among people, free
and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particu-
lar the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of
international law, including respect for the principles of the Charter of the UN (Arti-
cle 3 (5) TEU).
Skeptics argue that on top of the debt crisis, the terrorism crisis and the Brexit the
migration crisis will be the trigger for the beginning crisis of values (Nixon, 2016).
‘How will tomorrow be like?’ is a question vehemently raised again during these days
(Council of Europe, 1995: 49). European values are humanist values, but the constant
influence of other religions, values, morals and norms caused by the refugee crisis and
the resulting high influx of Muslim people entering the Union’s borders seeking for
asylum and permanent residence frighten the European society. The anticipated sub-
mission to a foreign culture is a predominant topic and is discussed by many intellec-
tuals and experts in television shows, papers and multi-party talk shows. The question
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behind xenophobia, racism and skepticism about people with an immigration back-
ground is whether European values brave foreign influence or, what is argued by
skeptics, whether the mentality of constant solidarity and pure tolerance will irrevo-
cably damage the ideals and freedoms the Union is built upon. This refers to Article 3
(3) S. 4 TEU, highlighting the Union’s responsibility to ‘combat social exclusion and
discrimination,’ triggering a slight conflict with Article 3 (3) S. 6 TEU, referring to the
Union’s accountability ‘to respect [Europe’s] rich cultural and linguistic diversity [in
order to] ensure [the safeguarding and enhancement of] Europe’s cultural heritage.’
The question is whether safeguarding non-EU values and cultural heritage should be
pursued as well, following the non-discriminatory approach and the protection of mi-
norities (but it is not distinguished between local, originated European minorities and
intra-EU minorities as a result of e.g. the refugee crisis), or whether it is about Euro-
pean values and cultural heritage exclusively, referring to the puzzle pieces of Euro-
pean identity. Is Europe actually allowed to focus on safeguarding and promoting
European values exclusively to ensure the continued existence of what the Union is
built upon? Or is Western and European attitude as ‘tolerant and open society’ by
definition restricting the option to focus solely on something?
Critics claim that the current refugee crisis will ring in the end of European val-
ues by simultaneously eroding the basis of the Union. Critics talk about ‘no tolerance
to the intolerant,’ referring to the increased tension between Europeans and Foreign-
ers (Kissler, 2015). The quotation roots in a debate about the building of mosques, the
height of minarets regarding the protection of neighbor-rights and unacceptable im-
pairment through, inter alia, calls to prayer, the legal admissibility and the general
weighing of interests with focus on the principle of consideration and the statute that
exotic architecture is not covered by infringed neighbor-rights (compare Administra-
tive Court Arnsberg, resolution from 17 May 2011 – 14 L 218/11) and the academic
career of women wearing hijab during e.g. the participation in official government
bureaucracy. Reversely, the quotation refers to the limited freedoms, chances and pos-
sibilities for heterodox and potentially uncovered females in Islamic countries and to
the level of tolerance that can be expected there, with special focus on the possibility
to practice tradition, cultural heritage and religion. A tit for tat mentality is not com-
patible with European values but again many skeptics refer to the unlimited tolerance
triggered by the non-discriminatory approach and criticize the created vicious cycle
doomed to end the value community Europe.
Female Islamic Covering – Compatibility with European Values
Generally, it has to be differentiated between various female styles of Islamic veils as
openly displayed symbol of belonging to the Muslim community: sheila, hijab, al ami-
ra, khimar, chador, dupatta, niqab and burka (Pew Research Center, 2016). The
Afghani and Pakistani styled burka, favored by the Taliban, covers body and face in-
cluding a grill across the eyes, permitting women to see without being seen by keep-
ing the face totally concealed (Vyver, 2014). There are no statistical data about the
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number of Muslim women actually wearing the burka in the European Union. The
estimate in Germany is between 300 and 3,000, but no definite statistical number can
be given for the respective country or for the member states in total (Löffelholz,
2016). Nonetheless, the number of women wearing burka is comparatively small. This
paper is not focusing on female Islamic covering, but the ongoing debate about a bur-
ka ban is a discussion driven ad absurdum, facing the number of women actually
wearing a burka. The lack of knowledge about Islamic clothing and covering and the
danger of getting confused about burka and niqab mislead many giving an opinion on
this issue. In contrast, the niqab is seen more often on the streets of Europe nowadays.
The covering is a combination of abaya and a second veil covering the face but leaving
the eyes visible. This form of covering is more popular and seen more often apart
from the most common form of displayed veil, the hijab, as headscarf styled in com-
bination with modest Western clothes. Daily conflicting situations between European
regulations and the religiously founded convictions occur, and the discussion about
the compatibility of European values with this form of covering becomes increasingly
heated (e.g. incident to lift the veil in a bank in order to finalize a transaction (Fried-
mann/Hipp, 2016)).
Following Article 2 TEU and the respect for human dignity and minorities and
Article 3 S. 4 TEU referring to combat social exclusion and discrimination, it has to
be concluded that expressing religious beliefs by openly following a dress code as part
of an intra-EU minority (again, no differentiation between originated or newly settled
minorities is made) is an irrevocable right safeguarded by the Treaty on the EU. Arti-
cle 2 TEU also implies the equality between women and men, and Article 3 S. 6 TEU
obliges the Union to ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is secured and enhanced. It
is said that the EU should uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute
to the protection of its citizens. The conflict of interests gets obvious, as gender equali-
ty was not given anymore, as burka ban supporters argue, while opponents claim that
women had never been more free. As previously stated, it is essential to define the ter-
minology when discussing intercultural topics to ensure a common base with regard
to the argumentation. The term ‘free’ is obviously defined differently in both societies,
as critics of the burka ban argue that ‘freedom’ was not about exposing a naked body
but supporters refer to the burka as deindividualization. Again, the perspective is cru-
cial to the argumentation, and the cultural discrepancy in defining ‘free’ and inter-
preting the burka as material symbol of bondage creates a sheer insurmountable gap
between the arguing parties.
The regulations on airports and in e.g. banks are an essential part of the security
concept, and the implementation of separated women rooms in order to lift the veil in
front of female employees, as demanded by a covered lady in a Sparkasse subsidiary
(Friedmann/Hipp, 2016), causes an inevitable conflict about the degree of European
tolerance and adaptability towards the counterpart. As many critics stress the urgent
need of foreigners to adapt to local values by referring to the same adaptability of
Westerners visiting Muslim countries, the sensitive debate is more a question about
the consequences of actually implemented separated rooms in accordance with sharia-
opted separation between men and women, again conflicting with European values
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and the equality approach. In contrast, the non-implementation will for sure lead to
social separation of e.g. burka-women due to limited scope of action in parts of the
daily life, but the philosophical question is about encroachment on religious freedom
in a society claiming tolerance and religious freedom for the individual. Other issues
remain open, like the unbalanced rules and regulations for (Muslim) foreigners and
the local population referring to the scanning and natural undressing at airports for
non-Muslims, but no such demand for those purely covered.
The discussion about the burka ban is still ongoing and it portrays the severe gap
between opponents and supporters of Islamic covering in Europe. The question is
about the compatibility with European values, referring to gender equality, freedom
and democracy vs. supporting a dress code, which is a sign of Saudi Wahhabism asso-
ciated with sharia and ‘tit for tat’ mentality, necessarily resulting in a clash with the
ideals of a society based on the rule of law and developed security concepts. Never-
theless, the heated discussion about the burka ban seems media-driven and exagger-
ated, in the face of the small number of women actually wearing the Wahhabi-orient-
ed full-covering in Europe. Moreover, a ban in e.g. Germany would require an
amendment of the constitution, as such a ban would ‘infringe on religious freedoms
and cannot be justified without constitutional change’ (Friedmann/Hipp, 2016).
Political correctness might refuse to open up a debate about a more popular Is-
lamic covering as referred to before. Referring to the black cloth as statement against
the European society and proclaiming a negative attitude towards European values,
the debate has to address a far intensified sensitive issue, particularly because it affects
a larger number of veiled women. When the argumentation is purely about the isola-
tion from ‘Europe’ as value system and society through cloth and because of arising
security concerns due to the opaque and non-see-through layers of black tulle (e.g.
Kenya, incident in 2013 (Shute, 2013)), the discussion has to focus on e.g. the niqab,
but further differentiation and demarcation are not part of this paper. However, if the
argumentation in the fundamental debate about validity and uniform application of
European values is taken seriously in order to defend ‘Western values’ (see Glossary),
freedoms and the non-separation of women and men in public, the types of questions
in debates have to be modified. Burka opponents refer to the inability to integrate into
the society by building a defensive, visible wall of dark cloth between themselves and
the immediate environment. The question is whether establishing contacts ‘with the
immediate environment’ are actually desired, which has to be negated, but the paper
will not focus on theological argumentation.
Supporters of a burka or niqab ban stress security issues. In an open society, it has
to be possible to clearly identify the counterpart, also because of security issues, as
explained before. The societal question refers to the conflict between the liberal co-
habit and the face/eye-covering full veil. Interculturally seen it is important to shake
hands in Western societies and to directly look into the eyes of the counterpart, which
demonstrates honesty, competence and a good character (Nunez/Nunez Mahdi,
2007). A survey showed that pedestrians who were asked about their perception of
burka often referred to fear. Social psychologists explain that mimic was a door to
communicate efficiently with the counterpart. It is an essential part in keeping control
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over a situation and in successfully evaluating the spoken word. A face veil inhibits
the look behind, and the strong association of the burka with a foreign (and potential-
ly unknown) culture, terror and Islamism prevails and results in fear and rejection
(Wölfle, 2016). Critics argue that the burka was a symbol of suppression, but it is
more a symbol of a patriarchic society and cultural heritage than religiously founded.
There is no sura in the Qur’an referring to a full-covering including face veil and
obligatory eye-grit, which define the burka, again demonstrating the culturally di-
verse interpretation of modest dressing and variations of veils, yet no further differen-
tiation and interpretation of ‘fatwas’ (English: legal texts) is made in this paper.
There is no EU harmonized regulation concerning a burka ban in public. The
member states treat this issue differently: since 2011, France has prohibited women to
wear burka or niqab in public, willful violations result in a fine. Belgium introduced
the burka prohibition in 2011 as well, but additionally to the payment of a fine, the
state ordered imprisonment in case of willful violation. The Belgian court argued that
freedom of religion was not absolute. The prohibition to cover is an essential element
of equality between men and women, the societal life and public security. Tessin, a
Swiss Canton, introduced the burka ban just recently, in 2016, and the Netherlands
are about to decide on a law to ban the eye-veiling cloth out of governmental build-
ings, schools and hospitals based on public safety issues (Scherfig, 2016). According
to Article 4 of the German Constitution, ‘freedom of religion, freedom of conscience
and freedom of religious and ideological commitment is invulnerable. The undis-
turbed practice of religion is ensured.’ Germany as a state is ideologically neutral and
holds a legal monopoly against religious communities. The constitution guarantees all
citizens the undisturbed practice of religion on the basis of human dignity. The per-
ception of religion is different from the perception in e.g. France, a country based on
laicism and the strict separation of state and religion, declaring religion a private mat-
ter and thereupon justifying the burka ban.
Generally, legally forced covering for females can only be found in e.g. Saudi Ara-
bia, Iran and Sudan, countries with a Muslim majority. A headscarf ban for female
employees in public institutions and for state servants can also be found in other
countries with a Muslim majority like e.g. Malaysia, Morocco, Albania and Turkey.
Tunisia and Egypt applied the ban on headscarves as well until its re-establishment
during the Arab Spring. Countries following the French laicism approach, like Bel-
gium, parts of Switzerland and former French colonies like Syria, Cameroon, Chad
and Niger, aim at separating state and religion, thus favoring a ban on Islamic cover-
ing, as explained before (Speer, 2016) (see Annex V: Concealment Worldwide: Select-
ed Portray of Countries forcing or banning the Islamic Veil).
The fundamental question concerns the potential compatibility and harmoniza-
tion of European values in the definition of the Treaties with e.g. burka and niqab.
From a Western perspective, the full covering body veil is a symbol of female suppres-
sion as expression of a patriarchic society, hindering integration, threatening the soci-
ety and causing safety issues. Wearing a burka in Europe is an openly demonstrated
sign against Western society, as argued by skeptics. The wall, that is built between the
covered women and the rest of the world separates her culturally, societally and elimi-
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nates the possibility to get in contact with Europeans easily. The universality of Euro-
pean values is challenged by existing prejudices and arguments on this issue (Niko-
laïdis, 2014). It is for sure a challenge for Europe to prove whether European values
are indeed universal values. Nevertheless, the claim for universal European values si-
multaneously triggers anti-Western sentiments, again with focus on a perceived supe-
riority. Applying European values and standards, grounded on traditions, universally
to everyone in the Union results in the rejection of Western values as epitome of one-
sided suppression and intolerance. The degree of argumentation is a balancing act,
and both counterparts make it essentially hard to find consensus.
It has to be defined whether values should be interpreted differently depending
on culture, region, context and persons applied to. Primarily, it has to be seen that
values, norms and beliefs actually highly differ across the globe and strongly depend
on the regional and cultural context. Therefore, if the answer is positive, meaning val-
ues and norms have to be interpreted differently, depending on culture and the per-
son on which these norms are applied to, then Europe sacrifices itself by willingly en-
tering the path that is criticized by Henryk Broder claiming ‘critics to pure tolerance’
(Broder, 2008). Broder (2008) argues that a tolerant society, supporting each individ-
ual to fully act out its own interests and beliefs, was denying the differentiation be-
tween good and bad, as each assessment was automatically anti-tolerant, causing the
borders of tolerance to blur. If values are adoptable and changeable, depending on a
particular context, Broder (2008) climaxes in a betrayal to Europe as value communi-
ty. Values define the community and the sustainable and efficient living together.
Abandoning the basis of European cohabitation means dispatching the underlying
codex for 500 million European citizens across 28 member states by uprooting them
from Europe as an institution and community. Therefore, the question has to be
negated: values have to be constant to raise the claim for universal application to ev-
eryone and equally to both genders. Freedom of religion, as anchored in the TEU and
the constitutions of the member states, is given, but freedom of religion and expres-
sion for some, while disturbing the freedom of others, is not sustainable and will
cause disputes, incomprehension and hatred. European values are indeed universal,
but it is up to the Europeans to apply them universally to secure a future of mutual
agreement after finding consensus on this stony path and to reach a high level of inte-
gration by living together as neighbors in an inter-faith dialogue.
Cultural Relativism Threatening the Project Europe
The Union was designed to prevent war, therefore the European Project can be re-
ferred to as peace project, creating a united Europe. It is not just about peace, but also
about the association of states committing themselves to common values, rejecting
the authoritarian and intolerant ideologies known in Europe before (Scheppele,
2015).
Referring to equality of humans, freedom for the individual and humanity, it is
Europe’s challenge to face external cultural influence, while sticking to own values.
8.1.3
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73
The roots of the Union and essentially its past are guides through a rough time of po-
litical unrest and turmoil, which is now affecting all member states that are catching
up on equal footing. Europe’s population feels neglected when it comes to its own in-
terests and historical heritage and the fear to be restricted in its freedoms, which have
been developed centuries ago and unite the Europeans in a common past. ‘Liberté,
Egalité, Fraternité,’ as credo during the French Revolution in 1789, triggered move-
ments all over Europe, like the Hambach Festival in 1832. Freedom of the person
(Art. 2 GG), freedom of religion (Art. 4 GG), freedom of art/speech/science/educa-
tion (Art. 5 GG), freedom of assembly (Art. 8 GG), freedom of association (Art. 9
GG), free career choice (Art. 12 GG) and the right to petition (Art. 17 GG) are some
of the fundamental freedoms written down in the constitution of the Federal Republic
of Germany. Most of the rights Germany roots on today have been developed during
the age of enlightenment and the ideas of Immanuel Kant, who was philosophizing
about the ‘reason as source of morality.’ The Hambach Festival was proclaiming free-
dom and democracy during the time of Restoration and at the beginning of the
Vormärz era. These stages were essential parts in the development of Germany, yet
the partially censored and cancelled German carnival celebrations in February 2016
in several cities raise doubts as to its factual application. Political correctness triggered
censorship: not respect, but fear of unpredictable consequences that might follow a
‘provocation,’ previously part of freedom of expression and cultural heritage. The ac-
tual offensive and distasteful character of e.g. Prophet Muhammad caricatures by
Charlie Hebdo in 2015 are not to be discussed further, as the thought-provoking im-
pulse is about the double standards, not about the art itself.
There is no right or wrong when expressing an opinion, as it is not about the
quality of the expressed opinion, which in most cases demonstrates the tolerance of a
society. ‘There is no need for debates if agreement prevails. Yet the end of a debate is
the end of freedom if the applause does not cease’ (Kissler, 2015: 29). Muslims easily
criticize the West as anti-Muslim and accuse governments of being involved in a Jew-
ish world conspiracy. However, it has to be objectively seen that the EU-citizens’ fear,
which might result in antipathy or even rejection, is not spurred on by mass propa-
ganda but has its reasons. The instigations of violence, expressed just by a small mi-
nority of Muslims, yet so dramatically and justified on the basis of a world religion,
makes it comprehensibly hard to distinguish between (Muslim) refugees and warriors
of the Caliphate proclaiming these ideas. This minority that describes Christians as
‘error, turned away from true faith’ and proclaims their approach as universal Islam,
indeed triggers anti-Muslim feelings across the Union. It is difficult for European citi-
zens, heterodox and atheists, to separate the body of thinking, ideology, spiritual Is-
lam and institutionalized as well as jihadist Islam and not to stereotype foreigners
with Muslim background, when the ones executing terrorist attacks actually refer to a
holy book of a world religion, claiming to be the most pious and devout by proceed-
ing this way (Kissler, 2015). Granting tolerance is easy when unconcerned, but hereby
it is essential to understand the difference from cultural relativism, meaning tolerance
on the brink of the abyss and passive follower behavior regarding a form of violence
legitimated as tradition and therefore worthy of acceptance (Broder, 2008). The con-
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flict will be further explained in Chapter 8.7 under consequences of ‘Trinity of Multi-
culturalism.’
Islamisation of Europe or the Europeanization of Islam
Many Europeans benefit from the freedom of movement within the Union, deciding
to live, work and study abroad. However, it has objectively to be kept in mind that
refugees, apart from economic migrants and forum shoppers, were forced to leave
their homes due to an existential fear. The immigration was neither planned long in
advance nor voluntarily. For many, Europe is not the promised land in terms of living
and working preferences, nor a desired role model for values, norms and beliefs. This
factor is essentially important when it comes to Europe’s challenge regarding a sus-
tainable and successful integration.
From the angle of intercultural science, it is apparently hard to give up behavior
and thinking that have been shaped by the immediate cultural environment for gen-
erations. Therefore, it is ultimately important to understand each individual’s cultural
backpack (Slawomir, 2005: 7), a reminiscence that cannot be removed before crossing
a country’s border. There is no clash of cultures but a conflict between two civiliza-
tions with historical roots. Tibi (2008: 16) refers to the Cornell Project of 2002 that
resulted in two options for the future of Europe: the Islamisation of Europe or the Eu-
ropeanization of Islam.
Global Migration and especially the refugee crisis triggered a movement of people,
refugees and immigrants as transmitter, introducing the politicization of religion and
the religionizing of politics on the European continent, rooting in thoughts that origi-
nally developed outside of Europe (Tibi, 2008). Intellectuals often refer to the value
system in the open, post-modern European society. Unlimited thought and articula-
tion skills seem to be given and induce the tolerant society to open up for e.g. sharia,
while simultaneously jeopardizing Europe’s future when making so-called ‘wrong tol-
erance’ respectable due to political correctness (Tibi, 2008). ‘Tolerance becomes a
crime when applied to evil’ (Mann, 1952: 649), and as result the Union is indeed po-
larized (Nixon, 2016). Cultural, linguistic and religious aspects have to be examined
carefully to create a sustainable environment for a harmonious blend of cultures. This
issue also refers to the willingness and likelihood to give up and adopt certain struc-
tures, despite the fact that the move was rather forced than voluntarily, neither
planned nor properly organized (see Annex W: Likelihood of Cultural Adoption – A
Scientific Demarcation). The question refers to the compatibility of role models, val-
ues and thinking with so-called ‘Western lifestyle.’ Both sides have to be open-minded
to adapt to the new situation. It is essential for the people arriving in Europe to inter-
nalize European values and to take over European identity. Both-sided tolerance and,
in particular, unbiased both-sided cultural open-mindedness are essential for success-
ful integration (Tibi, 2008).
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Historical Fear of Foreign Infiltration with Changing Participants
History does not per se repeat itself, but it tends to leave marks that might lead to the
assumption that history was likely to be repeated. Yet the surrounding and situational
circumstances differ dramatically and cannot be superficially compared without re-
moving blinkers. The current debate about Muslim migrants is a perceived threat the
world has seen before, yet with changing participants throughout history. Looking
backwards, the Irish-catholic immigrants in 19th century London were originally seen
as a threat to the British. In the beginning, voices claimed that these folks were not to
be integrated into the major population, but the actual rapidness and success of the
immigration story became legendary. The Irish migrants were integrated within less
than two generations and quickly seen as an enrichment to society (Saunders, 2012).
Still, history showed that tragic events and incidents dramatically influence the
public awareness of a whole ethnical tribe, religion or language family by creating
lasting preconceptions. It is undeniable that 11 September 2001 changed the percep-
tion of the rest of the world towards its Muslim neighbors. Suspicions and smoldering
distrust characterized the following years. Different theories developed and ideas
about ‘conquering the Occident’ and ‘disloyalty towards host-states, due to pure loyal-
ty towards religion’ spread through the media and became popular debate topics for
mainstream media. Different voices claimed that Islam prevented successful and sus-
tainable integration and resulted in the destruction of Western freedom and tradition.
In 1993, the theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ (see Glossary) enjoyed a revival under
Samuel Huntington. The author hereby defined the medieval image of rivaling em-
pires, yet outmoded by cultural growing together and strong economic ties. In a sec-
ond publication of 1993, Huntington argued more precisely about the change in con-
flict pattern over time. After medieval disputes, mainly due to economic and territor-
ial expansion drivers, followed by clashes between nations, Huntington referred to
ideological conflicts. Primarily, these conflicts took place between actors within the
Western world. After the end of the Cold War, conflicts tended to take place between
the frontiers of Western and non-Western civilizations, as non-Western civilizations
revolted ‘against the role of chessboard-figures on the game board of Western driven
geopolitics’ (Schwan, 2001: 12−15). Christopher Caldwell (2009) summarized the
growing fear of infiltration and undermining of value by raising the question: ‘can Eu-
rope be the same with different people in it?’
9/11 proved that the idea of monolithic, not compatible cultures creating a spiri-
tual no-man’s land culminating in the end of the Occident was generally conceivable
by the public. These radical thoughts serve as a platform for e.g. Geert Wilders, the
third most popular politician in the Netherlands. By encouraging electorates to deny
tolerance for those who deny the savoir vivre of the Netherlander, Geert Wilders does
not consequently speak out intolerance but justifies his paroles by consequence
(Saunders, 2012). The likeliness, willingness and compatibility to integrate sustainably
are questioned, and a differentiation has to be made between the ones willing to inte-
grate, happily coexisting with other communities and religions, the ones favoring the
concept of live and let live, without aiming for integration or valuing the benefits of a
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merged society described as tolerant, and the intolerants. Whereas all have a right of
existence, clashing body of thought causes trouble and disagreement on neighboring
each other. Statistics on the percentage of Muslims preferring sharia in their home
country varies dramatically from country and region, as well as the degree and extent
of the actually favored application. The attitude towards Muslim law again highlights
the integration efforts and the adjustments that have to be made. In case Islam is the
officially favored religion in a country, the support of sharia is obviously significantly
higher. Referring to the ones seeking refuge in Europe, it is important to question the
probability to accept European law and law enforcement mechanisms with focus on
the desire to apply sharia on spot (Pew Research Center, 2013) (see Annex X: Support
for Sharia across 39 Muslim Countries).
America, Canada and Australia have been immigration countries for ages, but
Europe has a different history, as it had been European migrants taking up residence
there, not the other way round. The absence of an immigration act in Germany shows
the situational context (compare Annex O): Germany finds it still difficult to accept
migration as factor of a fast changing world. The country does not have a regulation
on immigration based on qualification, national interests and economic needs like
classical immigration countries (e.g. America, Canada, Australia), ‘behaving like a
country with irregular migration, neglecting its de facto regular migration for
decades’ (Falkowski, 2011: 83). Traditional non-immigration countries refer to
refugees and ‘non-EU-immigrants as foreign threat and the ultimate others’ (Bauder,
2011: 22). The perception roots in the practice of ‘national identity formation through
the negation of immigrants’ exist’ (Bauder, 2011: 22). In the past, countries like e.g.
France reacted to the diverse and partially conflicting interests of different cultures
living in the country by banning signs of worship and excluding religion lessons from
public schools, as secularization is high in France. An example of adaption is the UK,
where sharia courts have settled conflicts since their establishment in the 1980 s
(Saunders, 2012).
Prejudice and wrong expectations on both sides are not conducive for the heated
debate within the Union. The insecurity and vulnerability of a society offers platforms
for politicians, lobbyists and private individuals all over Europe and fuels xenophobia.
Geert Wilders is just one example of keeping up the crisis by re-establishing a way of
thinking that has been dispelled from people’s minds for the last six centuries (Saun-
ders, 2012). In order to maintain Europe, built on common humanist values, the EU’s
task is to preserve an open-minded attitude, excluding stereotyping and condemning
clustering bogeyman images across ethnicities.
Anti-Semitism and Legitimacy of Israel in Post-War Europe
In the debate about migration and integration, issues like the embedded anti-
Semitism in thinking, the acceptance of Israel as a state and the Palestine question
have been neglected. However, these topics, which seem to be kept outside the discus-
sions due to political correctness, as some critics argue, have the potential to actually
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split society. Post-war Europe is sensitized to the topics referring to e.g. anti-Semitism,
as especially Germany is working through its history, facing its responsibility as major
European force next to e.g. France. A dangerous body of thinking might cause unpre-
dictable movements in the already established right-wing across Europe and trigger a
development that contradicts the post-war ideals and values the EU is built upon.
As the majority of refugees have their origin in countries where the regimes de-
clare Israel and Judaism the cause of all evil (Brenner, 2015), it is in the responsibility
of European governments to remove the misconception of a Jewish enemy and to re-
place it with practiced tolerance of parallel existences. Intolerance is a symptom, not
the actual cause of totalitarianism, but for sure triggered by means of intolerance
(Council of Europe, 1995). A targeted partnership is difficult to achieve when neither
side is open for a coexistence. Nonetheless, urgent support and educational work have
to be implemented in order to demonstrate the limits of a Western society. The specif-
ically targeted attacks on Jews in Paris and Copenhagen, as well as e.g. the desecration
of Jewish graves in France in 2015, have an impact on the Jewish community in Euro-
pe. Petr Papousek, vice president of the Jewish World Congress, declared that the in-
creased anti-Semitism in Europe was a result of foreign Muslim migration condemn-
ing Judaism. Israel is actually awaiting a new wave of Jewish migrants over the next
couple of years due to the increasing number of anti-Semitist incidents (Kusicke,
2015).
Prevention mechanisms have to be established for a sustainable and peaceful Eu-
rope, and it is important to critically question and ban arising stereotypes on both
sides. There must be no leeway for a repetition of the past. Europe is challenged, as
the lack of understanding the deeply religiously rooted perception is unknown and
neglected in the debate. Humanitarian aid for those in need, but safeguarding those
already living within the Union as neighbors and friends is a balancing act when it is
not about an opinion, but about profound religious beliefs, which determine the body
of thinking.
Conflict of Cultures – Jihad against McWorld
Double standards and double morals have to be abandoned. It is claimed that the post-
European society was tolerant, but still certain sensitive issues cannot be addressed
publicly (Tibi, 2008). However, it is essential to debate openly about difficulties of
combining the interests of neighboring civilizations (see Annex Y: Mutual Suspicion
and Incrimination thwarting Impartiality). Neglecting existing inconsistencies due to
political correctness or naïve thinking endangers Europe’s future. The importance to
maintain and defend pluralistic values becomes obvious when referring to e.g. ‘Je suis
Charlie.’ The terrorist attack in 2015 on a French satire magazine, due to the publica-
tion of Prophet Muhammad caricatures, was not a single act against the caricaturists
in charge but a violent statement against a society that defines itself as pluralistic,
based on humanistic values and the ideals of free-thinking.
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It is important to differentiate between Islam and Islamism, as the demarcation is
between Islam as religion and Islam as cultural-political ideology and basis of identity
policy, triggering world conflicts. Islamism is not per se an anti-globalization move-
ment but the source of conflict between two civilizations. As transnational religion
based on the idea to form the world according to Islam, Islamism can be seen as a
movement of sacral revival. The Communist Manifest, as basis of internationalism
and transnational movement during the 19th century, enjoys a parallel revolution on
Sayyid Qutb’s manifest from the mid-20th century, aiming at ‘hakimiyyat Allah’ (Eng-
lish: theocracy) and de-secularization. Islamist scholars argue that Europe failed as ac-
tor on the world stage and an oriental replacement was simply a natural development.
Global migration and especially the refugee crisis trigger the movement of refugees
and immigrants, as migrants introduce the politicization of religion and at the same
time the religionization of politics on the European continent, yet the roots of these
thoughts lie on the downside of Europe (Tibi, 2008).
These days, conflicts have a religious core, which is a cultural side effect of struc-
tural globalization, however running withershins. The 21st century marks the era of
the global village, but the question is whether this ‘village’ is indeed as global as antic-
ipated. Fear of the unknown is a culturally rooted fear, and especially during these
rough times, the vicious cycle of reversion to traditions and the well-known triggers
separation and drives the gap between ethnical groups, nations, countries and civi-
lizations further. Despite advantages of globalization, the caused cultural fragmenta-
tion should not be overlooked. The reversion to the own culture and religion is a de-
fensive answer to the somehow imposed trend of a global culture. The term ‘Jihad vs.
McWorld’ (Barber, 1996) includes stereotypes but summarizes and describes the two
opponents in the ongoing crisis. It is important to understand the Islamic resistance,
euphemistically speaking, not as resistance against the Western world but as resis-
tance against Western values, which have developed to universal values including a
world order (Tibi, 2008).
The refugee crisis is the reason to discuss these issues, but as long as Europe does
not understand which questions have to be raised, where political correctness is nec-
essary and where self-imposed restrictions, due to regrets about colonial misconduct,
is out of place, no sustainable measure can be undertaken in order to enlarge upon
the situation. Disregard and ignorance towards relevant topics will result in Muslim
enclaves and parallel societies, which are then, positively and negatively, referred to
by the term multiculturalist society.
Another factor that is neglected in the discussion is the religiously founded
‘da’wa,’ a religious duty for travelling Muslims to spread Islam as Muhadjirun, mean-
ing to actively missionize the heterodox as part of ‘hidjra’ (English: migration). Tibi
(2008: 40) critically raises the question whether European tolerance, in its purest defi-
nition, will provide the ground for Islamic universalism, referring to the Muhammad
caricatures that have caused the terrorist attack referred to as ‘Je suis Charlie.’ The
professor for international relations argues from a perspective many Europeans skip,
due to the lack of knowledge or what critics refer to as ‘Euro-egoism’ (see Glossary)
and the idea to consider European body of thought as universalistic body of thought,
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stereotyping humans despite cultural differences to think, argue and draw conclusions
the very same way, based on e.g. humanistic values and the ideals of Immanuel Kant.
Tibi (2008) explains that the excitement about the caricatures of the Prophet is
not due to simple tastelessness, but about the sharia-oriented censorship. A similar
application of censorship for an infringement on e.g. Christian or heterodox emotions
would not be legitimate and non-justifiable, as the authors’ rights are secured under
the freedom of expression and art. In a scenario of abused religious freedoms as part
of an identity policy, Tibi expects step-to-step Islamisation of Europe. In the begin-
ning of the 21st century, Europe provides the platform for a conflict of civilizations,
not for a clash of civilizations.
Inclusion through Europeanization as e.g. the killing of heterodox persons is not
and must not be covered by the ‘freedom of religion’ (Tibi, 2008), as e.g. a Belgian
Court argued that ‘religion is not absolute’ (Scherfig, 2016). Excluding sharia and its
practices is essential in order to maintain the rule of law and the constitutionally se-
cured rights: policies are needed to provide lasting security for both communities
(Tibi, 2008: 133). The conflicting contradictions in here result from the ‘Trinity of
Multiculturalism,’ defined as differences, acknowledgement and cultural rights as fun-
damental rights (Tibi, 2008: 41). ‘Sharia’ as fundamental cultural right and thus as
right to be acknowledged in a multicultural environment is the trigger for the vicious
cycle, when arguing about pluralistic values, freedoms and tolerance towards an intra-
EU minority (Article 2 S. 2 in conjunction with Article 3 No. 3 S. 4 TEU, but without
precise definition of ‘intra-EU minority’ as purely domestic minority or as result of
e.g. the refugee crisis). Human rights for the individual clash with sharia, multicultur-
alism as contrast to cultural pluralism remains an issue, but in the effort to de-reli-
gionize, Europe is confronted with an immensely religionized world (Tibi, 2008).
The challenge for the European Union is to understand that it is not the migrants
who cause a conflict of civilizations but the kind of religious ideology that is intro-
duced on the continent as result of the migrant crisis. It is essential for the people ar-
riving in Europe to adapt to European values and to take over European identity. The
difficulty is that in the discussion about arriving refugees many leave out the particu-
larity that, according to Tibi (2008), it is not ‘individuals [who] arrive on spot, but
members of the Islamic diaspora.’ Referring to the Muhammad caricatures causing
the ‘Je suis Charlie’ terrorist attack in 2015, pluralistic values have to be maintained
and defended. Before, the sea has been a natural border between Europe and ‘dar al-
Islam’ (English: house of Islam). Immigration has to be closely linked to security, and
due to the refugee crisis Europe has to deal with the development of the Middle East
in a way beyond politics to understand the people crossing the Union’s borders. At-
tempts to democratize the Islamic world in a time of Islamism will fail (Tibi, 2008).
Europe, as a community of shared history and ideals, is founded on human dignity,
not on a randomly created list of values as reference points (Hager, 2004). The toler-
ant society opens up for sharia while simultaneously jeopardizing Europe’s future in
implementing a so-called ‘wrong tolerance’ due to ‘political correctness’ as dangerous
enemy to the ‘island of freedom in an ocean of tyranny,’ as Horkheimer (1968: XIII)
refers to Europe. Tibi (2008) argues that it had to be differentiated between the Islam-
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ic and Islamist challenge, meaning a challenge due to the religion of Islam and the
challenge due to the political ideology of Islamism. Without clarification and demar-
cation, the spiritual Islam will be abused for a new form of totalitarianism (Tibi, 2008:
159−160). Islamisation, as claimed by Tibi (2008), does not fit to Europe, as there is
no awareness of common values. Europe has to open up a dialogue without political
correctness, research and differentiate, daring to address sensitive issues in order to
thwart totalitarianism in the form of Islamism, regardless of peaceful institutional Is-
lamism or violent Jihadism (Tibi, 2008: 134), and to prevent stereotyping by focusing
on an enhanced understanding of religion as driver of 21st century conflicts.
Post-Review of Kuwaiti Official Fahad Al Shalami’s Declaration in Connection with
the European Cultural Integration Task
Back in September 2015, Al Shalami’s statement (compare Annex I) seemed superfi-
cial, two-faced and ignorant. Uttered at the swelling peak of the refugee crisis by an
official representative of Kuwait demonstrating his point of view and excluding hu-
manitarian responsibility, it may seem conflicting with the idea of a Muslim commu-
nity united in pan-Arabism and, as often argued by Western critics, split in countries
separated by artificial borders created by the imperialistic forces back then. Following
this popular argument of Western critics, the understanding of the statement is even
more important, as it clearly points out the differences and mixed perceived sense of
Arab’s belonging within the Arab world. Many Europeans and Westerners do stereo-
type an overall ethnical group referred to as ‘the Arabs,’ whereby ‘ethnicity is defined
in cultural and linguistic terms and in terms of descent from distant ancestors’
(Barakat, 1993: 40). Cultural divergences and peculiarities are underestimated due to
lack of information and knowledge. It is necessary to understand Al Shalami’s state-
ment in favor of cohabitation and coexistence in tomorrow’s European Union.
Claiming to be united as Muslims, overriding national borders, but directly clos-
ing off behind these so disliked national borders when it comes to the question of tak-
ing in culturally close people in need, seems duplicitous. The statement of Al Shalami
includes a second hint, which is essential to highlight in order to understand the in-
tercultural difficulties Europe will face in the years to come. The backgrounds of a
Kuwaiti, declaring Syrian refugees as ‘culturally different,’ are important to under-
stand. It is an irrefutable fact that there is no community that can be referred to as
‘the Arabs,’ taking the prejudicial assumption that the created cluster is similar with
regards to shared norms, values, beliefs, heritage and history. This paper is not about
intercultural characteristics, cross-cultural differences and peculiarities, so in-depth
explanations are kept out. However, the knowledge and understanding of existing cul-
tural differences and various forms of practiced cultural heritage is crucial in order to
prevent further stereotyping and false assumptions. There are indubitable local fea-
tures, cultural distinctions and regional specifications that make it impossible to lump
together ‘the Arabs’ as one huge clan. Iran as Shia-dominated Persia, as well as the
North African states, are part of the so-called Muslim community and the Arabs as
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well, but only in the broadest sense. Cultural clustering and sub-grouping is essential
in understanding the divergences in order to manage sustainable future integration of
refugees in Europe. Ignorance and stereotyping will cause long-lasting damage for a
Union based on diversity and the understanding of a community made up of different
ethnical, linguistic and cultural backgrounds. The author emphasizes to act now for
the ‘Europe of tomorrow’ as key for a sustainable coexistence of a highly biased rela-
tionship between the Orient and the Occident, now meeting within the borders of the
EU.
European Cultural Outlook
The EU is on the move: it is simply a question of how deeply the supranational entity
will have been influenced by the ongoing debates and incidents on all levels and how
far-reaching, positively and negatively, the impact of the refugee crisis and the result-
ing intercultural and religious issues will be. It is up to the Union and the community,
the Europeans themselves, to react and demonstrate lively the essence of European
identity. It is undoubtedly a balancing act to combine value systems of the Orient and
the Occident, and the Union for sure has enjoyed times less challenging. History has
always been a guide for predicting the future and deriving recurring events. This time,
it is on the Europeans and the EU to strive for a future that does not include partial
remarks of the 1930 s past. This task especially includes the Muslim Europeans with a
major responsibility and refers to the well-established Islamic European communities’
duty to prevent increased religious clustering and societal split. As long as terrorist
attacks are executed in the name of Islam, the respective community bears responsi-
bility and has to be held accountable. Silent conviction is disproportionate, in contrast,
public demarcation and implementation of prevention measures are needed.
Today’s special challenge results from the blurred line between individuals exe-
cuting acts of violence and their religious belonging. Not despite, but because of their
religious affiliation, terrorist attacks are devotedly performed and dedicated to a holy
book. Xenophobia as a term generalizes on ‘foreigners,’ but turns to religious xeno-
phobia in this crisis, inaugurating a turning point in today’s perception of terror, as
terrorist attacks are closely linked to and executed in the name of religion, thereupon
urging the Muslim community to bear responsibility. The cruelty and frequency of at-
tacks executed by individuals of a world religion referring their acts to Islam triggers a
natural humane stereotyping. Demarcation is essential to prove cross-religious ‘we’ as
unity, standing together at the same frontier against religiously rooted terror and to
prevent the perception of a religious community silently in accordance with the exe-
cuted acts of violence. Maintaining European ideals and values, especially the high
standards of freedom and rights, demands a commitment and confession on Europe
as collective in order to succeed and to demark terror and affiliation from the hetero-
dox, neighboring our homes.
The fear of foreign infiltration is historically proven, but peculiarities have to be
outlined: the Irish were culturally and linguistically not really ‘foreign’ to the British,
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and even in terms of religion, both communities could refer to the common ground
of Christianity. The differences to today’s integration task are obvious, as religion, cul-
ture, tradition and language highly differ between the frontiers ‘Europe’ and ‘new-
comers,’ having no common basis. Sustainable integration will be the major challenge
in the years to come.
Defining ‘freedom of religion’ rather as ‘freedom of faith,’ thus excluding physical
patterns, seems to be a likely secular approach but facilitates living together and co-
habitation. Europe has to become aware of its values and realize their meaning and
importance. Evaluating the consequences of decisions taken today and facing the ac-
cusation of pure tolerance, Europe has to define which values are worth to be kept
and at which point tolerance actually restricts freedom and decide upon this assess-
ment. Today, rights and freedom are taken for granted, but the number of generations
enjoying these rights can still be counted easily. Naturally, appreciation is difficult
without the need to cope with a challenge, but the refugee crisis impacts the roots of
the European society in the long run and is indeed a major challenge to master. It is
essential to understand European values as legacy, as back then people gave their lives
while fighting for these rights. We owe it to ourselves, as successors of the ones paving
the way for what is referred to today as innate European spirit, to not decrease the
validity of European values including their application but, in contrast, to maintain a
pluralistic and open society. The future is shaped by the decisions taken today, and
each EU-citizen can contribute to Europe’s future as spoke in the wheel: insignificant
when acting individually, but powerful when part of a strong alliance. Repercussions
are existing challenges but worth to be taken seriously. The Union has never experi-
enced a similar situation with such a drastic impact on the innate value system before.
Time will witness the outcome of integration efforts and the future shape of the
Union under the foreign influence. An approach has to be defined in order to inte-
grate successfully: ‘Europeanization,’ ‘multiculturalism’ or by setting up a new pattern
for sustainable integration. Understanding cultural exchange as benefit to personal
development and broadening the horizon without stereotyping or prejudice will en-
able the EU to grow further. Concerns about cultural compatibility should be re-
moved by actually living cultural diversity, following the Union’s motto ‘united in di-
versity,’ yet broadening this diversity as result of the new cultural patterns in the
Union. The question which should be raised during today’s discussion on multicultur-
alism and assimilation is how to establish an environment of open-mindedness and
interest on the European side and on that of the newcomers’. ‘Tolerance’ is stressed in
this debate, however, a differentiation has to be made between embracing cultural di-
versity and learning from different cultures to enhance together or by undermining
one’s own values, identity and historical heritage. It is important to include the citi-
zens according to the principle of subsidiarity: acting as close as possible to the Euro-
peans, for the citizens as the Union’s residents, adding in this context the European
responsibility to maintain cultural heritage and values. The citizens’ responsibility is
to safeguard the legacy of those who laid down the principles for what should become
known and defined as European values later, as successors of the ones shaping the
Union’s spirit.
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Despite the challenges and difficulties the EU is facing, national conflicts have to
be overcome. Oppression and xenophobia do not belong into the 21st century, neither
into the European Union, which is based on humanist values and freedoms. Without
remaining true to its values and understanding its responsibility, the Union and the
unique model of a supranational entity cannot persist. The EU has to prove its ability
to change reasonably according to the zeitgeist, while sticking to its raison d’être and
valuing its stages of development as reminiscent, including the source of today’s co-
habitation, rooting in revolutions and brave uprisings for what became the essential
part of today’s Europe. Nobody can predict the future, but it can be forecast that the
Union will emerge changed after the end of this crisis and the sum of challenges
faced.
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Repercussions for the European Union
Emerging Nationalism – Backlash against a United Europe
Until 1918, ‘nationalism’ was closely linked to the formation of national states and
was regarded as a component of national history. It was either class or national cul-
ture based including linguistic aspects. Afterwards, ethnical and philosophical mat-
ters, as basis for nationalism, were included in the theorization. Nationalism can be
seen as ‘primitive revival of tribalism on an enlarged artificial scale,’ whereby sociolo-
gy equates ‘society’ and ‘nation’ as simply differing in class, status and power (Gellner,
2008: XVII). Generally, nationalism is defined as loyalty and devotion towards a na-
tion, whereby the sense of national consciousness often exalts the particular nation,
including its culture, language and history, by putting the nations’ interests above oth-
er nations’ needs (Merriam-Webster, 2016).
‘Patriotism’ has to be differentiated from nationalism, as it emphasizes ‘identity-
forming’ feelings and a strong sense of belonging to the respective country within a
community, yet superiority is not included. The country or ‘nation’ refers to ‘an ethni-
cally homogenous historical group, associated with a particular territory’ (Primoratz/
Pavković, 2016: 203). ‘Sectionalism,’ another synonym that is used for nationalism, is
a term describing a geopolitical group pursuing its own interests, whereby the group
is rather small and does not compromise the entire nation (Merriam-Webster, 2016).
By definition, there will be no sections before the creation of a national state has taken
place (Finkelman/Kennon, 2008). ‘Jingoism,’ as another term differentiation, is always
based on military aggressiveness as sort of belligerent nationalism (Winter, 2010)
aiming to pursue ideas of cultural superiority (Merriam-Webster, 2016). The extreme
patriotism results in an expressed hostility towards other nations (Winter, 2010).
The differentiation is important in order to understand the ongoing political shift
to the right across Europe and to prevent stereotyping or false assumptions about par-
ties. Most terrorist groups can be described as purely jingoistic. The platform of Euro-
pe’s right-wing parties is rather mixed, depending on the previous situation and con-
text in the respective country, influenced by triggers like unemployment rate or dis-
content with the leading government.
Political Impact: European Parties’ Shift to the Right
An excerpt from Muammar Al Gaddafi’s live speech held in Timbuktu (2006) is cur-
rently heavily discussed and interpreted by some as meaningful prophecy. The Libyan





tion, ‘without swords, without guns, without conquest’ (Al Jazeera, 2006). The ongo-
ing debate about migration and contingents is fueled by this quote, as some Euro-
peans feel vindicated in their fear of foreign infiltration by referring to Al Gaddafi’s
words. However, the phenomenon of political extremism has not solely developed
due to the current refugee crisis that originated in the Arab Spring. Anti-system polit-
ical parties, racist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, anti-liberal and eurosceptical groups
have been well-established across the Union before. Several factors have to be dis-
cussed in the analysis of the parties’ development and historical, social and economic
parameters have to be considered in order to understand the whole picture.
Historical data show that bad economic conditions over a longer period (e.g.
Great Depression (1930), Global Financial Crisis (2008)) facilitate the rise of authori-
tarianism, as people tend to become more radical. The year 2008 is considered a turn-
ing point regarding the boost of political extremism across Europe. High unemploy-
ment and economic stagnation over a significant period of time triggered political re-
actions and resulted in electoral success for far-right parties in the Netherlands,
France, Austria, Hungary and Greece. Although the aims of these parties cannot be
generalized, as their goals may slightly differ, they all have a common ground in the
financial crisis, boosting their significant electoral success (Klapsis, 2015). The follow-
ing table demonstrates a lineup of far-right political parties and their election results
before and after the financial crisis in national and European Parliament elections.







2006 2008 2013 2004 2009 2014
Austria Freedom Party of Austria 11.04 17.54 20.51 6.31 12.71 19.72
  2007 2010 2014    
Belgium Flemish Interest 11.99 7.76 3.67 14.34 9.85 4.26
  2005 2009 2013    
Bulgaria Attack 8.14 9.36 7.30 14.20 11.96 2.96
  2005 2007 2011    
Denmark Danish People’s Party 13.25 13.86 12.32 6.80 15.28 26.61
  2003 2007 2011    
Finland The Finns 1.57 4.05 19.05 0.54 9.79 12.87
  2002 2007 2012    
France National Front 11.34 4.29 13.60 9.81 6.34 24.86




1.58 1.78 1.46 - - 1.03
  2009 2012 2012    
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2006 2008 2013 2004 2009 2014
Greece Golden Dawn 0.29 6.97 6.92 - 0.46 9.39
  2006 2010 2014    
Hungary Jobbik 2.20 16.67 20.54 - 14.77 14.67
  2006 2008 2013    
Italy Northern League 4.58 8.30 4.08 4.96 10.21 6.15
  2006 2010 2012    
The NL Party for Freedom 5.89 15.45 10.08 - 16.97 13.32




11.68 5.08 4.56 2.02 5.56 3.61
- 1.33 1.58 - - 1.73
  2002 2006 2010    
Sweden Swedish Democrats 1.44 2.93 5.70 1.13 3.27 9.70
Source: Klapsis, 2014
The national parliament electoral success in Hungary (20.54%, 2013), Austria
(20.51%, 2013), Finland (19.05%, 2013) and France (13.60%, 2013) displays an unde-
niably rising right-wing across the Union. Some of the right parties display an open
form of xenophobia by showing antagonism towards e.g. Muslim minorities and mi-
grants, rather than a cultural or biological one, therefore they are considered cultural
racist parties (e.g. Front National, France) but not classical racist parties (Ignazi,
2003). They have in common the wish to benefit from favorable situations, growing
rapidly on the fertile ground of insecurity and fear, as extreme political situations ease
the rise of extreme political leanings (Klapsis, 2014). The connection between critical
economic situations and political change has been proven by researchers before: due
to insecurity about the future, economic crises make people more susceptible for
demagogy and populism, which raises fears and anxieties. Today, the question is
about political instability, though a weak economy is fueling the rise of political ex-
tremism, but is not the only trigger by far (see Annex Z: Performance of right-wing
populist Parties in European Parliamentary Election). Examples are Sweden and Aus-
tria, two of the wealthiest and most prosperous countries in the Union, which yet
show a significant rise in the right-wing (Klapsis, 2015).
The political landscape in Europe did not only begin to change because of the
current crisis, as there have been political shifts to the right before, e.g. the Front Na-
tional under Marine Le Pen in France. However, the terrorist attacks executed by un-
dercover terrorists crossing the Union’s borders by officially seeking refuge and local
IS sympathizers caused anger and fear in the country, leading to garnered support
within the population. Geert Wilders from the Netherlands’ party PVV has been one
of the most popular faces of the political right for years as well. Meanwhile, the party
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is represented in the European Parliament due to a 13.32% electoral success. Another
example is Austria, a country that has always been a stronghold of right national po-
litics. The FPÖ in Austria has already celebrated an electoral success in 2000 with
26.9%. Hungary is known for the active Jobbik, a movement for ‘a better Europe.’ The
country’s president, Victor Orbán, supports the party, making Hungary a so-called
brown spot within the Union. Up until now, Poland has been the only European
country with an extreme radical right-wing government and has denied taking in
refugees due to terrorist attacks in France before. The country is openly anti-Euro-
pean, claiming ‘Poland first’ under the paroles of the PiS party. Greece’s right-wing
has already discussed the introduction of landmines on popular migrant routes in
2002. Nikolaos Michaloliakos and his folks are known for violence. The Italian Lega
Nord aimed at a separation from the economically weak South since 1990, now open-
ly fomenting against migrants, as thousands pass the country’s borders daily. Ger-
many’s right-wing under Frauke Petry (AfD) is still more insignificant in comparison
to the European right party big players (Holzhauser, 2015).
The partially systematic abuse and misinterpretation of European legislation, re-
ferring to the minors sent on smuggling boats across the Mediterranean Sea or via the
Balkan Route to benefit from the rights of the minor to get granted family reunion,
have to be addressed. Moreover, when an obvious or attempted abuse of welfare sys-
tems becomes public, xenophobia and hatred are the natural consequence, causing
suspicion, prejudice and stereotyping among European citizens and supporting dan-
gerous right tendencies. The exploitation of welfare systems could be reduced by har-
monized benefits and enhanced data collection systems among the member states.
Enhanced collaboration and actual harmonization of registration systems would de-
crease the development of parallel societies made up of nationals from countries of
origin declared as safe, who live in the Union under the scope of the screen, by detec-
tion again pushing the right-wing.
Europe accused of Rising Fascism – A Demarcation
In 2016, Europe is split into three sub-blocs: first, the North, centered around Ger-
many including the Benelux States, Nordic and Baltic countries united in similar eco-
nomic policies and the belief in tight financial budgets as well as – until very recently
– tolerant immigration policies. Second, the South, sharing equal economic problems,
desiring a relaxation of debt and deficit rules from the EU turning the Southern states
into a kind of entity, and third, the Eastern states, comprising former communist
countries, making up an entity because of a common past, less sophisticated democ-
racies and more populist voters compared to the ‘old’ member states, as well as the
fact that they are all in a worse financial position. Victor Orbán, Hungarian prime mi-
nister, referred to the Brexit as ‘cultural counter-revolution’ and aims to take the ini-
tiative for his country by stressing the governments’ role in standing up for national
identity. The Eastern countries are united in the idea of a decentralized Europe,
against ‘outsiders.’ The unofficially created North and South alliances may also be ex-
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plained by cultural differences, but further explanation is kept out. Europe’s current
challenge is the increased populist East and how to deal with the ongoing develop-
ment of rising stereotyping and prejudice (Bershidsky, 2016).
Some critics claim that it was fascism that was now slowly rising in Europe, but
this is a misinterpretation of the term fascism and an ‘attempt to discredit the resur-
gence of nationalism, trying to defend the multinational systems that have prevailed
in the West since World War II’ (Friedman, 2016 a). As nationalism was part of the
Enlightenment, referring to liberal democracy and human rights in order to deter-
mine and decide on national interests as citizens, tyranny was feared, and multina-
tional empires dominating the area of today’s Union were associated as epitomes of
tyranny. During the national uprisings in Europe of 1848, as well as during the French
and the American (liberal) revolutions, multinational systems were destroyed and re-
placed by national states. The main difference between fascism and nationalism is the
electoral process, which might vary from country to country, but it is always based on
the citizens’ periodical selection of leaders (Friedman, 2016 a).
As the UK just recently decided to leave the Union and anti-immigration policies
as well as protectionist features increased, again influenced by the high influx of non-
EU foreigners entering the Union over a short period of time, critical voices claimed
this was a sort of fascism. However, this is not fascism but choices taken by the people
and executed by their elected authorities. Without judging the decisions as right and
wrong, it has to be seen that these are expressions of liberal democracies, not dictat-
ing the way to go, but rather representing the citizens’ view, without guarantee that
the majority’s view is wise and just. The rise of nationalism is a result of the European
institutions’ failure to function effectively, as the EU is still struggling with economic
problems as a result of the financial crisis in 2008. The influx of migrants is the topic
that has dominated the media for months, but it has just overshadowed the unre-
solved issues the Union still has to face, e.g. Greece’s debt crisis. The nationalists raise
the question whether internationalization was still beneficial and demand an urgent
change, but the ongoing European nationalist movement must not be misinterpreted
as fascism (Friedman, 2016 a).
The impact of the refugee crisis and the debates on reintroduced borders in a per
se borderless Union demonstrate the degree of vulnerability in today’s integrated Sin-
gle Market. The possibility to remain separate and abstain was cut throughout the
years and resulted in plenty of advantages for the member states, yet challenging
times demand an intense confrontation with inconvenient but actually existing side
effects of the integration process. Fear of the unknown, cultural issues and the general
anxiety of foreign infiltration trigger vivid outcries, condemned in e.g. right parties’
electoral success as perceived solution for current issues. It is not appropriate to clus-
ter the right-wing affiliates per se as uneducated sympathizers with the former Na-
tional Socialist regime, but one has to differentiate further and include the feeling of
neglect, as the political representation of moderate parties is no longer perceived as
adequate. Concerns have to be taken seriously, and the political debate has to remove
its stereotyping on superiority by facing the fear of European citizens. Tabooing a po-
litically represented wing is inadequate in a pluralist Union. Dealing with concerns
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and opinions of valuable EU citizens in order to find a sustainable solution simultane-
ously combats xenophobia, hatred and the accusation of fascism, all rooted in the is-
sue of non-EU foreigners arriving in Europe seeking refuge and the ones abusing the
open-door policy built on the grounds of humanity.
Brexit – Future Shape of the Union’s Structure
Under the slogan ‘don’t be deceived again, vote leave,’ the British voted for Brexit in
July 2016 (Friedman, 2016 b) and are expected to be out in 2018 after the end of the
exit negotiations (Rhodes, 2016). The Brexit, as narrow result of the British referen-
dum, can be explained by the historically demonstrated anti-European attitude of the
Brits (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015) including the impact of the refugee crisis. The results
of the referendum, an expected renewed recession and weakened economy, polarized
the already split nation further (Rhodes, 2016).
Opponents of a united Europe claimed the dysfunction of the common economy,
as the Union is still struggling with the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008
(e.g. 20% unemployment rate in southern Europe). Remaining part of an entity that
economically stagnates and the feeling of oppression and loss of control by being
forced to follow external decision-making from Brussels additionally triggered the
probability of an exit. The lack of sovereignty led to a rise in nationalism, not just in
the UK but across European countries that are based on the belief that the institutions
no longer served a purpose but take control away from the right of national self-de-
termination. Another issue that triggered the Brexit vote was the immigration crisis
and in particular the increased terrorist attacks across Europe (Friedman, 2016 b).
The rising religiously oriented extremism in Europe triggered the British exit, as many
EU critics and Brexit supporters discussed the likelihood of a safer UK without Union
membership, yet the UK has never been part of the Schengen area and is indeed con-
stantly executing border checks (Swinford, 2016). Despite moral obligations to sup-
port refugees on the basis of humanity, opponents see the migration wave affecting
the country’s internal status quo regarding culture, politics and economy too nega-
tively (Friedman, 2016 b).
The outcome of the referendum demonstrates people’s increased disbelief in mul-
ticulturalism, internationalism and cosmopolitanism. The vote was preliminary moti-
vated by anti-immigration sentiments that were supported by those promoting the
anti-liberal package. Nationalism, as trigger for the result of the referendum, has
many reasons and should not be underestimated when discussing Europe’s future and
the potential to remain an entity. Far-right nationalist parties across the Union feel
vindicated in their aspiration for a decentralized Europe after the Brexit. Especially in
Hungary and Poland as well as in France, the Scandinavian countries and Italy, the
demands for an own ‘exit’ increased and became more likely, resulting in a partially
fractious democratic breakdown. In the author’s opinion, the openly held discussion
on xenophobia, as well as an increased racism against foreigners in general but
against migrants in particular, is likely to be repeated in other countries when elec-
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tions will take place. The result of the UK referendum fueled nationalist movements
all over Europe. The discomfort with multiculturalism and the fear of changing social
and cultural norms became obvious (Rhodes, 2016).
Euroskepticism, as ‘political ideology opposing European integration, is a com-
plex phenomenon,’ which had already developed in the 1980 s (Glencross, 2014: 267).
These days, Euro-skeptics and Euro-critics across the left/right divide in European
politics (Glencross, 2014: 271) primarily claim the Union’s top-down approach. Frus-
tration is expressed as to how integration hampers ideological goals at both ends of
the political systems (Glencross, 2014: 271). The outcome of the British referendum
campaign demonstrates the citizens’ hostility against the ‘Brussels heteronomy’ pro-
cessed in pre-electoral slogans like ‘take back control’ (Haughton, 2016) and ‘let’s make
Britain great again,’ adopting Donald Trump’s campaign slogan post-Brexit on a jour-
nal’s front page. Intense bureaucracy, outdated administrative practices (Tömmel,
2014) and the tendency to centralize competences in Brussels striving for continuous
harmonization (Heckmann, 2016) collide with a lack of transparency, causing the or-
dinary European citizen to feel ignored, passively directed by others and deceived
about his domestically existing democratically defined rights to influence the political
direction and the decision-making. The British Euro-skepticism was pushed by con-
testation of national political parties, being torn over how to respond to the citizens’
dissatisfaction and disagreement on how to cope with the refugee crisis (Glencross,
2014).
The Union was originally designed to be a constant entity, built on abandoned
powers and shared competences by definition of ‘unity.’ The supranational entity un-
derestimated the power of nationalism and the ‘attempt to retain nationality as cultur-
al right’ (Friedman, 2016 a). After 2008, the decision-making process and the per-
ceived externally imposed doctrine of Brussels became increasingly difficult to accept
for some member states, resulting in the current situation of a shift to the political
right and the support of anti-European ideas (Friedman, 2016 b) to prevent refugee
distribution per quota. Europe has to be understood as post-modern society made up
of national societies (Beck, 2012), which is mirrored best in the mosaic of cultural
patterns across the Union. It is not that citizens lack the feeling of identity, but the
stress ratio, created through the parallel existence of two identities, first, national
state, and second, a higher set integration network, causes obvious identification is-
sues (Beck, 2012: 61). Change, as result of adaption and adjustment, as well as flexibil-
ity, are key capabilities to remain sustainable and constitute the essential steps the EU
has to take in order to efficiently support the citizens’ interests, rather than sticking
desperately to a model that turned out to be not suited to last persistently and that
does not meet the perception it intends to create with its given structure.
EU-Turkey Statement – A Pragmatic Collaboration
It seems that the Union is struggling at all frontiers simultaneously these days. The
migrant crisis caused the acknowledgement of admissions, yet some of them might be
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repercussions of the idea of a united Europe with respect to its path of development
and its profound values. The ‘Turkey Deal,’ as colloquially referred to, is an agreement
between the EU and Turkey, released in March 2016 (Jacobsen, 2016). The EU acted
pragmatically, out of the situational context and desperation, facing the humanitarian
needs and the states’ inability to handle the ongoing events effectively and efficiently.
The Union’s move to set up an agreement granting Turkey several benefits in return,
which previously have been discussed rather critically, is best mirrored in the long-
lasting negotiations on Turkey becoming a member state of the Union or not.
The agreement was initiated in order to stop the flow of migrants on the Aegean
smuggling route landing in Greece, or precisely, within the Unions’ borders. Greece’s
lack of capacity to process the mass of asylum applications was due to the country’s
inability to handle the high number of migrants while still suffering from the effects
of the financial crisis and other unresolved correlated issues. In return, Turkey was
promised to receive facilitated EU visas for Turkish citizens and 6 billion Euros in
financial aid for the refugees being stuck behind the Turkish border (Kingsley,
2016 b). The special clause that caused heavy criticism throughout the EU and across
different national parties concerned in particular the accession negotiations between
the two partners (Unknown, 2015 b). Critics claim that the deal breaks EU law and
the UN Refugee Convention, as the convention clearly denies expelling asylum seek-
ers without having previously examined the applications individually (Kingsley,
2016 b). The facilitated issuing of Schengen visas and the thereby linked possibility for
Turkish citizens to benefit from the freedom of movement within the Union is seen
very critically by many. Opponents of the arrangement feared a win-lose situation: a
potential actual reduction of the refugee influx, but a simultaneous increase of impov-
erished Turkish nationals seeking welfare benefits in Central and Western Europe.
Critics claim that the deal would trigger poverty migration, as ‘many shantytowns in
Turkey resemble South American favelas’ (Hausner, 2016). It is expected that the 90
days of legal stay permit under the short-time visa of the Schengen area will be ex-
ploited by phasing out the permit in order to settle down permanently within the EU’s
borders. Moreover, the constantly suppressed Kurdish nationals in Turkey might also
take the possibility to escape via the newly created quasi legal entry, whereby the
agreement would act as misleading door-opener to another wave of migration with
unknown impact (Hausner, 2016).
Turkey has aimed to become a member state since 1999, and the official accelera-
tion negotiations started in 2004 (Unknown, 2015 b). Critics argue that the country
had never been part of the area of today’s EU, neither culturally nor geographically
throughout history. Accepting Turkey as member state of the Union would trigger
further negotiations about accepting Israel and the Maghreb states as future Union
members, neglecting the idea of Europe as a geographical unity based on common
historical and cultural origins (Schuster/Köppel, 2004). The fundamental EU values
are, inter alia, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights including
the rights of persons belonging to minorities (Article 2 TEU). In direct comparison to
EU member states, a data analysis shows that Turkey holds a marginal position in the
European Values Survey 2000, demonstrating the reason why the accession negotia-
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tions have not been settled for such a long time (Würmeling, 2007). Ongoing human
right abuses, torture and questionable quasi freedoms conflict with EU-ideals and val-
ues, the European member states have committed themselves to (Schuster/Köppel,
2004).
Especially Austria and Bavaria critically questioned several clauses of the agree-
ment. The parties claimed that the European accession negotiations would be taken
ad absurdum when trying to negotiate about opening the door of Europe for a coun-
try publicly abusing human rights and suspending the rule of law so continuously and
vehemently. The democratic standards of Turkey are far below the general guideline’s
expectation, and being aware of these facts while continuing accession negotiations
means to willingly overrule fundamental European values (Unknown, 2015 b). Ongo-
ing human right violations and the internal war against the Kurdish minority, as well
as the AKP-Islamism and president Recep Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman striving for hege-
mony, are claimed by critics. Therefore, the EU-Turkey Statement is seen as funda-
mental betrayal of European values, as the EU’s concession to hold out the prospect of
accession conflicts too immensely, again highlighting the pragmatic politics under
which the agreement was concluded (Göll, 2016).
The impact of the agreement is far-reaching: inspired by the Union’s deal with
Turkey, Sameh Shoukry, Egyptian foreign minister, just recently declared officially
that his country would positively answer a potential deal with the Union as well.
Shoukry denied the accusation of human right violations in Egypt and referred to
several established integration measures. However, in October 2016, the Commission
officially denied to enter into any further refugee-related agreement with African
states similar to the one concluded with Turkey. Critics claim duplicity of the respon-
sible EU authorities and demonstrate alertness regarding the impression that only se-
lected states were worth concluding an agreement with (Unknown, 2016 c). Skeptics
also argue that Erdoğan was the one to express power, abusing the Union’s vulnerabil-
ity, while openly demonstrating his ability to transfer refugees or block the routes to
the EU. At the same time, Juncker is accusing ‘part-time Europeans’ as an additional
reason for the entities’ susceptibility, as he refers to member states deciding occasion-
ally about showing solidarity and acting as part of the Union (Luther, 2016).
It is crucial to finally define roles: is the Union a petitioner, at the mercy of
Turkey? Or is the Union meeting the country on equal footing as coalition partner in
a humanitarian crisis? As long as no differentiation is made and the positioning of the
two players is unclear, it will be easy to abuse the situational context for desired bene-
fits that were not granted without, surrendering European values, leaving behind the
initial idea at the beginning of the creation of the Union, but fighting these ensnared
diplomatic battles on the people’s backs, burdening Europeans and refugees.




Identification of a European Trend in a Globalized World
National interests in the post-war society caused states to pool their sovereignty in a
supranational organization due to economic and strategic reasons. The close integra-
tion was initiated by national leaders who understood the importance of a united Eu-
rope as key to a sustainable future based on lasting peace and reconciliation (Kenealy/
Peterson, 2015). Throughout history, there have been many attempts to organize the
multitude of countries, cultures and linguistic groups into an entity, so the concept of
a united Europe is not new, but the degree of today’s autonomy and sovereignty mir-
rors a successful integration (Staab, 2011). Schuman opened the community for fur-
ther participation when he invited other states, geographically located in Europe, to
join the community in the process of enlargement (Homewood, 2014). Nonetheless,
an EU-collapse was predicted by The Economist, referring to ‘capax imperii nisi im-
perasset’ (Latin: thought capable of ruling until it actually tried) since 1982 (Mc-
Cormick, 2011), and skeptics compare the Union to an empire in a world where em-
pires have already disappeared (Moore, 2016). The EU has developed into a suprana-
tional entity within some centuries, a model that is unique worldwide. The experi-
ment of inclusion and harmonization across a variety of ethnical, linguistic and cul-
tural backgrounds resulted in an integrated entity that ‘produces far more collective
action than any other system ever construed’ (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015: 238).
Today’s challenges and ongoing crises might introduce the Unions’ turning point,
as Europe is in a constant state of flux (McCormick, 2011). Citizens feel insufficiently
consulted (McCormick, 2011), which results in frustration and contestation, causing
‘Euro-skepticism’ (see Glossary) and triggering change on domestic political levels, an
evidence of the Europeanization of national politics (Glencross, 2014). The critical re-
ality remains: Europeans know little about how the Union works and are little familiar
with the functioning of the EU (McCormick, 2011). The perceived lack of transparen-
cy in the top-down approach of the EU’s decision-making process including intense
bureaucracy causes the feeling of being at the mercy of far-Brussels. The relationship
between Europeans and EU-decision-makers is challenged further, as Euro-skepti-
cism and Union-frustration caused anti-European movements and national averting
like the Brexit campaign in 2016. Europeans feel deceived from a comparative right as
ensured electoral power on national level, allowing change in political leadership,
however, the distance to and the perceived heteronomy of the decision-makers in far-
Brussels cause fear. Article 12 (2) of the Charta of Fundamental Rights refers to the
obligation to represent the citizens’ political will (Geiger/Khan, 2010: 59) on suprana-




opinion. Critics claim that citizens were too narrowly engaged in European business,
despite the European Parliament (McCormick, 2011). Increasingly often the member
states’ political elite initiates short-term oriented change, condemned in shifts to the
political right (Naßmacher, 2013), causing inability to act as Union, resulting in a rel-
ative lethargy of the so-called European experiment (McCormick, 2011).
The entity needs to grow further as political Union in order to sustain (Naßmach-
er, 2013), as ‘the lack of political finality that is the absence of final integration’ pre-
vents from preceding further (Glencross, 2014: 228). The European integration shows
that ‘the EU as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ (Fontaine, 2006: 7), but the
current lack of inner-European cooperation and solidarity weakens the Union as a
whole. It has to be recognized that a future in peace and stability is only achievable in
a united Europe, as isolated states cannot compete in a globalized world. The scope of
achievements in a European entity is way beyond the scope of achievements in indi-
vidual national states. Despite perceived far decision-makers, the Union is founded
on the shoulders of the national states and on the principle of conferral and subsidiar-
ity. The European integration process is questioned: ‘does more Europe necessarily
mean less democracy?’ (Naßmacher, 2013), and it is the Union’s responsibility to re-
spond to the skeptics’ accusation. Europe in the world of tomorrow is still responsible
for the decisions taken yesterday – it is now that the European model has to develop
and to prove its consistency and universality by modernizing when needed, sticking
to its values and demonstrating European solidarity, aiming to transfer a clear mes-
sage, ‘managing diversity, sustainability, peace, solidarity, welfare and democracy
equally’ (Falkowski, 2011: 18).
The Union can improve and enhance cooperation on all levels. Yet the vision of
consensus-finding will actually differ from reality, due to the ‘enormous diversity and
pluralism across the Union’ (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015: 243). From the intercultural
perspective, an ankle that has to be detected early as issue in order to prevent long-
term conflicts resulting in a cultural crisis between Occident and Orient, the refugee
crisis has to be seen as challenge but also as chance for Europe. Juncker (2015: 6)
refers to the ‘imperative to act as Union’ in the refugee matter. It is essential for the
future of Europe to develop awareness as civilization, rather than a missionary con-
sciousness. In this context it can be referred to an ‘Islamic Challenge,’ which cannot
be managed with the claim to universal values alone. The European relativism of val-
ues versus the value collective of Muslim migrants striving for an expansion of dar al-
Islam will result in incompatibility (Tibi, 2008). Self-defamation, as part of modern
European attitude, causes censorship and avoids critical questions. These times urge
to open up a discourse excluding political correctness in order to support the people,
Europeans and newcomers. No one should turn a blind eye on difficult and sensitive
issues, as it does not improve but does actually exacerbate the situation.
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The EU as Global Player – Responsibility and Challenge
These days are characterized by change, and in the spirit of fast pace it gets immensely
challenging to balance the interests of those striving towards the future and those wal-
lowing in the past. A pro-active versus a cautious approach on change are two sides of
the same European medal, mirroring the European citizens in their variety and cul-
tural diversity, whereby ‘Brussels as multinational crossroad’ (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015:
237) features the cultural mix by its representatives’ best. Globalization has increased
the feeling of vulnerability, as a shift towards a multipolar world has taken place over
the last decades. New major players from emerging markets developed and the inte-
gration project, which developed into one of the world’s hugest trading blocs (Staab,
2011), has to prove its experience in terms of unity in order to remain competitive
(Falkowski, 2011: 179). Also, globally acting violent terror organizations have not
emerged from the darkness without harbingers, but they portray the intermingled po-
litical constructions in the 21st century. ‘The Islamic State can be seen as child of the
war in Iraq’ (Todenhöfer, 2015: 9), and the West has its responsibility and burden on
that. The development has taken place for years, and the circumstances have en-
hanced the rapidness of establishing this militant group now operating worldwide
and clearly positioning its ideology from democratic elements and secularization (To-
denhöfer, 2015: 111).
The future is integration but simultaneously fragmentation: European identity
roots in its credo, but the lack of Europeans to identify themselves as European first
and second as nationals of a member state stresses the importance to improve the
perception of ‘Europe’ and identification as European citizens. The increased nation-
alism across EU member states triggers first attempts of protectionism. Structural, so-
cial and cultural issues cannot be solved without standing together in solidarity and
accordance as unity. The member states must overcome disagreement and strive for
consensus. ‘Europe’ is needed in a rapidly transforming and changing world
(Falkowski, 2011: 11) as network, while globalization has triggered increased mutual
dependencies. The member states have the potential to be part of a global power ‘in a
world where economic and political size matters’ (Falkowski, 2011: 196). To perceive
mutual agreement as societal enrichment (Council of Europe, 1995) based on the de-
sire to profoundly understand the counterpart is urgently needed. The Single Market
is continuously challenged by national interest and interests of the community, how-
ever, the borderless Union has developed to a global force in a multipolar world re-
writing ‘think local, act global’ (Deresky, 2014: 154) to ‘think global, act European’
(Falkowski, 2011: 195). With the EU’s long experience in the field of sovereignty
transfer, the Union has turned into a central player in the global network of power
(Falkowski, 2011) as highly influential vehicle (Staab, 2011).
Europe is a continent of diversity, starting from flora and fauna to the definition
of its identity by the diverse geographical, personal, linguistic and cultural variations
that define the European society (Falkowski, 2011), not as melting pot but as juxtapo-
sition of manifold differences (Hummer, 2010). Today, the individual and the com-
munity rely on national and global security forces due to new global security chal-
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lenges. Internal security depends on how to externally secure the environment
(Falkowski, 2011: 199). It is essential how the EU as lasting force for peace reacts to
the crisis (Falkowski, 2011). The Union is also critically challenged by fundamentally
different opinions (Staab, 2011) in the current crisis management, which makes it dif-
ficult to provide an outlook for the future of the EU. Jean-Claude Juncker argues that
‘there is not enough Europe in this Union, and [that] there is not enough Union in
this Union’ (Juncker, 2015: 5). Core characteristics will resist change, but it is the
community’s burden to preserve the European identity and value system.
The merger of individual states, the removal of borders and the introduction of a
single currency are milestones in the development of the supranational entity, making
the Union something unique worldwide. Cultural and linguistic differences constitute
its motto ‘united in diversity’ and simultaneously demonstrate the Union’s discrepan-
cy causing foreseeable disagreement. The inability to harmonize and speak with one
voice on certain issues roots in the strong feeling of ‘neighborhood’ rather than ‘unity,’
which again triggers the need to improve European cohesion and spirit. As long as
there is no common attitude in the refugee matter, the crisis will remain a major chal-
lenge. It is essential to define a concept as to how to deal with the issue in order to
prevent repercussions in the long run and to improve the force of a common Euro-
pean response.
The Future Path of Europe
Unlike a classical sovereign state and also because of the intellectual and cultural
movement of postmodernism involving the challenges about identities and states, the
EU is referred to as postmodern state. Nikolaïdis captured the Union as ‘demoicracy’
(Greek: demos ‘people,’ demoi ‘peoples’), as the EU consists of multiple democratic
communities instead of a single political community or ‘demos’ (Nikolaïdis, 2004:
97−119). As result of European integration, the organizational vehicle aims to cover
and represent all national identities and idiosyncrasies, but ‘Europe is not the Euro-
pean Union and the European Union is not Europe’ (Staab, 2011: 178). When the in-
dividual states do not feel the Union as contribution and supporter of national inter-
ests but rather as a burden, the rationale of existence and legitimacy is critically scru-
tinized. Researchers identified several options for the Union’s future path, e.g. ‘Free
Trade Europe,’ ‘Constitutional Europe,’ ‘Multi Speed Europe’ or ‘United States of Euro-
pe.’
The model of a ‘Free Trade Europe’ is also referred to as ‘British concept of Euro-
pean integration’ (Staab, 2011: 178). The basis of this idea is to keep the intergovern-
mental structure and national vetoes and to politically enhance only if all member
states are in accordance with the proposal, emphasizing the Single Market as free
market without trading barriers (Staab, 2011). The concept of a ‘Constitutional Euro-
pe’ is predominantly supported by Greece, Spain and Italy, stressing the importance to




In the 1990 s, Wolfgang Schäuble, German federal minister of finance, and Do-
minique Strauss-Kahn, former French foreign minister, referred to a ‘Multi-Speed Eu-
rope’ as inner core of states moving ahead with faster and closer integration (Staab,
2011). The European asymmetry, which is also mirrored in the differences on opinion
about dealing with e.g. the refugee crisis today, might trigger a similar model to Multi-
Regional Europe, whereby merged countries move ahead according to a common ob-
jective based on shared opinion, resulting in a new geographical and political defini-
tion of Europe, or at least causing regional sub-grouping. The ‘core of inner countries,’
which refers to Luxembourg, Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, pur-
sues common goals, striving for a ‘Union within a Union’ (e.g. fast progress and en-
hanced integration) (Staab, 2011). Critics express concerns regarding this ‘core Euro-
pe,’ a term defining the so-called ‘dominant leading states’ that drive the Union fur-
ther but guide and direct the Union’s path, according to EU-skeptics, by national in-
terests. Critics refer to the Franco-German axis, balanced by the British entry, yet
pushing the Union and triggering a debate about powerful European states potential-
ly leading the supranational entity as ‘directorate,’ despite the principle of conferral
(Della Sala, 2012).
A ‘United States of Europe’ with ‘the Commission as government taking over
supremacy and the European Parliament plus a senate of member states as two cham-
bers, is supposed to prevent Euroskepticism, according to Viviane Reding, vice presi-
dent of the European Commission. The proposal aims for a European ‘super-state,’
‘relegating national governments and parliaments to a minor political role’ (Water-
field, 2014). Some argue that the idea of a United States of Europe is exactly where the
Union is heading towards: further integration as trigger for improved cooperation in
different fields as solution to the crises the EU has to face. The ‘Bratislava Roadmap’
refers to the ‘Union’ as ‘best instrument we have for addressing new challenges. We
need the EU not only to guarantee peace and democracy, but also the security of our
people […] and to benefit from rich European cultural heritage’ (Bratislava Roadmap,
2016: 1).
Skeptics argue that the concept of pure unity was unachievable: national identity
conflicts and implementation difficulties would still remain an obstacle. The limited
number of personnel dealing with a number of highly complex tasks results in an in-
stitutional overload testing the Union’s efficiency and effectiveness and causing mani-
fold problems. Shifting more competences and power to the EU level could resolve
this issue, but it is not likely that the member states are willing to do so, especially
when faced with the unresolved financial crisis and the current refugee crisis. Skeptics
refer to the Union’s shell as superficially demonstrating efficiency, yet the multi-lay-
ered infrastructure and the complexity of policies discussed make it difficult to accu-
rately decide on effectiveness and efficiency (Tömmel, 2014). In the debate, critics re-
fer to the naturally pressured common language, culture and single nationality as pre-
requisites of a United States of Europe concept (Sinn, 2012), which again makes its
translation into reality unlikely, as a dominant language could cause a perceived supe-
riority. History has shown that countries can overcome conflict of interests and policy
differences while aiming to cope with global challenges and those waiting just ahead
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of Europe’s borders. Increasing the Unions effectiveness is the EU’s path to survive,
while constantly striving to improve the Union’s performance as international actor
(Kenealy/Peterson, 2015).
Outlook
Aiming to establish an integration culture for the non-EU newcomers and to provide
a sustainable environment, Europeans have to understand ‘Europe’ and its fundamen-
tal concept. It is time to become aware of European values, something that was
deemed to be given before. Human rights are not Western, nor European, but univer-
sal according to the definition of human dignity under Article 1 CFR in conjunction
with ECtHR Judgement No. 35071/97 of 4 December 2003 para. 40 in the Commen-
tary by Hans Jarass (2010: 39), ‘separating humans as subjects from objects.’ In con-
trast to the American ‘e pluribus unum’ (Latin: out of many, one), the European pen-
dant ‘in varietate concordia’ (Latin: united in diversity), best describes the mosaic of
cultures, ethnicities and languages the EU is made up of. After 70 years of fulminant
evolution toward an economically and politically integrated supranational entity, it is
time to finalize by feeling the European spirit and understanding European challenges
as national challenges. Standing together in rough times shows the states’ awareness
of unity, which profoundly demonstrates true integration. Ideally, binding effects
should not be forced but come naturally, as solidarity cannot be forced, which is best
portrayed in the behavior of several member states facing the high influx of people as
a result of the refugee crisis. Europe is not a separate continent but a district of global
village in today’s globalized world. Before discussing structural development, the
European inner core has to be understood, valued and lively performed.
Niels Bohr, Danish physicist, once said: ‘prediction is very difficult, especially
about the future,’ and so it is with the EU. The unpredictability, constant development
and events make it hard to establish an idea about the future Union. In order to define
the future shape of the EU, organizational, structural and societal-wise, inner dis-
agreement and disunity have to be overcome. Facing the spill-over effects of revolu-
tions, national uprisings and the condemnation of political decisions, Europe has to
understand its vulnerability and focus on intensified cooperation and solidarity in
times of need. The jurisdiction has to be adapted in order to respond adequately to
changing needs. The Union remains a welcoming entity for those in need, but system-
atic abuse of value systems and of a favorable legal situation cannot be the basis for a
sustainable living together.
Ibn Khaldun, Islamic philosopher from the 14th century, estimated the weakness-
es and strengths of a civilization by its degree of ‘asabiyya’ (English: bond, commit-
ment). Europe’s challenge is to estimate whether nowadays pluralistic society will
manage to integrate another civilization and to find out whether ‘Europeans have a
strong asabiyya’ (Tibi, 2008). Geopolitically ensnared connections have to be under-
stood to respond adequately and proportionately to the crisis. The European Union




inherited core is essential for a future in diversity and harmonious agreement. The
Europeans, as heart of the Union, can decisively influence the future, as the Europe of
tomorrow is shaped by the decisions taken today. In the past, ‘European integration
was realized by law enforcements’ (Oppermann, 2016: 100), but these times demand
integration achievements above the legal order: Europeans by birth and maybe one





The European society moves closer together these days, not necessarily as Europeans
but as nationals of a state, feeling the urgent need to defend local values, norms and
beliefs due to fear of the unknown and the future. The political split and governmen-
tal disagreement about the treatment of foreigners, asylum seekers, refugees and eco-
nomic migrants caused an increase in nationalism and invoke on local values, partial-
ly condensed in right-wing parties’ electoral success. In these rough times, the com-
mitment to European values, as core of the European Project, becomes increasingly
important to maintain stability and continuity. The population needs a modernized
Europe, an intensified unity and an enhanced solidarity in order to sustain and to be
able to respond adequately to this crisis and the ones to come. Despite the Union’s
tremendous evolution, additional improvements and further developments can and
have still to be made. Europe, as part of the globalization process, should therefore
strive for enhanced cooperation and intensified de-localization in order to integrate
and harmonize the Union further and to improve its decision-making ability as an
entity. The EU cannot keep its existing structure and shape, there has to be an unbi-
ased adaption to change, as it is not advisable to stick to a pre-defined path while neg-
lecting a changing environment. The European Project should not be taken for grant-
ed, nor should the values and freedoms, which our society feels so naturally these
days. Sticking to the roots of the founders’ spirit while flexibly adapting to what has to
be changed in order to remain, is essential for a lasting European entity.
The refugee crisis has proved the immense consequences of increasingly inter-
mingled geopolitics and the dynamics of crises, especially the oriental epochal turn-
ing point of a ‘spring’ that turned towards an all-season effect. The global village, as
the world of the 21st century is referred to, is not immune against movements and
influential patterns crossing the geographical borders, not necessarily physically but
through the developments of information technology. Technology, as cause and trig-
ger of globalization, helped the world to come closer, positively and negatively. Previ-
ously, locally arising terror increased its scope and caused a new level of uncertainty
within the Union, and especially the instrumentalization of religion jeopardizes Euro-
pe profoundly. The future has become less predictable, and the disagreement on the
level of the member states challenges the concept of an entity, as in today’s multipolar
world international affairs are unmanageable for individual small national states.
Again, improving coherence and solidarity to withstand new arising global challenges
is the key in a fast changing world where the international agenda is set, discussed
and evaluated by few major players.
The Arab Spring and the thereupon triggered refugee crisis, as well as militant or-
ganizations’ anger that roots in former epochs but is also linked to the invasion of
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Iraq, do not only affect but impact the Union. The supranational entity is confronted
with plenty of challenges and has to balance humanity while fighting against the sys-
tematic abuse as value community rather than as a Union, with focus on an open-
door policy and the resulting increased level of terrorism within EU’s borders. The
imbalance between Sunni-Arab revenge driven by jihad ideology, and the inability to
define ‘we’, as closed unity on issues of refugees and compatibility, creates a vacuum
on the Western side resulting in a disoriented society, which is unable to respond to
the global threat of religiously driven jihadist terrorism, increased nationalism and
populist right-wing factions. The unpredictability and vulnerability of terror acts
cause the worst damage, as societal split arising from distrust is created. It is Europe’s
responsibility to stand together in rough times referring to Francois Mitterrand’s
words ‘nationalisme, c’est la guerre’ (English: nationalism results in war) (referendum
campaign for the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992). Europe experiences a difficult learning
process and the emotionalization of political debates causes misconception about the
actual threat and danger. Depending on the issue, reaction, adaptability and resis-
tance are key words for the Union’s path.
Europe is challenged in multiple ways and most likely to change, as the crisis has
already left its mark. A multicultural and more diverse neighborhood is the likely fu-
ture of Europe as result of the ongoing refugee crisis. Therefore, it is essential to create
a concept to transform, while keeping the innate basis in order to develop a sustain-
able and peaceful future, based on humanistic values. As Europeans, for diversity, dig-
nity of the individual, human rights and freedom: the Union’s citizens can prove their
actual awareness of unity, despite their fear due to unfamiliarity with foreign tradi-
tions and values. The current crisis and its effect will remain a major challenge in the
years to come, especially in the area of integration and interculturality as well as in
cross-cultural communication issues. It is not populist to talk about limiting immi-
gration, nor is it anti-humane. In contrast, the regulation and organization of immi-
gration is an essential part for inner-state functioning and cohabitation as well as for
intra-European stability in the form of burden sharing. As written down in e.g. the
Constitution of Germany, there is a ‘responsibility before humankind,’ referring to fu-
ture generations and it is naïve to gamble away the future by neglecting this fact.
Cross-border solidarity by understanding the crisis as common responsibility is es-
sential. First, Europe has to decide which integration approach to choose for the ones
in need seeking refuge, then legal enforcement has to support the implementation of
what is needed in order to finalize the target. Safeguarding Europe’s values and taking
an equivocal stand, while being open-minded, flexible and not insensitive about for-
eign values and beliefs, is the key to a future in mutual agreement. It is not about or-
ganizational restructuring and the inability to separate political goals but about soci-
etal reality misleading and shattering the foundation the EU is built upon. The Union
has to establish a second concept for those, not driven by educational or work motives
in line with the European freedom of movement, but third-country nationals and
Eastern Europeans heading towards Western Europe as ‘refugees,’ hiding the econo-
mic drivers for migration and benefiting from an open-door policy. The jurisdiction
has to be adapted and member states’ devotion as spiritual part of the Union should
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ideally be condensed into a compulsory, not a voluntary participation. The border
management and Frontex’ autonomous power to intervene have to be supported.
Moreover, the asylum applications have to be processed faster, yet in more detailed
and integrated form on a harmonized, uniform platform like EURODAC, but en-
hanced, as gaps became apparent in several post-investigations. The database does
obviously not work as expected or the access possibilities are restricted, constituting
dangerous gaps not just for welfare abuse, but for terrorists. Family reunion has to be
suspended to decrease the likelihood of minors being sent on dangerous routes in or-
der to claim family reunion on the spot, and facilitated deportation of individuals
from countries of origin declared as safe should be a selected measure to be dealt with
as a priority. Time has witnessed that asylum seekers do not comply with the govern-
mental enforcement on distribution, thus causing immense bureaucratic work for the
competent authorities to register and de-register and to separate files of the individu-
ally displaced persons from others. Yet disagreement and political dispute still hinder
the implementation of efficient law enforcement mechanisms to effectively prevent
the foregoing.
Increasing nationalism as sign of the citizens’ wish to regain control over political
decisions and to feel closer to the decision-making process causes even more vulnera-
bility in times when the EU needs strong bonds and, most of all, unity. Leadership is
demanded in order to respond to the crisis. The EU’s structure has to be overthought,
and politicians have to include the European citizens’ opinions on deciding about a
future path: an intensified or a rather loosened member states network? A classifica-
tion and delimitation of common member states’ targets has to be made, therefore a
bundled decision-making power to respond uniformly and fast to crises might be the
most likely future of Europe.
Enhanced cooperation across the member states to fight terrorism and to dimin-
ish the probability of attacks within the Union’s borders, marking an area of pluralist
and humanist values, has to be established in time. The screening of terror affiliates
and sympathizers remains challenging, but financial means and staff shortage should
not hamper effective monitoring of those likely to execute an attack against Europe as
entity and value community. In order to avoid the abuse of European asylum policy
and welfare systems, monetary benefits, asylum standards, procedures and data access
have to be harmonized across the EU. Thinking more European implies the develop-
ment of a European solution: a European limitation on asylum seekers, not a country-
wise defined quota. Aiming to sustainably integrate and provide for those in need,
while separating them from the ones aiming to benefit from a humanitarian crisis, the
member states have to define a clear structure and stand together closely, as this crisis
revealed that Europe cannot afford to continuously discuss issues on a political level,
without fast implementation and visible progress: indeed, action is needed. Globaliza-
tion has fundamentally changed the world, but human standards remain. Europe is a
synonym for diversity and for a society based on the dignity of the individual. The
refugee crisis is a challenge on a supranational and on a civil level, but it is also a
chance. Populist rhetoric has to be out of place, debates have to be led more transpar-
ently and they also have to address sensitive topics to be able to respond adequately.
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It is the major responsibility of the already established Muslim community in Eu-
rope to condemn acts of violence in the name of Islam, to establish a prevention
mechanism and to enlighten potentially radicalized sympathizers, as well as to pub-
licly separate from ideological drivers of jihadist terrorism. Demanding Christians to
gain in-depth understanding of Islam is disproportionate, but indeed profound theo-
logical understanding is necessary, as the targets and plotted crimes go far beyond po-
litical motives but root in religious ideology. As long as these acts of violence and mil-
itant terror are executed in the name of and linked to a world religion, it is indeed the
responsibility of the respective religious community to denounce and convict. Europe,
as entity, comprises diverse ethnical backgrounds and cultures defined in the credo
‘united in diversity.’ Everyone committed to European values, apart from ius soli and
ius sanguinis, should feel the European spirit. Going further, the author suggests an
ideal development of a philosophical ‘ius Europa:’ embracing individuals with diverse
third-country backgrounds, joining the community in the feeling of unity on the
common basis of respect for EU values and innate ideals. Regardless of national be-
longing, we are all united on this continent, defined as community and in order to
provide a sustainable future in lasting peace and unity, it is an essential task for the
Muslim population to separate and condemn the drivers of societal gaps. Dark forces
benefit from distrust: banning these triggers of hatred from our society, by creating a
cross-religious and cross-societal unity, does not immediately solve the issue but
strengthens the European spirit in the long run. Despite the various challenges on all
levels, the intercultural challenge and overall security threat is likely to be the biggest
geopolitical challenge in the 21st century. The Union lived humanitarian responsibility
when circumstances demanded it, and a salute is to be given to the citizens demon-
strating fraternity in times of need. This is what can be referred to as European iden-
tity and living European values. The future of Europe is depending on the degree of
true devotion to Europe as community and entity, rather than continuing a national-
istic priorization. Defining the European citizenship as responsibility and chance for
the individual, neglecting national belonging and overcoming disagreement by refer-
ring to the innate common grounds of the EU facilitates the establishment of Euro-
pean asabiyya as strong awareness of Europe as value community. The refugee crisis
and the Arab Spring have for sure changed the Union by impact and will remain a
challenge in the years to come.
Knowing where we come from facilitates the understanding of the present and
eases the steps to be taken in order to shape the future. Being able to understand the
development of the Union, including the lessons from the past and the affiliation and
devotion to a unique peace project based on human rights by keeping in mind all
those, who lost their lives during the last centuries for the rights and freedoms taken
for granted so naturally these days, demands an urgent preservation of the cultural
legacy: to welcome newcomers, yet not to undermine heritage, custom and cultural





The term denotes rights and obligations derived from EU Treaties, laws and court rul-
ings. Member states joining the Union have to accept and implement the entire acquis
before the accession treaty is signed (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015: 249).
Alien
The Schengen Borders Code refers to an alien as ‘third-country national,’ meaning
any person other than a national of a member state of the European Union according
to Article 17 (1) TEU and someone who is not covered by point 5 of this Article
(Point 6 SBC).
Charter of Fundamental Rights
As several member states refused the establishment of an EU constitution, the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights was established as not legally binding guide and was pro-
claimed in 2000 (Geiger/Khan, 2010: 39) at the Nice Summit (Kenealy/Peterson,
2015: 249). The Charter includes fundamental rights and principles, but only funda-
mental rights obtain a legal claim (Geiger/Khan, 2010: 40). As part of primary law,
the Union is bound to the Charter (Geiger/Khan, 2010: 40), which aims to strengthen
and promote fundamental human rights of Europeans (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015: 249).
Civilization (according to Huntington, 1993)
A ‘civilization’ is defined as a cultural unity. Cities, regions, nationalities, religious and
ethnical groups differ regarding their heterogeneous cultural features. The term marks
the greatest possible cultural merger of humans on the level of identity, which is based
on subjective self-identification, common language, history, religion, values, tradi-
tions and norms. The European civilization is heterogeneous among its 28 member
states but differs most from non-European civilizations. Huntington identified eight
civilizations in total and gives reasons for the clash of civilizations, which is supposed
to be triggered by cultural conflicts (Schwan, 2001), but no further explanation is giv-
en in this paper.
Clash of Civilizations
The theory defines the peoples’ cultural and religious identities as primary source of
conflict in the post-Cold War era (Schwan, 2001).
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Copenhagen Criteria
The criteria are fundamental conditions regarding economic readiness, institutions
and human rights, aspiring states have to meet before being able to join the Union
(Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011: 299).
Cultural Backpack
Culture is assumed to be a survival kit, carried by members of a society in a so-called
cultural backpack (e.g. cultural software, social psychology, sociology and linguistics
as well as cultural anthropology and socio-linguistics) (Slawomir, 2005: 7, 8). Cultural
differences result from variations in norms, values, beliefs and communication style
(Sorrells, 2013).
Direct Effect
A major legal principle in the Union’s law, established in 1963 due to Van Gend en
Loos (C26/62) (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015: 251), holding that individuals can directly
invoke EU legislation in cases before national courts (Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011: 300).
Under the ‘direct effect,’ community law applies directly to individuals and national
courts have to enforce it (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015: 251).
Doctrine/Principle of Supremacy
The term defines a fundamental legal principle and doctrine, established in Costa v.
Enel (C6/64) (Glencross, 2014: 109), stating that in case national legislation conflicts
with EU law, Union law always prevails (Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011).
Enlargement
Term defining the process whereby national states apply to become member states of
the European Union, resulting in 28 member states in 2016 (Homewood, 2014).
Euro-egoism
The term refers to Europe’s exclusive concentration on its own interests and difficul-
ties (Council of Europe, 1999: 8).
European Convention on Human Rights
The term describes an international treaty drafted in 1950 by the Council of Europe.
An individual can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in case the individ-
ual feels his rights have been violated by a state. All judgements are binding to the




The term defines a (top-down) process, whereby national systems adopt EU policies,
while shaping the body of the European Union (Kenealy/Peterson, 2015).
European Integration
The process of European integration is defined as the process of creating ‘Europe,’ re-
sulting in economic, political and social interconnections between the created unity
called member states of the Union. The basis for integration is the accordance with
the concept of common fundamental values (Naßmacher, 2013).
Euroskepticism
The political ideology opposes European integration as complex phenomenon where-
by the term originates in Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech of 1988. It is a pan-Euro-
pean affair, manifested in e.g. political parties (Glencross, 2014: 280).
Fundamental Freedoms
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union defines the internal market as
an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, ser-
vices and capital is ensured (Article 26 (2) TFEU). The four fundamental freedoms
are defined further in Article 28, 45, 56 and 63 TFEU.
Internal Market
The term refers to an area without internal frontiers in which free movement of
goods, services, persons and capital is ensured (Article 26 (2) TFEU).
Measures having equivalent effect
Measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions are harder to identify
than quantitative restrictions but also part of non-tariff barriers. The term covers
health and safety requirements, packaging requirements and the composition and
marketing of goods (Homewood, 2014: 98).
Opting-out
Member states were given the possibility of exemption from implementing several
provisions of the Treaty. The states may fundamentally agree with the Union’s deci-
sion, but may determine how to implement it. The UK and Denmark made use of the
opt-out during the implementation of the Euro currency (Falkowski, 2011: 47).
Principle of Conferral
The principle sets limits to the power of the supranational entity. According to Article
5 (2) TEU, ‘the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences transferred
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upon it by the member states in the Treaties,’ meaning member states confer compe-
tences to attain objectives they have in common (Article 1 para. 1 TEU). In order to
exercise the Union’s competences, the institutions shall adopt regulations, directives,
decisions, recommendations and opinions (Article 288 para. 1 TFEU). As result of
the Principle of Conferral, the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts
trough the transfer of respective competences (Article 2 (1) TFEU), whereby the
member states democratically and voluntarily give part of their sovereignty to the
Union (Homewood, 2014). In case of conflict of law, EU law prevails, highlighting the
created hierarchy, which has already been emphasized by the court in Van Gend en
Loos (C26/62, ‘direct effect’ (see Glossary)) and described as ‘new legal order.’ The
primacy of European Union law was exposed in Costa vs. Enel (C6/64) and is written
down in the Declaration No. 17 of 2007.
Principle of Proportionality
The principle in Article 5 (4) TEU defines that neither the content nor the form of the
Union action shall exceed what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives of the
Treaty.
Principle of Subsidiarity
Areas outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union shall be governed by the mem-
ber states at a central, regional or local level. Unless the member states cannot suffi-
ciently achieve the objectives of the proposed action, the Union shall not act under
the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 (3) TEU). The principle was developed in the
Treaty of Maastricht, pointing out Europe’s people-orientation, which is contrary to a
centralistic approach (Schmidt, 2002). Decisions and actions should be taken at the
most efficient level of governance and as close as possible to the European citizens
(Kenealy/Peterson, 2015: 255). The intention is to prevent unnecessary accretion of
power at Union-level (Glencross, 2014).
Push Back Methods
The term refers to the unlawful turning down of refugees near the border. Pushing
back asylum seekers is a measure not in line with international and EU law (Richter,
2015: 69).
Quantitative Restrictions
Quantitative restrictions are part of non-tariff barriers, yet generally easily recog-
nized. It is distinguished between quota and ban. Article 34 TFEU prohibits quantita-




The term refers to the process whereby new policy areas are partially or exclusively
regulated on the EU level. New policy areas or sectors are increasingly regulated at
EU level (Schimmelfennig/Rittberger, 2006: 74).
Supranational Institutions
All those EU-institutions that are devoted to represent the interests of the Union are
referred to as supranational institutions (Lelieveldt/Princen, 2011: 303).
Western Values
The term refers to a set of principles established by the ‘Western Civilization,’ includ-
ing rationalism, the rule of law, the separation of church and state, human rights, self-
criticism, the disinterested search for truth, equality before the law, freedom of con-
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The Treaty of Maastricht is also referred to as ‘Treaty on European Union’ and entered
into force in 1993. The Treaty establishing the European Economic Union was
amended in order to create a European Community. The term ‘European Economic
Community’ was therefore replaced by ‘European Community.’ The Treaty created le-
gal mechanisms in order to act more widely on a global level on the basis of intergov-
ernmentalism, what can be described as external dimension to European integration
(Glencross, 2014). Beyond economic goals, the Union pursued also political motives
in the creation of the Treaty of Maastricht, mainly striving for five key-objectives:
strengthening the legitimacy and improving the effectiveness of its institutions, estab-
lishing an economic and monetary union, developing the social dimension further
and developing a common foreign and security policy (Eur-Lex, 2010).
To give a short overview of the Treaty: the TEU literally created the EU (Article 1
para. 3 S. 1 TEU), which points out its enormous importance for the development of
the Union ‘as new stage in the process of creating an ever closer Union among the
people of Europe’ (Article 1 para. 2 TEU). Article 9 S. 2 TEU in conjunction with Ar-
ticle 20 (1) S. 1 TFEU established ‘European citizenship,’ stating that every person
holding the nationality of a European member state should be citizen of the Union.
The citizenship is additional, not replacing the national one (Article 9 S. 3 TEU).
Moreover, the citizens can benefit from an area of freedom, security and justice (Arti-
cle 3 (2) TEU) where social exclusion and discrimination shall be combated (Article 3
(3) S. 4 TEU). The Union shall establish an internal market (Article 3 (3) S. 1 TEU),
defined further in Article 26 TFEU. Additional rights were granted to European citi-
zens, e.g. the right to petition (Article 227 TFEU).
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Three-Pillar Structure of the Union
The figure below portrays the ‘Three-Pillar Structure of the European Union.’ A de-
tailed description of the development, change and shift of competences is left out, as it
is not necessary for the understanding of this paper.
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The Arab Spring – A detailed Overview of 2010 – 2016





Source: The Economist, 2016
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Theory of ‘Imagined Community’ as Trigger for Pan-Arabism
Three geographical clusters define the Middle East: Southwest Asia including the Ara-
bian Persian Gulf, the Fertile Crescent and North Africa (Hovsepian, 1995). Due to
inter-Arab rivalry, two forms of nationalism have been developed: ‘state nationalism’
and ‘pan-Arab nationalism.’ Pan-Arab nationalism cannot hold in strong govern-
ments, as it contradicts the desire to center citizens’ affiliation to the national state
(Amaney, 2004). Therefore, pan-Arab unionism is the result of regional regime insta-
bility (Tibi, 2008), although it had never been political reality but rather a symbol
when it comes to the Palestinian question as example (Barzilai, 1999).
Benedict Anderson developed a theory on ‘imagined community,’ whereby the
community as a whole is opaque for the individual, yet all are sharing the image of an
association. Again, the media play a fundamental role in defining national identity by
reflecting and driving public opinion. The Arab Spring benefits from the created
awareness and the awoken sentiment regarding Arab consciousness and identity defi-
nition as Muslim first, Arab second, and member of a national state third (Pintak,
2009), showing opposed forces: religion and secularity (Hovsepian, 1995). The Arab
Spring as movement is the result of created pan-Arabism, whereby the Arab Spring
combines values, myths and symbols, not distinguishing between nationalities, but




Differentiation between ‘Jihad’ and ‘Holy War’
The reference of ‘jihad’ to ‘Holy War’ is a remnant of the past era of crusades. In the
Western world, the term ‘jihad’ is mainly associated with terror and violence. Yet ji-
had also means striving for personal development in order to improve (Ali, 2003). ‘Ji-
had’ (English: effort, endeavor) is split in ‘jihad akbar’ and ‘jihad athim,’ the big and
the small jihad. With the big jihad, the individual aims daily at moral perfection, con-
stantly improving inner purification using prayers and repentance. The small jihad
refers to sole defense of the Muslim community (Napoleoni, 2015).
Jihad akbar remained unchanged over the centuries, whereas jihad athim
changed under the influence of imperialism and developed to a defensive and offen-
sive power. The defensive jihad is about protecting Islam against malicious attacks,
but the offensive jihad is about the violent spreading of Islam. Historically speaking,
only the Caliph, as religious leader, was empowered to call out for the offensive jihad.
Today, the jihad led by the Islamic phoenix shares part of both meanings (Napoleoni,
2015). The re-establishment of the Caliphate under a Caliph refers to the legitimate
call for offensive jihad in today’s world and therefore important to mention in order
to understand the implementation in the context and to comprehend this meaningful
reawakening of past times.
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History of Perceived Sunni Arab Humiliation and Suppression
The fall of the Caliphate in Bagdad in 1258 resulted in the end of the predominant
Sunni Arab hegemony. In the 13th century, the political guidance of the Islamic world
was shifted to the Turkish Seljuk, the Mongol Ilkhanate and the Mamlucks and later
to the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century ruling the Islamic territories. At the end of
the medieval times, the Sunni Arab world had even lost its predominance in trade
and shipping. In contrast, Persia remained independent and an economical driver in
the region. A second humiliation was the suppression of the Ottomans as first colo-
nial power. In the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, France and Britain defined the ge-
ographical borders as part of their spheres of influence as second phase of colonial
dominance, replacing the Ottomans. The new political order separated economic and
social networks as well as tribal areas known for centuries in the Levante (Hanne/
Flichy de la Neuville, 2015: 61).
The Islamic State does not recognize the separation caused by the West back then.
Historically, Iraq and Syria have been one territory characterized by a linguistic, reli-
gious and political entity. The IS does not neglect the happenings throughout history,
but refers to the perceived humiliation in its whole action plan (Hanne/Flichy de la
Neuville, 2015: 62). Even the expansion strategy is similar to the Muslim expansion
strategy in history: the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and finally Rome (Hanne/Flichy de
la Neuville, 2015: 56). ‘No man-made border is eternal and no man-made organiza-
tion will remain,’ therefore the grouping under a common flag fights primarily the
post-colonial borders. The perceived humiliation of Sunni Muslims has continued
during the 20th century through e.g. the Alawite minority ruling in Syria, economic
frustration and Western-driven exploitation of natural resources. The lack of moder-
nity in the region (author’s note: whereby ‘modernity’ was defined by the West), trig-
gered resentment and anger. The development of Islamism during the 1990 s can be
seen as attempt to retain pride and to take revenge for the historical humiliation




Islam and its Denominations
Denominations of Islam – Overview
Sunni
1,371 – 1,471 Mio. constituting the Muslim majority of 85 – 90%
Mainly in Asia and Africa
Shia
Religious separation created as result from the Ali affiliates’ split
Today around 154 – 200 Mio. Shia Muslims
 
Imamah
Constitute around 90% of Shias today
Mainly in Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Lebanon, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan
Alevi Mainly in Turkey
Zaidiyyah Mainly in Yemen
Ismaili Mainly in Yemen, India, Central Asia and East Africa
Druze Mainly in Israel, Lebanon and Syria
Alawite Mainly in Syria and Turkey
Ibadi
Today around 2 Mio. constituting the Muslim minority
Mainly in Algeria, Oman, Tunisia and Zanzibar
Source: Fürtig/Bank, 2016: 13
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Number of Terrorist Incidents caused by Major Terrorist Organizations in
2015
The following figure shows the approximate incidents caused by major terrorist
groups in 2015 and underlines the ongoing threat from all present terrorist organiza-
tions. Despite the medial omnipresence of the Islamic State, other violent, militant
groups like e.g. Taliban or Al Quaida still cause active threat.
Number of Incidents caused by Major Terrorist Groups in 2015





GCC’s Denied Access – Understanding the Importance of Cultural Sub-
Clustering in the Effort to Integrate Sustainably
On 2 September 2015, Fahad al Shalami, a Kuwaiti official, declared that his country
and the GCC states would not accept refugees as they exposed them to the risk of ter-
rorism. Al Shalami stressed that people suffering from stress and trauma were not
welcome in Kuwait and argued that the region was too valuable and too expensive for
refugees to settle down in terms of living costs. The official declared that GCC coun-
tries only fit for workers but that ‘it is not right to accept people who are different’
from their domestic [Kuwaiti] culture (France 24, 2015).
The GCC countries have been criticized for not taking in refugees despite their
financial capabilities and cultural (closer) proximity to the respective ethnical group
seeking refuge (Fathalla, 2015). The countries on the Arabian Peninsula argued that
taking in refugees would expose the GCC to a safety risk, as terrorists could hide un-
der the influx of people, so the countries that rank among the richest in the world
according to the GDP started to donate financial aid to fund refugee camps externally,
e.g. in Jordan or Lebanon (Edmunds, 2015). The regional media discussed this issue,
and several statements portrayed the various opinions across the GCC population on
this off-sealing behavior. Some cynically asked ‘how the ones declared as infidels
(=the Westerners) can take more responsibility of refugees than their Muslim broth-
ers?’ (Fathalla, 2015).
The Saudi Makkah Newspaper published a cartoon in 2015: the man on the right,
dressed in traditional Gulf-dress resembling Khandoura and Ghoutra, claims, ‘why
don't you let them in, you discourteous people?!,’ while his own door is barricaded
with a barbed wire fence, witness of attempted entry, dotted with the remnants of
cloth scraps. The door on the left side is designed in the colors of the European Union
flag, symbolizing the door to Europe. Behind the door peephole, a man is eying his
demanding door neighbor critically while a covered woman (here: reference to Mus-
lim refugees through hijab and link to perceived obvious cultural proximity to Mus-
lim countries) dressed in ragged clothes kneels in front of the door holding a child in
her arms, both seeking refuge. The ambivalence and sarcasm of this cartoon made it
to one of the most widely shared ones in social media underlying the discrepancy be-
tween those arguing in favor of changing the law and taking in people and others re-
fusing to help by taking in refugees, yet compensating externally by donation.
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The Cartoon ‘Let them in’
Source: Saudi Makkah Newspaper, 2015
Sarah Leah Whitson, executive director of Human Rights Watch for the Middle East
and North Africa, refers to the ‘check-signing attitude of GCC countries in order to
let someone else deal with it.’ Although cartoons and articles portray some critical
voices within the population and question the procedure, Michael Stephens, head of
the Royal United Services Institute in Qatar, refers to ‘the paradigm in which the West
is continuously stepping in to solve the problem.’ Stephens argues that the West did
not step in on time for once, so ‘this has left many people looking at the shattered vase
on the floor and pointing fingers’ (Hubbard, 2015).
On 25 August 2015, the BAMF tweeted that the Dublin III Procedure would not
be applied to Syrians, which meant that Syrian nationals would not be sent back to
the European member state where the first registration had taken place. This state-
ment was (mis)interpreted as right to stay in Germany without fearing deportation
when holding a Syrian passport. However, it has to be pointed out that Dublin III had
failed long before, it was just this day that the BAMF made it ‘public,’ an act that is
important to know in the chronology of the happenings during the following weeks
(Faigle/Polke-Majewski, 2016).
5 September 2015 – A major Turning Point in the Refugee Crisis from a German
Perspective
The night of 4/5 September 2015 will be remembered as sidereal hour of glory for hu-
manity and the epitome of the ‘Willkommenskultur’ referring to the act of Angela




for refugees. However, her wording and act have been subject to heavy criticism for
Merkel opponents and foreign governments when e.g. Hungary’s president Victor
Orbán declared ‘the refugee crisis a German matter’ (Noviny, 2015). Due to the tense
situation at the station in Hungary, where hundreds of refugees had been waiting to
make their way to Austria, the competent authorities were expecting an escalation.
Werner Faymann, Austrian chancellor, wanted to open the Austrian border to let
in refugees waiting directly behind the Austrian-Hungarian border: uncontrolled and
without any bureaucracy in an exceptional time to relieve Hungary and to take some
burden off the tense situation (Unknown, 2016 d). Merkel and Faymann wanted to
prevent panic and to disburden Hungary. The politicians were sure that the people
blocking the station while waiting for their chance to enter West Europe could only be
stopped by force – which both denied (Rothenberg, 2016). In accordance with
Merkel, Faymann released the breaking news on Saturday, 0.42 a.m., by declaring that
‘the refugees waiting in Hungary can enter Austria and Germany.’ However, that
weekend around 20,000 people arrived in Munich, despite the expected number of
4,000−6,000 people (Unknown, 2016 d). Merkel’s slogan ‘we can make it’ became the
trigger for what is known as ‘Willkommenskultur,’ when the refugees had been await-
ed at the stations by singing, hugging German citizens, handing over flowers to the
newly-arrived ones. On this ‘trail of hope,’ an effusive description of Europe’s high-
ways, hundred thousands more entered the Union on their way to the center of Euro-
pe, striving for a better future (Faigle/Polke-Majewski, 2016).
The ‘Merkel Effect,’ which defines a significant rise in numbers of persons seeking
refuge in Germany after the decision of 4 September 2015, is correct in so far as the
number of refuge seekers back then almost doubled from 30,000 to 60,000 refugees
per week. However, the wave of migration has to be analyzed: many had already been
on their route before the decision to open the borders was even made. Merkel’s deci-
sion might have motivated others to start migrating or to resettle to Germany, if al-
ready within the Union. But the people waiting in Hungary had been on their way for
quite some time and did not expect an invitation, so the wave of migration has not
initially been triggered by Merkel’s decision, as was argued by many critics later. The
search engine ‘Google’ analyzed search requests with the word combination ‘asylum
in Germany’ in Arab language. It could be proven that the search intensity immensely
grew as of August 2015, yet not everyone searching for information on this matter
would actually become a refugee. The data analysis also showed that Merkel’s slogan,
which was later interpreted as unlimited invitation, had not directly increased the
number of asylum seekers. The Google analysis underlines that many had already
been on their way before or even thought about searching for refuge in Europe
(Faigle/Polke-Majewski, 2016).
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Source: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016
The general attitude towards foreigners and also the German ‘Willkommenskultur’
changed due to several incidents with persons under granted refugee status across the
European Union. Angela Merkel’s decision including her slogan ‘we can make it’ was





Exclusive and Shared Responsibilities between the EU and its Member States
The following tables provide an overview of (1) the exclusive responsibilities of the
Union, (2) the Member States’ exclusive responsibilities and (3) shared ones. The
ranking does not imply priority, and the responsibilities mentioned are selected ex-
amples.














Rules on competition within the Single Market
Monetary policy for member states using the Euro as currency
Marine biological resources under common fisheries policy
Common commercial policy
Concluding international agreements
Source: Fontaine, 2006: 36
Shared Responsibilities between the EU and its Member States














Economic and social cohesion
Agriculture and fisheries
(except the ones named under exclusive EU responsibilities)
Environment




Research, technological development and space
Humanitarian aid
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Member States’ Responsibilities with Potential Support of EU


























Temporarily Reintroduced Border Controls at October and December 2016
levels
The following tables show countries that have decided in favor of temporarily reintro-
duced border controls in May 2016. All data are taken from the online release by the
European Commission. The time of research for this paper covered the end of the
reintroduced border controls in November 2016 and the decision to prolong border
checks, which led to an update of the website. Therefore, the same source is stated but
with updated information.
Temporarily Reintroduced Border Controls (October 2016 levels)
Country Duration of Reintroduced Border Controls Location
Germany 12 May – 12 November 2016 Land border to Austria
Austria 16 May – 12 November 2016 Land border with Slovenia and Hungary
Denmark
1 June – 12 November 2016 Danish-German land border, Danish ports with ferry
connection to Germany
Sweden 8 June – 11 November 2016 Several Swedish ports
Norway
10 June – 11 November 2016 Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Germany,
Denmark and Sweden
Source: European Commission, 2016 e
Temporarily Reintroduced Border Controls (December 2016 levels)
Country
Duration of Reintroduced Border Con-
trols
Location
Germany 12 November 2016 – 12 February 2017 Land border with Austria
Austria 12 November 2016 – 12 February 2017 Land border with Slovenia and Hungary
Denmark 12 November 2016 – 12 February 2017
Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany, Dan-
ish-German land border
Sweden 12 November 2016 – 11 February 2017
Swedish harbors in the police region South and West,
Oresund bridge
Norway 12 November 2016 – 12 February 2017
Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark,
Germany and Sweden
Source: European Commission, 2016 e
Due to the massive number of persons seeking international protection (e.g. Germany,
Austria), the unexpected migratory flow (e.g. Denmark, Norway) and the unprece-
dented influx of persons (e.g. Sweden), border controls have been reintroduced and
prolonged for the European member states listed in the tables before.
A detailed list on member states’ notification of reintroduction of border controls
at internal borders pursuant Article 25 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code is not











Selected Legal Frameworks on Migration and Mobility
GAMM Framework
The European Union’s ‘Global Approach on Migration and Mobility’ (acronym:
GAMM) is an overall framework on migration, implemented as ‘Global Approach on
Migration’ (acronym: GAM) in 2005, as comprehensive strategy to address irregular
migration and human trafficking and to manage migration and asylum by intensified
cooperation with third-nations (Stern, 2015).
GAMM includes frameworks on various levels, e.g. the Rabat Process of 2005, the
Khartoum Process of 2014 and bilateral agreements with e.g. Cape Verde and Tunisia.
The Rabat Process is referred to as model for the Khartoum Process under the
GAMM legal framework (Stern, 2015). In the following the paper focuses on the
Khartoum Process, but a comparison and depiction between the two legal frame-
works will not be discussed.
The Khartoum Process
The ministers of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Sudan,
Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia and the United Kingdom and the European and
African Union Commissioners in charge of migration and development, as well as the
EU High Representative / vice president of the European Commission, met in the
presence of Switzerland and Norway on 28 November 2014 in Rome to sign the ‘EU-
Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative,’ also referred to as Khartoum Process
(Declaration of the Ministerial Conference, 2014).
The Khartoum Process is a framework between the member states of the EU and
countries of the Horn of Africa aiming at concrete projects in the field of migration.
The initiative was inspired by the ‘Rabat Process of the EU with West African States’
in 2005. However it differs as it includes Sudan and Eritrea, both generally ‘considered
outlaws in the international community’ (Stern, 2015: 1). The initiative focuses on
fighting illegal migration within countries of origin and transit and on preventing mi-
grants from using illegal transportation. Root causes of irregular migration ought to
be removed through increased development aid, but the Declaration does not include
ways to establish legal migration channels further (Stern, 2015).
The regional dialogue on migration and mobility reflects challenges posed by
mixed migratory flows of irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers between
the Horn of Africa and Europe. Concerns were raised regarding the human and social
impact of mixed migratory flows and the number of endangered lives due to journeys
across e.g. the Mediterranean Sea. The prosecution of smugglers, traffickers and oth-
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tance to ratify and implement the ‘Palermo Convention and its Protocols,’ a UN Con-
vention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols against Smuggling
of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons, supplementing the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (Declaration of the Ministerial Conference, 2014).
By launching the ‘EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative,’ it was agreed to
undertake concrete actions to prevent e.g. human trafficking and smuggling of mi-
grants in a partnership of shared responsibility. Further cooperation should be in the
area of bilateral and regional development to improve the national migration man-
agement. Moreover, horizontal cooperation should be strengthened in order to assist
migrants in vulnerable situations. Criminal law frameworks and the ratification of the
Palermo Convention were also considered effective measures fostering a well-man-
aged mobility, including intra and inter-regional labor mobility, addressing irregular
migration and assisting the national capacity on migration management (e.g. volun-
tary return and readmission in accordance with the relevant international conven-
tions and the Geneva Convention (Declaration of the Ministerial Conference, 2014).
The Declaration is a balancing act between the conflicting interests of the partici-
pating nations. First, it is not sure whether the Khartoum Process will be effective in
actually reducing the number of illegal migrants. Second, the shift of responsibility to-
wards the supranational level caused distrust and antipathy across the European pop-
ulation, as it reduces accountability. It will be difficult to oversee supranational action
on a domestic level (Stern, 2015). The fact that the initiative includes autocratic
regimes is seen critical, especially as many of these states caused circumstances, which
later on led people to seek refuge elsewhere. The European Union risks its reputation
and credibility by dealing with these regimes, causing the impression that the Union
supports human right violations and legitimizes the respective states as business and
cooperation partners (Stern, 2015).
The ‘EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative’ lacks binding effects for the
participating states, as the initiative launched is on voluntary basis ‘without prejudice
to the sovereignty of the participating states.’ The Khartoum Declaration does not cre-
ate legal rights under international law (Declaration of the Ministerial Conference,
2014).
In the absence of the creation of legal rights, the initiative seems inappropriate to
provide assets regarding the current challenges. Despite the focus on human traffick-
ing and the impact of migration flows, no concrete measures are defined, as it is upon
the individual states to apply the initiative voluntarily. Before concluding an agree-
ment, Europe should weigh up the risk of losing reputation against the actual out-
come, not the desired one. These undertakings will lower the EU’s possibility to claim
certain standards and cause long-term effects with unknown outcomes in case of be-
ing a future potential political victim or if beaten a trick.
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Europeanization vs. European Integration – A short Scientific Demarcation
The adaptive process of ‘re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree
that political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of na-
tional politics and policy-making’ defines ‘Europeanization’ (see Glossary) according
to Robert Ladrech (1994: 17) (Bulmer/Lequesne, 2013: 16). The innovative feature of
Europeanization captured in this definition refers to the continuously changing Euro-
pean environment (Bulmer/Lequesne, 2013) and the impact the EU exerts on nation-
al states (Sedelmeier, 2012). In a scientific study, Ladrech empirically investigated
French institutions and how they had been affected by the increasingly dominant role
of European ‘supranational institutions’ (see Glossary). As the definition of Euro-
peanization differs from ‘European integration,’ a term referring to e.g. political inte-
gration and a loyalty shift to the European level, the first expression is associated with
a top-down approach, constituting the second phase of research on the EU
(Sedelmeier, 2012). In order to study Europeanization, according to Maarten Vink
and Paolo Graziano (2007: 3−20), it is essential ‘to start investigating at a domestic
level and to detect, whether policies or institutions formed at EU level determine po-
litical challenges and pressures by the diffusion of European integration at the respec-
tive domestic level’ (Bulmer/Lequesne, 2013: 18).
Following Claudio Radaelli (2003: 27−56), as a consequence of European integra-
tion, ‘Europeanization is not convergence,’ as ‘it has to be distinguished between a
process and its consequences.’ Harmonization is set as goal, but Caporaso and Jupille
(2001: 21−43) argue that e.g. directives leave too much room for continued national
diversity due to the non-direct applicability of directives, resulting in unexpected de-
viations at the domestic level (Bulmer/Lequesne, 2013).
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Definition of ‘Refugee’ according to the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951
(Article 1 GRC)
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any
person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and
30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938,
the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization dur-
ing the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to
persons who fulfill the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section;
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his na-
tionality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the pro-
tection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the coun-
try of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term ‘the country
of his nationality’ shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a
person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nation-
ality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed him-
self of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.
B.
(1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words ‘events occurring before 1 Jan-
uary 1951’ in Article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either:
(a) ‘events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951’; or
(b) ‘events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951,’ and each
Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or ac-
cession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obliga-
tions under this Convention.
(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time ex-
tend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of sec-
tion A if:
(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his
nationality; or
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of
his new nationality; or
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or out-




(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has
been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself
of the protection of the country of his nationality;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section
A(1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous
persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationali-
ty;
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able
to return to the country of his former habitual residence;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A
(1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous per-
secution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence.
D.
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from or-
gans or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees protection or assistance. When such protection or assistance has
ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled
in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Con-
vention.
E.
This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent
authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and
obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.
F.
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to
whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against hu-
manity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in re-
spect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
Author’s short digression: according to Article 16 a (I) GG, Germany grants asylum to
those who are politically persecuted. Thereinafter, asylum is a basic right in the Ger-
man constitution. How to treat the persecuted asylum seekers is defined in the Gene-
va Refugee Convention of 1951. Since 2002, people persecuted because of sexual ori-
entation or due to gender are also granted the right of asylum in Germany. The Euro-
pean Charter of Human Rights prohibits the expulsion of individuals in case of ongo-
ing severe human rights violations in the individual’s country of origin, even if the
individual has not received the right of asylum due to several reasons (Bittner, 2016).
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Historically speaking, Article 16 a GG was defined in 1949, after the end of World
War II. ‘We’ was actually interpreted differently than today: Foreigners were e.g.
Spaniards or Russians, but actually the Article was primarily created for Germans. In
its first formulation, Article 16 a referred to the right of asylum for any German who
was politically persecuted because of his engagement in democracy, unity, social wel-
fare etc. It was changed, as ‘foreigners’ should also be granted asylum in case of their
engagement in the previously mentioned activities and the ideal that asylum cannot
just be granted to those who are culturally close to Germans (Bittner, 2016).
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Brief Digression: Germany – An Immigration Country?
The following background information is summarized and exclusively taken from
Karl-Heinz Meier-Braun (2013) in order to facilitate the understanding of the reader
on the progress of German development concerning this matter with regards to to-
day’s refugee crisis and the lack of an immigration act.
The first stage of Germany’s alien policy took place between 1952 and 1973 when
many migrant workers, dominantly from Italy, followed the invitation to work under
profitable conditions in Germany. Back then, it was expected that the migrant work-
ers’ stay was temporarily, but as it became obvious that many settled down perma-
nently in Germany, politicians started to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
keeping migrant workers during the second stage (1973−1979). The fear of intercul-
tural and social conflicts led to a politically decided migrant-work-flow-stop in
November 1973. This measure caused the remaining families to follow in order to
prevent separation. The number of foreigners rose from 686,000 (1960) to 4.4 million
(1980). Lothar Späth, prime minister of Baden Württemberg, officially declared Ger-
many an immigration country in 1979 by referring to prior guest workers as migrants
now.
The third stage can be described as development phase and implementation of in-
tegration concepts. The Kühn Report of 1980 already demanded an urgent social and
political change and the final recognition of Germany as an immigration country in
order to prevent unpredictable challenges arising from social developments, heated by
potential intercultural conflicts. The influx of migrants, asylum seekers and economic
migrants frightened the domestic population, as it was suddenly surrounded by peo-
ple with different European, Asian and African roots. It was not just a phenomenon
in selected metropolises anymore but turned out to be a common image in smaller
cities as well. A breaking point was expected: at a foreign population share of 4.65
million, different strategies to handle the situation should be initiated at the time.
The fourth stage (1981−1990) in the process finally introduced a change to alien
politics. Integration concepts were replaced by measures to limit foreign growth. Dif-
ferent means were debated (e.g. immigration stop in case the foreign share of e.g. the
city of Frankfurt am Main would rise above 30%), while fear of social conflicts domi-
nated and influenced the political decision-making. Thus, disagreement and continu-
ous political denial for the urgent need to establish an immigration act prevailed and
resulted in a social-political change towards xenophobia, whereby the fear of foreign
infiltration prevailed. Debates triggered the common assumption that willingness and
likelihood of foreign immigrants to assimilate and integrate would be rather unlikely.
In this context, Franz-Joseph Strauß, Bavarian prime minister, introduced the con-
cept of a ‘Prosperity-Asylum-Epidemic.’ The term refers to the impossibility to take in
everyone around the world whose prosperity is below the German level. The tension
climaxed in the elections of the federal state parliament in 1980. The NPD declared
‘Germany for Germans,’ and the question of the compatibility of celebrating Christian
festivals in e.g. a kindergarten with a Muslim majority of minors aroused. Politicians
promised to reduce the number of foreigners living in Germany. Yet during the reign
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of chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982−1998) the foreign population actually increased
from 4.6 million (1982) to 7.3 million (1998).
In the fifth stage (1990−1998), late repatriates and asylum seekers dominated the
political sphere, while guest worker issues were neglected. Germany was confronted
with a massive influx of foreigners from the previously named categories. Debates
about Asylum Law continued, and the adoption of ‘asylum’ as basic right was imple-
mented in the German constitution. In 1992, a report for the Ministry of Social Af-
fairs of North Rhine-Westphalia showed the increased number of conflicts between
refugees, late repatriates from the former Soviet Union and locals. A boy of Turkish
descent but born in Germany claimed late repatriates for receiving the German pass-
port and declaring themselves Germans, without even speaking the German language.
The government supported late repatriates, mainly from Russia, by re-integration of-
fers, like e.g. language courses free of charge, but missed the chance to do so with oth-
er immigrant groups, too. The situation climaxed as the conflict potential grew rapid-
ly. The use of violence on the basis of xenophobia was driven by the extreme right-
wing and increased especially in the new federal states in the early 1990 s. In 1998, the
parliamentary pre-election campaign demonstrated the split opinion about Germany
being an immigration country or not.
During the sixth stage, the political parties declared that an irreversible immigra-
tion process had taken place. The demographic development was one of the political
parties’ drivers to formulate an immigration and integration concept in order to han-
dle future immigration. The thesis paper presented by the CSU in Bayreuth declared
that ‘Germany was not a classical immigration country.’ Facing around 4 million un-
employed people, the population questioned the previously defined consensus that
Germany needed immigrants for its economy. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 also
changed the perception of the foreigner-debate, as it was not an attack against New
York but against the West, which negatively affected the generally positive attitude to-
wards regulated immigration. Edmund Stoiber, prime minister of Bavaria, declared
that Germany was still not an immigration country (2001). Stoiber did not deny that
immigration was taking place, but he referred to humanitarian aid as the reason for
the existing immigration. The same day, Petra Müller, head of the Commission for
Immigration, declared that Germany was indeed an immigration country. Sigmar
Gabriel, minister for economic affairs and energy, criticized the unregulated immigra-
tion of late repatriates from the previous Soviet Union and referred to statistics iden-
tifying this particular migrant group as the largest one – and the one with a high
share of causing conflicts. Gabriel requested late repatriates and prospective migrants
to prove persecution in the countries of origin to systematically reduce the number of
late repatriates entering Germany.
The politicization of Aliens and Asylum Law, which had been abused for political
party profiling before, dominated the political landscape again. Heiner Geißler, CDU
general secretary, stressed the importance to condemn excessive nationalism. In the
post-war history, the Aliens and Asylum Law became a focus of domestic political
topics. Today, around 16 million people living in Germany (population: 82 million)
have an immigration background, representing 19.6% of the population. The majority
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is from Turkey (~3 million), Poland (~1.5 million), Russia (~ 1.2 million), Kazakhstan
(~0.9 million) and Italy (~0.8 million).
The fact that immigration is taking place has already been noticed in the 1960 s,
but the lack of concrete concepts and the failure to take decisions in advance to influ-
ence the overall societal political scene in order to reach sustainable integration
demonstrated again the persistent negation and neglect of immigration as factor. Ar-
ticle 73 (1) No. 2 GG issues that immigration is a federal task, however, the govern-
ment officially denied that Germany was an immigration country and the concept of
temporarily staying guest workers prevailed for centuries. Today, the refugee crisis
challenges not only Europe’s but also Germany’s legal basis. In 2006 Wolfgang
Schäuble, federal minister of the interior, declared that ‘Islam is part of Germany and
part of Europe.’ In 2010, Christian Wulff, federal president, stressed the pun of a
‘Bunte Republik Deutschland’ (English: Federal State of Germany), replacing the term
‘federal’ with ‘colourful,’ referring to the different ethnical and cultural backgrounds
of families living in Germany. Later in 2011, the new federal minister of the interior,
Hans-Peter Friedrich, dissociated himself from Schäuble’s words but did not deny that
‘Muslim people living in Germany are part of Germany, however, historically seen Is-
lam has no roots in Germany.’ A study of the Institution of Labor Market and Occu-
pational Research in Nürnberg revealed in 2010 that xenophobia has increased in the
politically moderate societal layer. The polling institute TNS Emnid at the University
of Münster discovered that 40% of the population actually feared foreign infiltration.
Due to the intensive focus on integration policies over the last years, asylum and
refugee politics were not developed further, which became obvious in 2012 when the
first wave of refugees entered the federal territory of Germany as a result of the Arab
Spring.
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Statistics on Asylum
Germany received 702,293 initial asylum applications in 2016, which is a plus of 79%
compared to 2015 (392,028 initial asylum applications). The number of follow-up ap-
plications decreased to 20,535, resulting in a total amount of asylum applications of
723,027 in 2016, which equals a total increase of 70.1% compared to 2015. The total
protection rate of all countries of origin is at 63.3% (BAMF, 2016: 2)
Overview of Initial Applications and Protection Rate in Germany (2016)
Country Initial Applications
Percentage of all Initial
Applications
Protection Rate
Syria 262,268 27.3% 98.1%
Afghanistan 124,909 17.8% 55.5%
Iraq 94,251 13.4% 70.3%
Source: BAMF, 2016
Asylum Applications in the Union and in selected Member States
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The Registration of Refugees portrayed exemplarily at the Federal Republic
of Germany
The number of reports about multiple registration of refugees and the simultaneous
collection of benefits from various social welfare systems by using different identities
is not surprising by critically analyzing the current status quo. In the absence of law
harmonization and the lack of centralization, the member states use different systems
for registration, causing secondary illegal migration and triggering social frauds com-
mitted under diverse identities (Unknown, 2016 e). The Federal Republic of Germany
is used as an example to underline the importance to harmonize standard procedures
and systems within first, a country, and second, among the member states on a supra-
national-level.
Refugees arriving in Germany are primarily registered via the tracking system
‘Easy’ and are distributed to the 16 federal states on the basis of an allocation key
called ‘Königssteiner Schlüssel,’ which is based on quotas including the income and
the number of population. However, the system does not register any personal data
(e.g. names, fingerprints) or criminal history, and in case of an allocation to e.g.
Bavaria, the refugee might still decide individually against the official guidelines and
move to e.g. Berlin. The right to move freely within a member state is granted to an
individual recognized under international protection (Article 33 of the Directive
2011/95/EU). As no personal data are registered, the competent authorities in Berlin
will most likely grant new papers to the individual, as they cannot check on the iden-
tity or on potential prior registration, especially if a new name and a new identity are
stated. In 2015, around 13% of the registered and allocated refugees never reached
their target place but disappeared from the screen. The federal states also differ e.g.
when it comes to granting a health care card, accommodation and to providing inte-
gration courses. The benefits also vary in height and in the form they are issued. So
far, only Bavaria sticks to granting benefits in voucher form and performance in kind,
other federal states like Hesse or Saxony-Anhalt hand out monetary means in cash
but rethink this measure now in order to prevent improper spending (Fischer/Gath-
mann, 2016).
Not all federal states use the IT application Easy. Hamburg, as an example, uses
‘Paula Go’ (Stadt Hamburg, 2016). The fact that Germany uses different systems for
registering refugees on the national level makes the application of various systems
across Europe not surprising. The lack of harmonization leads to the inability to ex-
change data and besides to the fact that e.g. Easy does not save fingerprints or person-
al data at all (Aust/Bewarder, 2015). In case of terrorism and prevention mechanisms,
the registration systems were heavily criticized, as e.g. the attackers from Paris in 2015
were traced to have entered the Union via the Balkan Route with forged Syrian pass-
ports (Diehl/Reimann, 2015). The inability of competent authorities and police forces
to collect sustainable evidence in time is the result of a lack of knowledge about the
individuals’ past or criminal history. Additionally, Frontex cannot access the databas-




passports and real ones (Aust/Bewarder, 2015), but data synchronization would re-
duce the existing security risk.
Every German national holds an ID Card, which is uniform and equally valid in
all 16 federal states. Yet, in many cases, refugees arrive without passport or identifica-
tion documents, because of loss or because it enhances the chances to stay under a
different identity and a misstated nationality. However, the residence title, which is
granted after successful recognition as refugee, has not been uniform. Multiple regis-
trations, time-consuming procedures and the exchange between BAMF, Federal La-
bor Office, Federal Police Force and other authorities slow down the entire process. It
was not before April 2016 that North Rhine-Westphalia, as first of the 16 German
federal states, introduced a new proof of arrival on the federal government’s decision
(Stawowy, 2015) by starting to collect biometrical data from newly arriving refugees
to avoid the abuse of multiple registrations. The idea was to create a nationwide
database for the authorities to compare biometric data and to double-check potential
prior registrations before handing out final documents (N24, 2016). Without a valid
prior registration, neither an application for asylum nor (monetary) benefits should
be granted. The implementation of the new proof of arrival aims at faster processing
periods resulting in a facilitated procedure (Stawowy, 2015). Nevertheless, the process
of implementation is time-consuming and allows many to still benefit from the frag-
mented application systems.
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The Directive 2011/95/EU
The Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and the Council ‘on standards
for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for
subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted’ was issued on 13
December 2011. The purpose was in defining ‘standards for the qualification of third-
country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for
a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for
the content of the protection granted’ (Article 1).
According to Article 5 (1), ‘a well-founded fear of being persecuted or a real risk
of suffering serious harm may be based on ‘events, which have taken place since the
applicant left the country of origin,’ or ‘on activities, which the applicant has been en-
gaged in since he or she left the country of origin’ (Article 5 (2)). Actors of persecu-
tion include the state (Article 6 (a)), parties or organizations (Article 6 (b)) and non-
state actors (Article 6 (c)).
Member States would not grant international protection, if ‘in a part of the coun-
try of origin, the individual had no well-founded fear of being persecuted or is not at
real risk of suffering serious harm (Article 8 (1) (a)) or had access to protection
against persecution or serious harm (Article 8 (1) (b)). This means that the individual
‘can safely and legally travel to […] that part of the country and can reasonably be
expected to settle there.’ In order to decide on granting international protection, the
Member States should ensure the cooperation with the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees and the European Asylum Support Office to get information
on the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country and on the per-
sonal circumstances of the applicant (Article 8 (2)). The Directive provides a list with
qualifications for being a refugee in accordance with Article 1 (A) of the Geneva Con-
vention by naming acts of persecutions (Article 9), e.g. violation of basic human
rights (Article 9 (1) (a)), violations of human rights (Article 9 (1) (b)) and by qualify-
ing the form of persecution, e.g. acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of
sexual violence (Article 9 (2) (a)), legal, administrative, police and/or judicial mea-
sures which are in themselves discriminatory or which are implemented in a discrim-
inatory manner (Article 9 (2) (b)), prosecution or punishment which is dispropor-
tionate or discriminatory (Article 9 (2) (c)), denial of judicial redress resulting in a
disproportionate or discriminatory punishment (Article 9 (2) (d)) or acts of a gender-
specific or child-specific nature (Article 9 (2) (f)). In order to obtain international
protection, one of the reasons written down in the list in Article 10 and Article 9 (1)
must be fulfilled (Article 9 (3)).
Reasons for persecution include, inter alia, race, color, descent or membership of
a particular ethnic group (Article 10 (1) (a)), religion or holding of theistic, non-the-
istic and atheistic beliefs, including e.g. the participation in, or the abstention from





A third-country national or a stateless person is excluded from the definition
‘refugee’ according to the Geneva Convention if considered under scope of Article 1
(D) of the Geneva Convention ‘relating to protection or assistance from organs or
agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees’ (Article 12 (1) (a)). A person is also excluded from the status refugee, if the
individual has committed, inter alia, war crime or crime against humanity (Article 12
(2) (a)). However, every individual, qualified as refugee under the Directive (Chapter
II+III), shall be granted international protection under refugee status by the Member
States (Article 13). In accordance with the rights laid down in the Geneva Conven-
tion, Article 21 refers to the protection from refoulement, as Member States have to
respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their international obli-
gations according to Article 21 (1). Article 33 of the Geneva Refugee Convention
refers to the principle of non-refoulement as prohibition to return or expel a refugee.
No contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion (Article 33 I GC), as was explained by the Committee: 'the turning back of a
refugee to the frontiers of a country where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion, would be tantamount to
delivering him into the hands of his persecutors.’
The Directive defines access to employment (Article 26), access to education (Ar-
ticle 27), access to procedures for recognition of qualifications (Article 28), access to
social welfare (Article 29), healthcare (Article 30) and access to accommodation (Ar-
ticle 32) for an individual under the status of a refugee according to the Geneva Con-
vention. Additionally, Freedom of Movement within the territory of a Member State
is granted to ‘beneficiaries of international protection, under the same conditions and
restrictions as those provided for other third-country nationals legally resident in
their territories’ (Article 33).
The Directive is important, as it highlights that every individual defined as
refugee is granted international protection within the European Union and refers to
the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951.
It is a directive, not a regulation, but it still binds the member states at least to a com-
mon ground, yet, as discussed in the paper, the actual usage, implementation and sol-
idarity among the member states are lacking on this matter.
Annex R The Directive 2011/95/EU
145
Differentiation between Directive and Regulation
The legal basis for a regulation is laid down in Article 288 para. 2 TFEU. Thereinafter,
a regulation has general application, as it is binding in its entirety and directly appli-
cable in all member states.
In contrast, a directive is governed by Article 288 para. 3 TFEU, stating that a di-
rective ‘shall be binding upon each member state to which it is addressed, but shall
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.’ A directive is not
directly applicable but needs to be implemented on national level. A union-wide har-
monization cannot be achieved by releasing a directive, but the actual accordance and
acceptance is improved, as the member states are free to achieve the directive’s end





Terrorist Attacks Worldwide (2015)
The following figure provides an overview of the terrorist attacks executed in 2015.
With focus on Europe, a geographical concentration becomes obvious in Germany
and France. Other areas on the world map and potential geographical concentrations









Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2016 b, adopted by Dankert, 2017
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Terrorist Attacks in Detail
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Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2016 a












The Conflict of Islam and Democracy
The lack of democratic governments in the Arab world is not because Arabs are per se
afraid of democracy, although many do not have access to literature to understand the
term in its full meaning. The separation of secular humanism and the isolation from
developing a bourgeois society which, back then, enabled the freedom of thought, the
right of self-determination, tolerance and the right of taking initiative in the West, is
lacking. So far, no Muslim state, apart from Turkey, has declared itself secular
(Mernissi, 2002).
Democracy (Arabic: dimukratia) refers to fear of the unknown, as it enables ev-
eryone to read, think and behave in any possible way. Many other words have been
adopted in the Arab language like e.g. car (Arabic: sayyara, automobile) or telephone
(Arabic: telifun). Nevertheless, no other adopted word is as intensely debated as the
term ‘democracy,’ which is derived from the Greek. The autocratic regimes refer their
legitimacy out of religion, the ones demanding democracy are called ‘kafir’ (English:
non-believers). The translation reveals that the term democracy is not only foreign to
the culture, but it also raises a conflict of interests. Supporting democracy means sup-
porting the unbelievers. The Arabic word for ‘West,’ which refers to Europe but also to
America and Canada, is ‘garb,’ literally meaning darkness or the inconceivable. It is the
literal area of the strange, the unknown (Arabic: al Garib), which includes everything
that is frightening and elusive. Islamists argue that a secular state will remove the
memory of the Prophet Muhammad and will lead to the renunciation of God, trigger-
ing hubris resulting in nihilism as part of what is considered and feared as ‘Western
aggressive consume culture’ (Mernissi, 2002).
Contrary to Judaism and Christianity, ‘Islam’ does not root in a tribe or person
but in a relationship, as it literally means submission, surrender or the laying down of
arms to finish the state of war. ‘Istislam at-tasallum’ means ceasefire or interruption of
hostility. Looking at the year 8/630, Mekka was a city in pagan Arabia with a multi-
tude of more than 360 gods. The daily lives back then were characterized by violence
and fear, which can be summarized as ‘shirk’ (English: merge). The year 8/630 refers
to the date of conquest of Mecca through Muhammad by literally overthrowing the
diversity of gods from the throne and replacing them by monotheism. Islam changed
the status quo as it guaranteed peace, so the people abjured the freedom of thought
and religion in return (Mernissi, 2002).
The reference text for democracy is the Charter of the United Nations. After
World War II, Muslim territories had been transferred to quasi parliamentarian
democracies on paper. The majority of the Arab states signed the Charter, but their
actual reference text remained the Qur’an. Despite the signature, incompatibilities be-
tween the Charter of the United Nations and the Muslim states appeared. As this pa-
per does not focus on a juxtaposition of religious norms and articles of the Charter,
some examples are provided afterwards just to get an idea about the conflicting situa-
tion.
Article 1 (3) UN Charter describes the purpose of the Charter in achieving ‘inter-
national cooperation […] in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
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and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and
religion.’ The Charter refers to ‘equal rights and self-determination of people’ and
highlights the universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language of religion (Mernissi, 2002). The equality
of men and women is laid down in Article 8 UN Charter and in the determination of
the signatories on page 2 UN Charter. Mernissi (2002) refers to Article 8 as anti-dis-
criminatory fundamental right versus practiced sharia. Article 18 UN Charter refers
to the definition of ‘jahilyya‘ (English: ignorance), meaning to revert to the status quo
of the year 0/622, as Mernissi connects the article to the freedom of conscience. The
concept of ‘voting,’ as depicted in the article, supports the claim for freedom of con-
science and freedom of thought, although the article is about the General Assembly.
The presidential electoral reality in many states is to be elected for a lifetime
(Mernissi, 2002) like e.g. Mahmud Abbas, Jassir Arafat or Ali Abdullah Saleh. In
2011, Saleh, president of Yemen, had to step down after 32 years of presidency, as the
opposition claimed the lack of democratic elections in the country during the Arab
Spring in Yemen (Borgstede, 2011).
H.R.H. Amir Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz, viceroy of the Hejaz and minister for foreign
affairs and chairman of the delegation from Saudi Arabia, officially signed the United
Nations Charter at the San Francisco Conference in June 1945 (United Nations,
1945). Mernissi (2002) points out that Saudi Arabia, including other Muslim states as
signatories, never opened up to further debates about the relationship of religion and
state in the respective countries. The Charter of the United Nations awakes the Mus-
lim idea of ‘shirk,’ which etymologically means to merge, to join and which is seen
negatively, as it is heavily interwoven with the time of chaos and confusion. The
question of democratizing Muslim countries triggers a conflict between Islam and
‘shirk,’ which is seen as synonym for freedom and pluralism. Islam replaced individu-
ality by including the single individual in a community (Arabic: umma) in order to
create uniformity and equality. Thus, individualism is exchanged for lasting peace
(Mernissi, 2002).
From a Muslim perspective, the term ‘party’ is associated with a rather negative
connotation, meaning ‘hizb’ and ‘si’a,’ referring to a group of people having different
opinions. The term has a sectarian character, causing a split, as it refers to the so-
called ‘army of non-believers’ (Arabic: djunud al-kuffar). Historically, the army of
non-believers, as the Quraish tribal people favoring polytheism were called, were the
ones combating Muhammad during his siege of Mecca. Their polytheism is seen as
synonym for the variety and diversity of gods and at a subtle level, it can be referred
to the freedom of opinion, resulting in pluralism (Mernissi, 2002).
Some researchers refer to the importance to provide development aid in countries
of origin and to undertake military interventions to establish democracy in autocratic
states of Middle Eastern regimes. But the conflicts between the Charter of the United
Nations and the idea of democratization in Muslim countries arise by name. The term
‘democracy’ refers to one of the pillars of Western societies. However, it was declared
a Western illness by many regimes before, mainly to keep the civilians calm. During
the peace walks of 1991 on the ongoing Gulf War in Bagdad, people first expressed
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their wish for political change by openly claiming: ‘Ma sa’luna! Ma sa’luna! Al-qarar
qararuna!’ (English: we haven’t been asked! The decision is at us!) (Mernissi, 2002).
Undoubtedly there is a movement across Arab countries, supported by those
striving for change. Despite the terror of violent organizations, it can be said that even
these formatted violent groups strive for change, despite their backwards orientation
(Mernissi, 2002).
Annex U The Conflict of Islam and Democracy
151










Headscarf ban for state servants and in public institutions 
Burka ban 
Regional burka ban  
Governmental enforcement to cover with hijab or niqab 






Likelihood of Cultural Adoption – A Scientific Demarcation
Scientifically speaking, there are four categories of immigrants adopting a local cul-
ture: assimilation (= adopting local culture, while continuing to practice the original
culture), integration (= maintaining original culture and adopting local culture), sepa-
ration (= maintaining original culture and failing to adapt to local culture) and
marginalization (= failing to adapt to local culture and failing to maintain the original
one) (Ghorbani, 2011).
The differentiation equals the degree of migrants’ willingness to give up or stick to
the original culture. Depending on the multi-religion and multi-ethnic societies of
host-countries, people and governments vary regarding their acceptance of newcom-
ers. Typical immigration countries like America employ a ‘melting pot’ policy, which
is referred to as ‘Americanization’ (Ghorbani, 2011) or ‘Civil Integration’ (Mouritsen/
Faas, 2015). The local culture rejects the immigrants’ practices as intolerable, fearing
to lose control, so the newcomers’ culture is not appreciated as addition to the domes-
tic one. Melting pot societies encourage immigrants to think like locals and aim to
integrate them as adapted members of the domestic culture including values, attitude,
behavior and practice (Ghorbani, 2011).
In contrast, multicultural societies embrace the mixture of cultures as addition to
the local community (Ghorbani, 2011). ‘Multiculturalism’ as term was first used in
1971 in educational literature and became popular as Canada adopted the expression
to label its policy on linguistic differences and cultural diversity (Bryson, 2002). Dif-
ferences in terms of cultural values are part of this ethno-cultural merger, where cul-
tures co-exist within a society, enriched by individual cultural additions (Saunders,
2012) based on respect, integrity and tolerance. Multiculturalism as paradigm of plur-
alism (Henry, 2002) increases the likelihood of a successful integration. In contrast,
the melting pot policy leads to assimilation, marginalization or separation (Ghorbani,
2011).
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Support for Sharia across 39 Muslim Countries
Support for Sharia
(Percentage of Muslims who favor to make sharia the official law in the coun-
try)





Higher Support for Sharia where Islam is the officially favored Religion
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013
The data are important and have to be understood as background information, relat-
ing to the number of nationals seeking refuge in the Union and the percentage of
affiliation of certain nationalities with Islamic law. The paper will not focus on this
issue further, but the actual non-compliance with the rule of law, and Islamic law as
thought-impulse should be given here, referring to the integration task as challenge
for the European Union in the years to come. The consequences of a conflict of pro-
found interests between the sharia and the rule of law should not be underestimated.
Fig. X2
Annex X Support for Sharia across 39 Muslim Countries
155
Mutual Suspicion and Incrimination thwarting Impartiality
Missing will and failure of international endeavors to solve issues increased the diver-
gence of value systems between the Orient and the Occident. The Orient interprets
the Western demand for freedom and democracy in Arab countries as hidden en-
forcement of Western interests, like access to natural resources. Since the early 1980 s,
religion has constantly been displacing the development of a modern civil society by
commencing on common values on the basis of religious conviction. Both sides make
a bogeyman out of the counterpart. Not political interests but religious belief marks
the boundary along the longitudinal side where the conflicts are dealt with. Members
of other religions are murdered, not because of their belief primarily but due to their
belonging to a certain culture, creating a paradox situation. In the Western society,
Islam is seen as disruptive factor in the development of a global society, as Islamic
states and Islam in general are equated with a lacking ability to change. In contrast,
the Orient fears the Western submission in order to control and exploit mineral de-
posits. The situation is paradox and portrays the deep crisis of confidence whereby
the gap is increased by every religious minority searching refugee in the West. The
suspicion becomes obvious, as it is claimed the West had no interest in exporting
democracy but did so due to several other interests (Tilgner, 2006), which are not ex-
plained further.
Many Arab intellectuals see the elimination of e.g. Saddam Hussein as an attempt
to weaken the Arab world with the aim to access oil resources. The increased discrep-
ancy between ideological claims of the regime and the corruption, repression and in-
competence of authorities triggers the wish for codetermination supporting rule of
law and accountability of the respective rulers. The media fuels the created bogeyman
by limiting the reporting to a non-differentiated image of the oriental society, e.g.
Iran. Despite its complexity, Iran is portrayed as center of radical Shia Islamism. The
possibilities to engage in a dialogue are limited, as the imposed perception removes




Performance of Right-Wing Populist Parties in European Parliamentary
Election
The following figure provides an additional graphical overview of the performance of
right-wing populist parties in European Parliamentary Elections with voting share in
percentage.
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